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Why This Book?
You have probably heard Reinhold Niebuhr’s serenity prayer in some 
version or other: ‘God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I 
cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom 
to know the difference.’ It’s clever and touching, but there is a bit of a 
false dichotomy. There is often very little we can do to make changes to 
the world, and yet we do not just simply sit back and accept. There is 
something in the space between courage and serenity. We try to cope 
and there are a range of strategies to make the world around us easier to 
bear and, dare I say, even enjoyable. 
I cover six themes: hope, death, love, reconciliation, self-management, and 
counsel. Clinging to hope is one way to cope. Hoping for better times keeps 
us in the game. And even in the face of death, hope does not dissipate 
and comes in many hues. From the end of life, we move to the springs 
of life, and give some thought to love in its many variants and with all its 
trials and tribulations. When there are breakdowns in the social fabric, 
we need rituals of reconciliation—offering and accepting apologies and 
asking for and granting forgiveness. To make life more palatable, we can 
also focus on making changes within ourselves. These are strategies of 
self-management. And to conclude, there are all kinds of counsel on offer, 
aiming to boost our spirits and make life more joyful. Let us look at each 
of these themes in turn. 
Hope. What is it to hope for something? A core feature of hope is that 
the prospect engages our imagination. Should we give free rein to hope? 
Emily Dickinson, in her poems ‘Hope is the thing with feathers’ and 
‘Hope is a subtle glutton,’ was of two minds. When is it a thing with 
feathers—or, in other words, when is it wise to hope? When is it foolish 
to hope—when should we banish that subtle glutton? Can we only hope 
for things that we truly want? Or might we sometimes find ourselves 
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with shameful and petty hopes that do not match our genuine desires? 
There are many attitudes in hope’s neighborhood: How is hoping 
different from, say, being hopeful? And finally, what’s with the audacity 
of hope in the title of Barack Obama’s book? What is so audacious about 
hoping? 
Death. What is there to hope for when the grim reaper knocks, and 
there is no telling him to come back later? Some religious people hope 
that with the closing of our earthly life, a door opens for a new life to 
come. But there are also distinctly secular hopes in the face of death. 
One might hope that one’s life was worthwhile. But what makes life 
worthwhile—is it a mode of living, is it about having made a mark and, 
if so, what kind of mark? One might hope to die well, but what makes 
for a good death? One might hope to be missed by loved ones. But why 
would one wish the pain of loss and grief upon them? And we may have 
hopes for a posthumous future, but why would we care about a future 
in which we are no more? 
Love. ‘What is this thing called love?’ the Cole Porter song asks. There is 
the curious feature of love’s constancy—its unwillingness to trade up for 
new partners, and its endurance in the face of change. There are three 
grand old models of love: Socrates’ eros model, St. Paul’s agape model, 
and Aristophanes’ fusion model. How do these models account for love’s 
constancy? These are all models of love that portray it as the kind of 
thing that is worth having. In contrast, there are cynical models of love, 
which are the mirror images of their venerable cousins. What can this 
array of models of love tell us about the flipside of constancy—about 
the heartache when love fades? How do we cope with love lost on the 
eros, the agape, and the fusion models, and what kind of cure do cynical 
models have in store? 
Reconciliation. Social life can drag us down. It carries the yoke of the past, 
and what is done cannot be undone. This leads to the curious practices of 
apologizing and forgiving. A genuine apology requires acknowledging 
our wrongdoing, feeling remorse and empathy, resolving to change 
our ways, and doing all this in a humble manner. Each of these 
components raises a gamut of questions. What distinguishes apologies 
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from saying that we are sorry about what happened? Can we apologize 
while standing by what we did, as Zidane did in an interview after he 
head-butted Materazzi in the 2006 World Cup final? Is there too much 
apologizing going on in today’s world? Can we accept apologies without 
forgiving? Can we forgive without accepting apologies? And finally, 
what determines the proper measure of amends that should accompany 
an apology? 
Self-Management. Sometimes it is no use trying to change the world since, 
try as we may, the world won’t change. It is the wrong place to engage 
the will. So why not engage the will where there is less resistance? Can 
we set out to desire what we can get rather than what we cannot get? Can 
we set out to frame things so that they seem more palatable? Pretense is 
a tried and proven recipe: Fake it until you make it! But there are certain 
attitudes, such as self-forgetfulness and spontaneity, that are hard to 
cultivate. Can we set out to believe what we would like to be true? This 
seems more problematic. Isn’t that wishful thinking or self-deception? 
But what could be wrong with talking ourselves into believing that we 
will succeed, even against the odds? 
Counsel. I confess: This chapter is a bit of a cheat. By the time we get 
there, we will have discussed many types of counsels that help us cope. 
But there are a few additional ones that intrigue me. Here we go. First: 
Be grateful! This counsel is much broader than just being grateful to 
someone who did you a special favor. What should we be grateful for 
in life, and how does gratitude compare in a religious and a secular 
worldview? Second: Help your neighbor! What is so uplifting about 
helping in a local soup kitchen? Why is helping others a recipe to forget 
about our own troubles? Third: Don’t cry over spilled milk! What is the 
difference between regret and disappointment? What can be said to 
dispel regret, and to dispel disappointment? Fourth: Express yourself! 
How can doing art offer clarity and relief? Why might keeping a diary 
help us with our troubles? And finally: Eat judiciously! That somber 
mood is doubtlessly due to too much gluten! But why might attention 
to diet be therapeutic? What is the causal route from dietary constraints 
to a better life? 
4 Coping
When young adults leave home to go to college, life throws a host of 
new challenges at them. Philosophy curricula try to include courses 
that reflect on life’s challenges and on how to cope with them. There is 
a recent move toward courses with titles like ‘Resilience,’ ‘Philosophy 
of Life,’ or ‘The Big Questions.’ Also, moral philosophy and moral 
psychology courses have come to include such reflection. There are 
many ways to use the material in this book in such courses.
The chapters are self-contained which makes it easy to integrate 
them in a broader syllabus. Or one could build a whole course around 
the book. A slower-paced way of doing this is to split up each chapter 
over two weeks. I have included discussion questions for each chapter. 
In a faster-paced course, one could read a chapter one week and then 
complement it with the suggested additional materials the next week. I 
selected materials that are accessible and invite philosophical reflection 
and discussion. With these materials, the book could also function as a 
textbook for philosophy and literature or philosophy and film courses. 
Each topic is addressed in a series of short essays that are written with 
an eye to classroom discussion. My focus is on philosophical puzzles. 
These puzzles are found in ordinary life, in poetry and literature, and 
in current social problems. I draw on the complexity of our lives and 
muddle through various considerations that pull in different directions 
when dealing with the puzzles in question. So, if coping is a bit of 
muddling through, then this book is a philosophical muddling through 
how we muddle through life’s challenges. 
This is not a self-help book. Coping strategies tend to work best in the 
dark. Thinking too hard about them makes them less effective. It’s like 
doing high-fives. You should focus not on the other person’s hand but 
on their elbow. The philosopher describes the hands meeting in mid-
air and creating vibrations—there is your clap. But don’t think about 
philosophy when you are trying to get a nice, clean clap. Look at the 
elbows instead. Only listen to the philosopher if you are curious to know 
what is really happening. Philosophers are not therapists. Therapists 
heal. Philosophers edify. Granted, the two are not mutually exclusive: 
They may cross-fertilize—healing may bring edification in its wake and 
vice versa. But their primary purpose is different. 
I have tried to shun philosophical jargon and make the writing 
accessible to students who are new to philosophy. This is not an academic 
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book with footnotes and references documenting that so-and-so said 
this-and-that. Many of the ideas in this book can be found in a more 
academic format in my earlier published work. 
Chapter 1 draws on ‘The Value of Hope’ (Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 59(3), 1999). Chapter 2 can be traced to 
‘Secular Hopes in the Face of Death’ (in Rochelle Green (ed.), Theories 
of Hope: Exploring Alternative Affective Dimensions of Human Experience, 
London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018). A shorter version of Chapter 3 
can be found in ‘What Is This Thing Called Love?’ (in Adrienne Martin 
(ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 
2019). Chapter 4 is based on ideas from ‘Apologies’ (Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 108(1), 2008) and ‘Must I Be Forgiven?’ (Analysis, 
69(2), 2009). Chapter 5 combines ideas from ‘Sour Grapes and Character 
Planning’ (Journal of Philosophy, 89(2), 1992) and ‘The Intentional 
Acquisition of Mental States’ (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
55(4), 1995). ‘Don’t Cry over Spilled Milk’ in Chapter 6 is a popular 
rendering of ‘The meaning of “darn it!”’ written jointly with Wlodek 
Rabinowicz (in Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and 
Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
I have only put in links to materials that are in the public domain. The 
links are highlighted in the HTML, epub, azw3, and XML digital editions 
and formats, are live but not highlighted in the screen PDF format, and 
a section with links is included for hardcopy readers. These materials 
often do not contain page numbers, but with the ‘Find’ command and 
the quoted text, it should be easy to find the right passage. For materials 
that are not in the public domain, I provide enough identifying 
information to find them through the library or somewhere on the web, 
depending on one’s level of access.

1. Hope
What Is Hope? 
Leonardo Da Vinci had the habit of buying captive birds just to set them 
free. In the Codex Atlanticus, there are multiple drawings of a caged bird 
with an inscription in Da Vinci’s trademark mirror writing: ‘I pensieri 
si voltano alla speranza’ [The thoughts turn toward hope.] For Da Vinci, 
setting a bird free was a symbol of hope. 
So let our thoughts turn toward hope. We start with the nature of 
hope: What is it to hope for something? Here is my proposal. Hoping 
for something is wanting it to be so, believing that it might or might not be 
so, and engaging in mental imagery about what it would be like if it were 
so. You need all three—that is, the desire, the belief, and the mental 
imagery—to be hoping, and if you have all three in place, then you are 
indeed hoping. Let us look at each in turn. 
We hope for what we desire. We can’t hope for something and at the same 
time have no desire for it. Sometimes hopes don’t follow what, all in all, 
we want. Part of me wants to have an ice cream, and part of me doesn’t. 
In as much as the ice cream is yummy, I want it, and in as much as it has 
a gazillion calories, I want to stay away from it. Now, all in all, I want to 
hold off. But I must admit, I do secretly hope that the ice cream van will 
come by and that I will succumb to temptation. 
Hopes may even be divided and follow conflicting desires. I want my 
child to get an MBA and continue the family business. But I also want 
them to be happy, and I know that their true aspiration is to become 
an artist. We can hope to eat our cake and, at the same time, hope to 
continue having it. We can’t have it both ways, but there is no harm 
in cherishing conflicting hopes. Such hopes only become problematic 
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when they compel us to act in inconsistent ways. However, so long as 
our actions are in line with what, all in all, we want, there is nothing 
untoward about conflicting hopes.
We hope for what we believe might or might not be so. I can hope for what I 
think is likely—for example, that I will make it home safely tonight—as 
well as for what I think is unlikely—for example, that I will win the 
lottery this week. But there is no hope in the face of certainty. If I am 
certain that my friend will come for a visit, I can look forward to it, but I 
can’t hope for it. If I am certain that my friend will not come, then I can 
regret it, but I can’t hope for it. 
Hope need not be about the future. If a fellow soldier was killed 
behind enemy lines, I may hope that they were not tortured. So long as 
I believe that they might or might not have been tortured, my hopes can 
be engaged. If I’m uncertain about the past, I can just as much hope for 
some past event as for some future event. 
When we hope for something, we entertain mental imagery about what it 
would be like. You are a Lana Del Rey fan, and you have never seen her 
perform live. You would like it if she were to come to a venue near you 
and you would certainly go. You haven’t checked her touring schedule 
but considering that you live in a reasonably sized town, it may happen. 
However, the whole thing hardly crosses your mind. Are you hoping 
that she will come? I don’t think so. It’s not enough to want her to come 
and to believe that it might happen. In addition, you need to devote 
some mental energy to it. You have to spend some time cherishing the 
idea of what it would be like if it were to happen. What songs would 
she sing? With whom would you go to the concert? What would the 
stage look like? What would the audience be like? For short, I’ll call it 
‘mental imaging’—the mental act of letting the prospect roll (or bounce, 
depending on one’s personality) around in one’s head. 
There are other terms that capture this third component of hope, 
but they all fall somewhat short. ‘Fancying’ is too close to desiring. 
‘Fantasizing’ has too much of a ring of the unreal. ‘Daydreaming’ 
comes close, but it is too spacey. ‘Envisioning what something would 
be like’ is a bit too intellectual. But if you like these terms better, that’s 
fine with me. 
 91. Hope
The mental imaging of hope has a vague association with Aristotle. 
There are greetings cards and even tattoos with the saying ‘”Hope is a 
waking dream.” Aristotle’ But admittedly, the reference to Aristotle is 
only second-hand and goes back to Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers, written over five centuries after Aristotle’s death. In his 
biography of Aristotle, he writes: ‘[Aristotle] was asked to define hope, 
and he replied, “It is a waking dream.”’
It is easiest to motivate mental imaging when it comes to hoping 
for wonderful things. But we also hope that bad things won’t come to 
pass. A soldier captured behind enemy line hopes that they will not be 
tortured. A parent hopes that there is no blow-up between siblings at 
a family reunion. What kind of mental imaging is there in such cases? 
Think of something that you fear and how you might dream that all 
will go well. In your dreams you lay out a path on which the dreaded 
event does not happen. Someone who hopes that all will go well does 
something akin to this while being awake. What goes around in their 
head are ways that the story might unfold smoothly without their fears 
coming to pass.
The Thing with Feathers
‘Hope is the thing with feathers/ That perches in the soul,’ writes Emily 
Dickinson. But what is so good about hope? Might one not equally say 
that if good things are to come our way, let them come as they may, and 
let’s enjoy them then and there. What additional benefit is gained from 
hoping for those good things to come, a skeptic might ask. 
Many of the benefits of hoping hinge on mental imaging. Mental 
imagery provides respite in trying times, adds to our resolve, uncovers 
new pathways, and makes room for reflection. Below, I will also show how 
hoping provides the courage to take on responsible risks and how it 
fosters inner strength. 
Respite. There is a simple answer to why hoping is a good thing a few 
lines down in Dickinson’s poem. She likens hope to a bird that keeps us 
warm and is not fazed by the gale winds of the storm around us. When 
we close the doors to the outside world, we can enjoy the pleasures of 
how sweet it would be to have what we want. Mental imagery is shelter 
10 Coping
from the storm. There is joy in indulging our senses in the theatre 
of the mind. It may not be the real thing—it is ‘the tune without the 
words,’ says Dickinson—but even without the words, the tune offers the 
strength to carry on. 
When Pooh Bear is asked what he likes best in this world, he is 
stumped for an answer: ‘Because although Eating Honey was a very 
good thing to do,’ A. A. Milne writes in The House at Pooh Corner, ‘there 
was a moment just before you began to eat it which was better than 
when you were, but he didn’t know what it was called.’ And though 
Pooh Bear (a bear of very little brain) lacks in vocabulary, he does not 
lack in wisdom. Indeed, the pleasures of anticipation may exceed the 
pleasures of experience. 
Hoping differs from anticipation, though. We anticipate when we 
are confident that good things are to come, whereas in hoping we ‘dwell 
in Possibility’—another Dickinson line. But the pleasure of hoping is 
somewhat like the pleasure of anticipation in that both involve mental 
imaging. The only difference is this: In anticipation, we imagine how 
wonderful things will be when we get what we want. In hoping, we 
imagine how wonderful things would be if we were to get what we 
want. And while enjoying this moment of respite, batteries recharge for 
the challenges ahead. 
Resolve. Mental imaging of what is hoped for is keeping one’s eyes on 
the prize. It is this focus that provides resolve, the motivation to persist. 
Admittedly, there is not only the carrot—there is also the stick. The 
carrot is the prize of success, while the stick is the cost of failure. Hope’s 
companion is fear, and fear involves mental imagery of the stick. Fear 
also has motivational force. Some people do better with carrots; some 
people do better with sticks. 
Most of us need some balance between hope and fear. Too much hope 
can make us drunk—we may wallow in the thought of how wonderful it 
all will be and forget that there are some necessary hurdles to overcome. 
Too much fear can make us despair. Despair is paralyzing and prevents 
us from taking the required steps. But the proper balance of hope and 
fear, adapted to the case at hand and sensitive to what works for each of 
us, is what offers the best chances of success. 
 111. Hope
Pathways. Mental imaging tends to spill over into exploring the pathways 
that could get us to where we want to be. Where might there be a feasible 
route? And what are the steps to be taken? Hoping is an antidote to 
resigning oneself to the status quo, and it engages us to creatively explore 
better ways forward. This is the hope of the civil rights movement and, 
more recently, of the Obama campaign. It is the hope that, in the words 
of Martin Luther King, ‘transforms [a] liability into an asset’ (‘Shattered 
Dreams’).
Reflection. Mental imaging not only explores pathways toward the 
destination but also focuses on the destination itself. We cherish 
daydreaming about what it would be like if we were to have what we 
want. But wants are fluid. If I want ice cream and I realize that there is 
none, I may just shift to cherry pie. I wanted ice cream because I wanted 
something sweet, and cherry pie would do just as well. Mental imaging 
coaxes us to explore the space of possibilities. If what was initially hoped 
for is not accessible, then are there any substitutes that would do just as 
well considering my larger aims?
Here is an example with a bit more substance. A journalist may hope 
to receive a Pulitzer Prize because they take it to be a mark of recognition, 
and they may hope for recognition because they take it to be constitutive 
of a rewarding professional life. Now hoping can be illuminating in that 
it invites one to reflect on and rearrange one’s values. Our journalist 
examines what it is they want in life and why it is that they want it. 
They may come to realize that a Pulitzer is not so necessary after all. 
There are other and better ways to gain recognition than by winning a 
Pulitzer. Or, more deeply, there are other and better ways to improve 
their professional life than by striving for recognition. They may become 
more service-oriented and intend for their journalistic contributions to 
make a difference. It is through mental imaging they come to see what 
they really want out of life, what is attainable, and what they are capable 
of. The mental imaging of hope stirs up reflection and recalibrates 
desires, leading to a richer life and greater want satisfaction. 
Hoping is unlikely to bring all these benefits at the same time. If I hope 
for past events, then there is no need to strengthen resolve or figure out 
a pathway since there is nothing I can do about the past. Respite and 
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reflection may be absent from our hopes as well. It is not guaranteed 
that we will find respite in hope—there are shameful hopes that reveal 
the darker side of ourselves, as we will discuss later. Nor can we always 
count on shifting our values through reflection—wants may be both 
specific and rigid so that mulling over them has little effect.
Hope’s ‘feathers’ are all contingent on circumstances. They are 
sufficiently prevalent that they are worth mentioning as typical benefits 
of hoping. And given that they are typical benefits, they are good 
reasons to try to foster hope in ourselves and the loved ones in our care. 
But they are not essential to hope. Hoping remains hoping, even if it 
comes without the benefits that it typically provides. 
 A Winning Strategy
In Matthew’s ‘Parable of the Talents’ (Matt 25:14–30), a master gives 
five coins to one servant, two coins to the second, and one coin to the 
third. The first two servants invest and double their coins, whereas the 
third plays it safe and buries the one coin and returns it on the day of 
his master’s return. The master praises the first two but scolds the third 
servant. 
This is a curious parable since it seems to encourage risk-taking. One 
feels for the servant who dutifully returns the one coin. Should he not be 
rewarded for playing it safe? Was it not the prudent thing to do to avoid 
risk and to make sure that he could return the one coin? 
There are good and bad gambles in life. A good gamble is a good 
deal— considering the chances and what there is to lose or win. We 
should embrace it. Sure, there is a chance of losing, but it is the hope for 
gain that provides the courage to take up a good gamble. I am not making 
any claims to Bible exegesis, but here is one way to read the parable: 
Investing the master’s coins is like taking up a good gamble, whereas 
burying them is like turning it down. There is nothing imprudent about 
taking up such gambles. Though one may lose sometimes, in the long 
run a disposition of taking up good gambles pays off.
Real life is full of risks, and risks can take many forms. There is 
choosing a career, committing to a relationship, engaging in friendships, 
buying a house, saving for retirement. If you are reasonably confident 
that you can identify the good gambles, then you should embrace them, 
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one after another. You may lose a few, but you can be confident that, in 
the long run you will do much better than if you are too scared to play. 
Why are people scared to embrace risk when they are facing a 
single good gamble? Because they take a short-term perspective. They 
succumb to myopia and become fixated on the possible losses of each 
gamble separately. This fixation has a high opportunity cost: It leaves us 
in a worse place than we would have been if we had persistently taken 
one good gamble after another. 
Here is where hope comes in. It makes us focus on the possible gains 
in good gambles and helps overcome our myopic fixation on the possible 
losses. And hence one will adopt the winning strategy of accepting good 
gambles in the game of life at large. 
The Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Samuelson relates an 
intriguing story (Scientia, 1963) that illustrates this idea. Samuelson is 
out with a few colleagues for dinner and proposes the following gamble 
with a fair coin. If heads, he commits to paying the gambler $200, whereas 
if tails, the gambler commits to paying him $100. One colleague, whom 
he calls ‘a distinguished scholar,’ says that he is willing to take up the 
gamble, but only if he can play the game one hundred times. 
The motivation behind this response is clear. By accepting the single 
gamble, one has a fifty-fifty chance of losing money. By accepting a 
series of one hundred gambles, one has a negligible chance of losing 
money and a big chance of winning money, even a substantial amount 
of money, by the end of the evening. (To lose money, one would have to 
lose 67 times or more, and the chance of such a losing streak is less than 
1 in 2000.) 
We might think that gambling with colleagues might strain 
friendships. We might have a dislike of gambling. But let us abstract 
from all that and focus on the risks and the payoffs. I think that most 
of us would agree to playing a series of one hundred gambles, just as 
Samuelson’s colleague did. But many of us would be hesitant to accept 
a single such gamble. Is it rational to accept the series, but not the single 
gamble? 
If the colleague is acutely short of money, we can well understand 
why he would not want to agree to the single gamble. In this case, the 
gamble is a bad gamble. What can be won is $200, but what can be lost 
is not just $100, but, say, $100 and the humiliation of washing dishes all 
night. 
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If he is not acutely short of money, then it is a good gamble. There 
is a 50 percent chance of gaining $200 and a 50 percent chance of losing 
$100. So, on average, one might expect a net gain of $50, that is, 0.50 
times $200 minus 0.50 times $100. Good gambles are gambles with 
positive expectations. We should embrace good gambles, even in the 
one-off case. And hoping that things will go well can help us do this. 
If Samuelson’s story did not convince you of this, here is another 
way to put it— without the numbers. Hope is what helps with smart 
risk-taking, and smart risk-takers tend to do well in life. An evolutionary 
biologist might put it as follows: Nature selects in favor of those who 
have hope written in their genes. 
But then what about fear? What fear is good for is that it makes us 
focus on the possible losses. It helps us overcome a myopic fixation on 
the potential gains in bad gambles. A resolution to decline bad gambles 
is also a winning strategy in the game of life at large. You may win an 
occasional one, but in the long run embracing gambles with negative 
expectations will make you a loser. Many problem gamblers have had to 
learn this lesson the hard way. 
While hope is an antidote to risk aversion that keeps us from taking 
up good gambles, fear is an antidote to risk proneness that makes us all 
too eager to take up bad gambles. The proper balance of hope and fear 
is instrumental in regulating risk-taking behavior in life. 
In Matthew’s parable, the master not only blames the servant for 
cowardice but also for sloth in refusing to take up a good gamble. 
Cowardice is what keeps the servant from taking up the risky 
opportunity. And by not taking up the opportunity, he need not take 
any initiative, catering to his sloth. Hope offers a mirror image. It gives 
us the courage to take up the risky opportunity. This is what we learned 
from Samuelson’s gamble. In addition, it provides the drive to make the 
investment pay off.
A Subtle Glutton
‘Hope is a subtle glutton; He feeds upon the fair,’ Dickinson writes at a 
later age and in a more somber mood. So far, we have sung the praises of 
hope. However, there are some distinctly darker sides to hope. Hope can 
lead to complacency, may leave us frustrated, needlessly raises expectations, 
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ruins the prospect of surprise, can carry wishful thinking in its wake, and 
may spawn obsession.
Complacency. Granted, hope may provide respite, but respite can be 
dangerous. In Dickinson’s poem, hope is seated at ‘the halcyon table’—
an idyllic place—but there is abstinence and solitude. While we are 
enjoying the respite, we suppress the need to make changes. Hope 
makes the abstinence and solitude bearable, and yet life passes us by. 
Without the comfort of hope, we would have rebelled and maybe made 
the changes that needed making. ‘[Religion] is the opium of the people,’ 
Marx famously writes in the introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right. One could make the same claim about hope. Hope 
makes the ache of yearning bearable, and so long as it is bearable, we 
do not seek change. So long as the peasants continue hoping that next 
year’s harvest will be better, they won’t revolt. 
Hoping can be plain foolishness. Hoping that your partner will quit 
drinking keeps you from leaving them. Hoping that an estranged lover 
will come back stops you from searching for new love. Hoping that 
a skin abnormality is just an innocent blotch keeps you from getting 
checked for skin cancer. And the list goes on. When the situation calls 
for asking scary questions or taking radical steps, the hope that there is 
a simple way out stops us from doing what needs doing. 
Frustration. There is the frustration of unfulfilled hopes. What we fear is 
the hangover from hoping. We do not dare to hope—better to let things 
be, let life unfold, and enjoy it as it comes. Granted, without hoping, 
there can also be frustration—simply because we did not get what we 
wanted. But it is hope’s imagery of how wonderful things would be that 
makes not getting what we want more painful. With unfulfilled hopes, 
there are broken dreams. 
Hume, in A Treatise of Human Nature (Bk III, Part III, Sect. II) writes: 
‘Men generally fix their affections more on what they are possessed of, 
than on what they never enjoyed.’ This is what behavioral scientists call 
the ‘endowment effect’: It is worse to have something taken from us 
than for it never to have been given at all. In the case of hope, what we 
want has not been given yet. But we did have something that resembled 
it—the mental imagery that we once cherished. And having that taken 
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away from us registers as a loss. A kind of shadow endowment effect 
explains why hoping increases our sense of frustration. One might say: 
‘People fix their affections more on that of which they have formed a 
mental image, than on that of which they have never formed such a 
mental image.’ 
Raised Expectations. Hoping involves forming a picture of how wonderful 
things will be. We fill in the details like a prospective bride or groom 
fill in the fine details of their wedding day. And then, when the time 
comes, things may just not be quite the way we had hoped them to be. 
They were nice alright, but not quite what we had hoped for. Had we 
not hoped, then we would have enjoyed every bit of it. But after all the 
hoping we did, reality let us down. The actual experience did not live up 
to our hopes; it was blander, less verdant, just a bit more ordinary than 
the fairy tale we had pictured it to be. 
Loss of Surprise. If hoping is such a good thing, then what is so great 
about surprises? Why would we ever want to surprise someone if 
we could tell them beforehand of the wonderful things that might 
happen? Then they could have the pleasure of hoping for it and, on 
top of that, the pleasure of experiencing it. But this is not how the 
calculus of joy works. If you have been hoping for that birthday party, 
then you can still enjoy it when it comes, but you won’t have that burst 
of joy that comes when you see the surprise guests gathered in your 
living room. And we want some of this in life as well—a burst rather 
than a slow build-up. 
Wishful Thinking. What is the chance that I will win the lottery? That 
my love will be requited? Or that my cancer is curable? We should not 
kid ourselves and think that the chances are higher than the evidence 
dictates. To do so is wishful thinking. The danger of hoping is that the 
lure of wishful thinking becomes much more difficult to resist. This is 
not to say that it is impossible to hope while remaining sober-minded 
about the evidence. But just as it is harder to exercise self-control when 
the peanuts are within reach, it is harder to stick to the evidence and 
nothing but the evidence while hoping. But why would this be so? I 
have two suggestions. 
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Too much mental imagery may obscure the line between reality and 
fantasy. Consider how difficult it is to determine whether our images 
of early childhood events are real memories or false memories based 
on stories told to us at an older age. Similarly, the distinction between 
reality and the mental images we form in hoping is easily obfuscated. 
And in the absence of this distinction, our capacity to form beliefs based 
on the available evidence vanishes.
Hoping also affects our resolve, and, in many cases, this raises the 
chance that what we hope will come about. We mistakenly generalize 
this feature to hoping at large. Indeed, sometimes hoping makes things 
so—or, at least, it helps make things so. Hoping that I can jump the creek 
indeed increases my chances of success. But hoping that the sun will 
shine on next Sunday’s picnic does nothing to increase the chance of 
sunshine. Our mistake is to transfer the boost in the chance of success in 
cases when hope makes a difference to cases in which the most fervent 
hopes cannot make one jot of difference. 
Obsession. Hope, writes Dickinson, is ‘A Patent of the Heart.’ As such, it 
is scarcely under the control of the will. Our hopes often do not make 
much sense. The chances are too small. We may be fully cognizant that 
what we hope for would not make our lives any better. And, hoping may 
come to feel like thousands of little ping-pong balls ricocheting off the 
walls of our cranial cavity. Hope may wear us out. It may make demands 
on our mental life that make it impossible to attend to our affairs. And 
we may catch ourselves obsessively hoping for trifles at the expense of 
being properly affected by what is genuinely important in life. 
Hope and fear can be instrumental in helping us plot the route ahead. 
But fear can become a phobia that barely tracks harm, and it can turn 
into paralyzing despair. Similarly, hope can become a philia, in the sense 
of an unhealthy attraction, that fails to track benefits and can become so 
overwhelming that it blocks normal functioning. 
Mind you, hope does not need to be costly. Some people manage to 
hope scot-free. Much depends on one’s character and situation. If there 
are no radical changes to be made, then the concern that hope induces 
complacency is misplaced. Some people have a strong frustration 
tolerance and shrug off their losses. They say: ‘At least, I had something 
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to hope for.’ Throughout hoping, one may retain a keen sense of reality 
and accurately assess chances. And many people can hope without 
any risk of hope slipping into obsession. Like the benefits, the costs of 
hoping are contingent—they do not define hoping. 
We often don’t know whether hoping will pay off or cost us dearly. 
Hoping itself is a gamble—much may be gained, yet much may be lost. 
Doing a risk analysis is murky, and we are in for the unexpected. But no 
matter, since hope is patented by the heart, we often have little control 
over it anyway. Our mode and measure of hoping is deeply engrained in 
our psychology. We find ourselves hoping for some things or failing to 
hope for others. We can try to hope or not to hope. We can encourage or 
discourage it in the young or in loved ones. But we are, at least to some 
extent, at hope’s mercy. 
Shameful Hopes
A few years ago, I was doing a rough stint of administration with an 
agenda chockful of appointments. My responsibilities were going 
to come to an end soon, and I was looking forward to a period of 
uninterrupted writing during a sabbatical. I had envisioned renting 
a cabin in the Montana wilderness with the change of seasons as a 
backdrop for my routine. I heard Greta Garbo’s voice in my head saying 
‘I want to be alone.’ Then, as luck would have it, one of my colleagues 
suggested that I apply for a fellowship at a prestigious university—
there would be interesting seminars, discussions, a social context. It 
made a lot of sense—a lot more sense than the hare-brained Montana 
idea. Montana would be fun for a few hours, possibly days, and then 
the intellectual solitude would drive me crazy. The fellowship would be 
both fun, interesting, and productive. The choice was easy—I applied 
for the fellowship. 
However, whenever I thought about the time ahead, all I could do 
was envision myself writing by a woodstove snowed in, in my Montana 
cabin. A fit-to-purpose office on a university campus in a large city, the 
philosophical discussions in seminar rooms, or any of the pleasures 
and privileges that the fellowship would provide had no draw on my 
imagination whatsoever. When I was awarded the fellowship, my heart 
sank just a tiny little bit. And yet, there was no choice. I accepted the 
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offer the day I received it and un-bookmarked the website of Montana 
cabin rentals. Certainly, I did the right thing and had a wonderful and 
productive time. 
I write these words with a sense of shame, especially to the 
institution that hosted my fellowship. But I trust they will forgive me 
since I am trying to make a philosophical point. Part of me wanted to 
go to Montana. Part of me wanted to take up a fellowship. Both were 
distinct possibilities. On balance, there was no question—the Montana 
desire was ill-considered, especially given the alternative. And this was 
so, not just for professional reasons, but also considering what would 
be conducive to my happiness, however conceived. And yet, only the 
Montana desire gained entrance to my mental imagery. 
What was I hoping for? To rent a cabin in Montana or to take up 
a fellowship? After I had applied for the fellowship but before being 
awarded it, I would have said that I hoped to rent a cabin in Montana, 
but I knew that it made little sense. Hope may track what part of us 
wants and it is not necessarily the part that puts the most weight on the 
scale. Hoping does not require that we endorse or validate what part of 
us wants. I, for one, certainly find myself hoping for things that hardly 
make any sense. I may not scream it from the rooftops, but there is no 
denying it: I was hoping to spend my sabbatical in a cabin in Montana. 
Things can get much more tragic. It’s not just hare-brained desires 
that spill over into full-fledged hoping, but also desires that are blocked 
by morality and social taboos. The Japanese author Minae Mizumura 
recently published a serial novel, The Inheritance of Mother, in which she 
talks about the hardships of a daughter caring for an aging and ailing 
mother. This is a duty that is very much part of Japanese mores. And 
yet, the seemingly unending day-to-day demands impose such a strain 
on the caregiver’s life that it becomes undeniable that at least part of her 
wants the end to be near. 
The novel is partly autobiographical, and Mizumura documents 
sitting at the bedside of her ailing mother while writing the book as 
a serial novel for a Japanese newspaper. The words ‘Mom, when are 
you ever going to die?’ became a subtitle for the original publication of 
the novel. ‘These blunt words […] echoed my thoughts at the time,’ she 
writes in a New York Times (9 May 2014) opinion piece entitled ‘Please, 
Mother, Enough.’ Is she hoping for her mother to die earlier rather than 
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later? Clearly, she takes this to be a possibility yet not a certainty, part of 
her wants it, and she engages in the mental imagery of a life free from 
the burdens of taking care of her ailing mother. 
One might object that she hopes for a life free of care giving earlier 
rather than later, but she does not hope for her mother to die. But a life 
free of care giving is so close to a life in which her mother has passed 
away, that it would seem disingenuous to say that she hopes for one 
thing without hoping for the other. The image of her being free from 
care giving is an image of a world in which her mother is no more. All in 
all, it may not be what she wants—it may only be what part of her wants. 
But it is the part that occupies her imagination. And as such it is like my 
mental imagery of a cabin in Montana. Hence, it’s reasonable to say that 
the daughter is hoping for her mother to die, much like I was hoping to 
spend my sabbatical in a cabin in Montana. 
Shameful hopes can also be a kind of anticipatory Schadenfreude. We 
secretly hope that others, even loved ones, will fail in their endeavors 
or that bad luck will befall them. Those dark desires are fed by various 
springs. The failure or bad luck would make us look better in comparison. 
It would give us a role as a confidant. It would feed our sense of self-
importance. It would give us a story to tell in company. It would provide 
us with an opportunity for caretaking, offering meaning to our lives. 
The springs of darkness are all around us. 
This is the reason why people sometimes reject expressions of 
support or alleged sympathy. They distrust the offer. They feel that they 
are being used to satisfy others’ secret hopes, however well-intentioned 
the support may seem, even to the person who is lending a hand. 
There is a Jewish story about a farmer who comes to the rabbi asking 
for advice about what to do with his sick goat. The rabbi admonishes 
him to take the goat in the house, have the goat eat at the dinner table 
and sleep in his bed. When the goat finally dies, the rabbi says: ‘That is 
so unfortunate because I still had so much good advice to give to you.’ 
The rabbi is taking the farmer for a ride. But even if the advice had 
been useful, there is something suspect about the rabbi’s interventions. 
The rabbi wants the goat to remain sick so that he can continue 
dispensing good advice. And this can become a shameful hope. It is 
the hope of a support person who wants, or at least part of them wants, 
their role to persist. This desire may not outweigh the concurrent desire 
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that the problem be resolved. But it may nonetheless take a front-row 
seat in mental imagery. 
Most of the time, we succeed in keeping our shameful hopes secret. 
But they may come out in an unguarded moment. This is what happens 
to the rabbi: Condolences are in order, but in speaking of what he deems 
to be unfortunate, he mentions the loss of his advisory role rather than 
the goat’s death. But what if we keep a close eye on our secret hopes and 
can lock them carefully within? Should we feel guilty about them? Are 
they not, after all, a mirror to the soul, and do they not bode ill of what 
lies within? 
Religions offer us a tool in the form of the supernatural to keep the 
responsibility for secret hopes at bay through the practice of prayer and 
the prohibition on curses. Praying and cursing are much more under the 
control of the will than hoping. If I find myself secretively hoping for my 
mother to die, for bad luck to befall loved ones, or for the goat to remain 
ill, then I can find at least some peace of mind in saying that I prayed for 
a good outcome or that I never cursed to steer fate toward dark turns. 
We declare praying and cursing to be the expression of what is in our 
souls, thereby keeping our secret hopes beyond reproach. 
In a secular context, there is a similar question about the permissibility 
of verbalizing secret hopes. There is a taboo against verbalizing a wish 
or a hope for one’s mother to die. It is one thing to harbor such a secret 
hope. But it seems heartless to freely verbalize it. And yet, Mizumura’s 
readers found catharsis in reading her novel and thanked her in a flood 
of letters. Her novel allowed them to accept their secret hopes, knowing 
that they were not alone. 
Neighborhood
There are many phenomena in the neighborhood of hoping. Earlier, 
we said that hoping is a bit of thinking possible; a bit of wanting, even 
though it may just be what part of us wants; and a bit of mentally tossing 
things around in one’s head. As we deviate from this model, we end 
up in the suburbs of hoping, and this is where we find many of hope’s 
cousins. Let us explore what happens when we wander away from 
hoping proper. 
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Could I hope for what I do not want? It is difficult to think of cases in which 
one hopes yet does not desire. Certainly, there are many cases in which 
we hope but it’s not for what, all in all, we want—as in when I was 
hoping for the solitude of a Montana cabin. But this is just to say that 
hopes may follow what part of us wants. 
There is the Christian injunction to pray for those who persecute us 
(Matt 5:44.) But we can pray while having no desire for the well-being 
of our tormentors. There is a space between praying and hoping. We can 
pray for what we hope for, but we need not hope for what we pray for. 
Prayer is in the neighborhood of hope, but it is distinct from hope. 
Could I hope for what I consider to be impossible? I can wish for what is 
impossible, but I cannot hope for it. And even if I consider something 
near impossible, I might say that I am not really hoping for it—it’s just 
a pipe dream. 
In love, the heart may still hope for what the mind already knows 
to be impossible. But in this case, I think that the mind is divided. One 
part of us continues to believe what we know to be impossible, even 
against all the evidence. Hope rides on the belief—running counter to 
all evidence—that love still might take a turn for the better. The other 
part of us sees the writing on the wall and knows that love has reached 
a dead end. We hope against hope: The love-struck part of us hopes, 
whereas the sober part knows that there is nothing to base this hope on. 
In politics, there are utopian hopes, such as the hope for world peace, 
though we know world peace to be virtually impossible. But world peace 
functions as a guiding ideal here. What we genuinely hope for is that 
there will be progress towards the ideal of world peace—and progress 
is, of course, something that might well happen. 
Could I hope for what I am certain will be the case? How about: I have such 
great hopes for the upcoming Olympics. Can’t I say this, even though I 
am fully confident that the Olympics will take place? 
Sure, but having great hopes for something is not the same thing 
as hoping for something to be the case. Having great hopes for the 
Olympics this year is not the same as hoping that the Olympics will take 
place this year. If I have great hopes for the Olympics, then I hope that 
some good things will happen in the Olympics, say, that my country will 
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win some medals. And I am neither certain that will happen, nor that it 
won’t happen. 
Could I continue to hope after suppressing my mental imagery? Sometimes 
we catch ourselves daydreaming, and we try to stop ourselves in our 
tracks. We tell ourselves that it’s not worth wasting our waking hours 
and will only lead to frustration. If we can’t stop the mental imagery, 
then we continue to hope, against our better judgment. If we can stop it, 
then what is left are stifled hopes. But stifled hopes are no longer hopes, 
just as stifled screams are no longer screams. 
Could I want something to be the case; think it possible, yet not certain; engage 
in mental imagery; and yet not be hoping? One might object that there is 
more to hoping than desiring, believing, and mental imagery—one 
should also have a positive frame and assume that things will turn out 
well. 
There is the maxim that an optimist says the glass is half full, whereas 
a pessimist says that it is half empty. Similarly, a person who is hopeful 
considers what is hoped for to be a genuine possibility. They say: ‘It’s 
unlikely, but, hey, it’s possible!’ They do not say: ‘Yeah, sure, it’s possible, 
but it’s so unlikely!’ Seeing the glass as half full rather than half empty 
is framing the situation in a rosy manner. 
Imagine that I am preparing for a garden party this weekend. 
Someone asks me what we will do if it rains. I respond that I am just 
going to assume that the weather will be fine. I have decided to go about 
my business on the supposition of blue skies. A hopeful person assumes 
that all shall be well, and this attitude is expressed in how they conduct 
themselves. 
So, the objection goes: Shouldn’t we build ‘framing things in a 
positive light’ and ‘assuming that all shall be well’ into our definition 
of hope? 
I don’t think so. Framing and assuming is what a hopeful person 
does. But there is a difference between hoping and being hopeful. Think 
about being by the bedside of a loved one who is seriously ill. At first, I 
may be hopeful—I entertain a positive frame of mind and assume that 
they will recover. But as worrisome test results come in, I may say: ‘I 
continue hoping, but I am no longer hopeful.’ I believe that recovery 
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is still possible, desire for it to happen, and let my mind drift to how 
wonderful it would be. However, I can no longer see things in a positive 
light or assume that things will be OK. And then, as death draws nearer 
and it becomes clear to me that recovery is just not possible anymore, I 
have to let go of hope as well. Hence, ‘framing’ and ‘assuming’ are part 
and parcel of being hopeful, not of hoping as such. 
Summing up, hoping has many cousins—praying, wishing, dreaming, 
being hopeful—but none are hope proper.
Inner Strength
Frank Darabont’s movie The Shawshank Redemption, based on Stephen 
King’s novella ‘Rita Hayworth and Shawshank Redemption: Hope 
Springs Eternal’ in Different Seasons, features a prison friendship between 
two inmates, Andy and Red. Andy and Red disagree on whether hope 
has any place in the dire circumstances they find themselves in. For Andy, 
hope is all there is to hang onto inside the prison walls—it is ‘something 
that they can’t get from you.’ For Red, it makes no sense at all—it ‘is a 
dangerous thing, hope can drive a man insane, has got no use on the 
inside.’ Red marvels at Andy’s capacity to continue hoping. ‘Andy,’ Red 
says, wore ‘his freedom like an invisible coat,’ which Red couldn’t do. 
What Andy brought from the outside was a ‘sense of his own worth,’ and 
he had ‘a kind of an inner light he carried around with him.’ 
One could just say that we know that there are pros and cons to 
hoping, and while Andy aims for the pros, Red heeds the cons. But what 
should we make of Red’s claim that something about Andy makes it 
possible for him to hope well? Or of Andy’s claim that hope itself is 
what fosters this something—’the something that they can’t get from 
you’?
What is this something? For now, let us simply call it ‘inner strength.’ 
Suppose that Andy is right: Hope fosters inner strength. But Red is right 
as well: We should only give in to hope if we already have this inner 
strength. But then one might ask: What is the good of hoping, if, to hope 
well, we already need to have the inner strength that it fosters? Let us 
think more carefully about this curious cycle that hope is caught in. 
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What are the inputs to hoping well? What aspects of inner strength 
do we need to hope well? Hoping well requires self-confidence: It 
requires the confidence that all will turn out well for oneself. This is 
what keeps our mental imagery sunny and bright, what stops our hopes 
from turning into despair. Hoping well requires self-control to stop our 
mental imagery from becoming obsessive. And it requires the ability to 
stay realistic and not give into self-deception. We respect others by not 
deceiving them and we respect ourselves by not deceiving ourselves. 
Hence, hoping well requires a form of self-respect.
What are the outputs of hoping well? What kind of inner strength 
does it foster? Hoping helps us in exploring new pathways to reach our 
goals. This reinforces our self-confidence—the confidence that we will 
find a way and succeed. Hope brings respite. This permits us to take a 
deep breath, find our bearings, and not get carried away by the urgency 
or the madness of a situation. And with a cool head comes the capacity 
for self-control. And, in hoping that good things will come to our loved 
ones, we consider them to be worth hoping for. In hoping that good 
things will come to us, we consider ourselves to be worth hoping for, 
worthy of respect. So, hope strengthens our sense of self-respect.
Frank Darabont cast the African American actor Morgan Freeman 
in the role of Red. In Stephen King’s novella Red is of Irish origin and 
from a poor part of town. In the movie Red’s Irishness only comes in as a 
joke. When Andy asks him why they call him Red, he responds: ‘Maybe 
it’s because I am Irish.’ Both in the novella and the movie, Red is from 
an underprivileged background with few opportunities. It is this lack 
of opportunities that makes hoping more of a mad endeavor, whereas 
Andy’s social background is an environment in which setbacks could be 
overcome and in which there is ample reason to hope. 
Self-confidence, self-control, and self-respect enter both as inputs and 
outputs of hoping well. But each of these aspects of inner strength gets 
a bit of a different spin when we spell them out as inputs or outputs of 
hope. Yet, they are all aspects of the same construct of inner strength. It 
is possible to have some aspects and lack others, yet they are intricately 
connected and correlated. If you have some aspects of inner strength, 
you are likely to have other aspects as well. 
Hence, inner strength through hoping seems to be subject to the 
Matthew Principle: ‘For whosoever has, to him shall be given.’ (Matt 
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13:12) And it sounds like the have-nots are doomed. They shouldn’t 
even try to hope, lest what little they have be taken from them.
In this respect, hope keeps company with many other good things 
in life. Think of meditation: I trust that meditating well can bring 
many good things to life such as stress reduction, concentration, self-
awareness, happiness, and acceptance, but if you lack those things to 
begin with, good luck with meditating well. The same cyclical model 
holds for many life-enhancing activities, such as reasoning, showing 
sympathy, or being a good friend or lover. What is gained by doing them 
well often corresponds to what is needed to do them well in the first 
place.
But things are not so dire. There are ways for the have-nots to break 
into these cycles. However anxious you may be, there are ways to get 
into meditation. Granted, we should take small steps and not expect to 
meditate like the Dalai Lama from day one. We can expect to spiral up: 
As we take these steps, we build up our strengths, which in turn enables 
us to meditate better, which in turn will further build up our strengths, 
and so on. 
And ditto with hope. We may lack the courage to hope. Hoping is 
not for us, we may think. Things will go wrong anyway. We will lose our 
bearings. It will drive us crazy. We don’t have the strength to hope. And 
yet, we should take that bold step of hoping no matter what. And once 
we are in the business of hoping, we can work up the strength that helps 
us carry on and attain what we never thought possible before. 
This move is at the core of Obama’s book title The Audacity of Hope. 
Doing something audacious is doing something one has no business 
doing—because it’s imprudent or because it’s not one’s place. So how 
could we be called upon to be so audacious as to hope? Well, at first, we 
may be like Red. Being from an impoverished Irish or Black background 
did not offer Red much reason for hope. His social world put too 
many roadblocks in place. Our situation in life may also be such that 
we lack the strength to hope well, fearing that hope will drag us into a 
downward spiral. We do not dare to hope. But then, it is through taking 
this audacious step toward hope that we come to find inner strength. 
And it is this inner strength that makes it possible for us to hope well—





Kant poses three perennial questions in The Critique of Pure Reason: ‘1. 
What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope?’ The last 
question is mainly a question of religion for Kant: Do I have any basis to 
hope for eternal life? 
Many people do not hold out any hope for eternal life. Why don’t 
they? After all, even if eternal life strikes them as unlikely, they could 
still hope for it, as one hopes to win the lottery. There is an obvious 
answer: they just attach no credibility to any talk about the supernatural. 
The prospect of eternal life is no more likely than the existence of wood 
nymphs and leprechauns for them. And one cannot hope for what one 
deems to be impossible.
But this is not the only ground why one might not hope for eternal 
life. When Einstein was asked whether he believed in immortality, 
he answered: ‘No. And one life is enough for me.’ (Walter Isaacson, 
Einstein: His Life and Universe, Ch. 17.) The ‘no’ part of Einstein’s answer 
is a statement of disbelief. But the ‘one life is enough’ part is different. 
Compare this with a more mundane exchange: ‘Do you think that 
there is more cake?’ ‘No. And one piece of cake is enough for me.’ The 
response signals that one simply has no desire for another piece of cake. 
And that’s how Einstein felt about eternal life.
Why might one not desire eternal life? One may have preferred not 
to have lived at all. So why would one want to live more, let alone into 
eternity? There is also a less morose attitude that could underlie not 
desiring eternal life. One may find beauty in the ephemeral, as one finds 
beauty in spring flowers. Life is good as it is, and making it last longer, 
let alone forever, would not make it any better.
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Furthermore, some people also refrain from hoping for eternal life 
because they feel that they have nothing to latch onto, and hoping 
requires, as we saw earlier, a kind of mental imaging—that is, our 
imagination should somehow be involved in hoping.
Alexa’s parents take her to the seaside every summer. She is hoping 
for summer to come—the prospect of building sand castles, going for a 
swim… One year they tell her that they are planning to go on a vacation 
to Switzerland the coming summer. She is confident that this will be 
fun, but she does not do much in the way of hoping that year. She has no 
idea what a vacation in the mountains will be like and hence it does not 
engage her imagination. Similarly, immortality is ‘so huge, so hopeless 
to conceive,’ writes Emily Dickinson. If visions of angelic choirs don’t do 
it for you, then there is no place for the imagination to go to.
So then, what is there to hope for at the end of life, if not eternal 
life? There are broadly four secular hopes to explore: We hope that our 
life was worthwhile, we hope to die well, we hope that the future will 
be good, and we hope that people will hold certain attitudes toward 
us when we are no more. All these hopes raise a host of philosophical 
questions. Those who do hope for eternal life should find these hopes 
of interest as well, since the hope for eternal life may coexist and be 
interwoven with secular hopes.
A Worthwhile Life
I was talking to a friend who is a retired medical doctor and now spends 
his days in archives doing genealogy. The only thing in life that he was 
genuinely proud of, he told me, was having uncovered his family tree. 
Having this to his name gives him a sense of satisfaction. Genealogy never 
engaged me much, but I have always felt envious of the medical profession 
when it comes to giving meaning to one’s life. If healing the sick and 
alleviating the pain of our fellow human beings does not give meaning 
to life, then what does? So, I responded: ‘What about your patients?’ He 
shrugged his shoulders and replied: ‘Nothing of that work will remain—
most of them are dead by now, all of them will die someday.’
In old age, it is common to look back and ask: ‘Was my life 
worthwhile?’ But what sort of things do we invoke to determine whether 
our lives were worthwhile? My friend has a particular answer in mind. 
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It is the very same answer that Horace gives when reflecting on having 
written the Odes. He writes ‘And now ‘tis done: more durable than 
brass/ My monument shall be, and raise its head/ O’er royal pyramids.’ 
This will bestow a kind of immortality on him: ‘I shall not wholly die: 
large residue/ Shall ‘scape the queen of funerals.’ A family tree may not 
be quite in the same league as the Odes, but the aspiration is similar. 
What we have to say for ourselves at the end of life is that we have made 
a mark, that we have achieved something sizeable and grand that we 
can pass on to posterity.
What makes an achievement sizeable or grand? What is the measure 
for this? Think of being successful at raising a family. Some people may 
shrug their shoulders and say: ‘What’s so big about that? Families have 
been raised since the dawn of humankind.’ But that is certainly setting 
the bar too high. If what it requires to have a worthwhile life is to do 
something out of the ordinary, few worthwhile lives would have been 
lived. We cannot all be special and stand out. Rather, we should be 
looking for achievements that make a sizeable difference for the better, 
carried forward into a future in which we are no more. Successfully 
raising a family certainly fits the bill.
Must our achievement leave a trace into a future when we are no 
more? Horace might want to put the tomes he wrote on a shelf next to 
his death bed, but this certainly cannot be the only way to make a case 
for having lived a worthwhile life. In talking to my friend, I pointed to 
the sizeable achievement of a lifetime of healing and alleviating pain. 
What does it matter that one outlives one’s patients and that nothing 
remains? There was much goodness at the time that the service was 
performed.
The same holds for the arts. Works of architecture, music, and 
literature may stretch beyond one’s death. This is less so for the 
performing arts, but still, one contributes to the development of a style. 
There are no proper recordings of Nijinsky’s ballets, but they remain a 
defining moment in the history of dance. But what about a more mundane 
art form such as DJ’ing? There is pride in throwing the greatest party, 
making the dance floor burn until the early hours. Nothing remains, 
but what does it matter? There is beauty in the ephemeral. And in old 
age, our DJ may look back and reminisce about all the joy and rapture 
they brought to so many dance venues. They may say that this made it 
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all worthwhile, just as my friend could, in the same way, look back on a 
lifetime of healing, even though all his patients are long dead and gone.
Must achievements be sizeable, must they be grand, however 
conceived, for a life to be worthwhile? Dickinson writes: ‘If I can […] 
help one fainting robin/ Unto his nest again,/ I shall not live in vain.’ The 
persona that Dickinson assumes in her poetry did not strive to do grand 
things. What made her life worthwhile was to make small and simple 
differences. Helping the proverbial robin makes life no less worthwhile 
than performing, say, the first heart transplant.
On one conception of assessing whether our lives were worthwhile, 
we ask how much of a difference we have made and to how many people. 
The grander the achievement, the more worthwhile we take our lives to 
be. But on another conception, this is a mistake. The difference that we 
can make lies in small and simple contributions, and that is what makes 
our lives fully worthwhile. There is no calculus. There is no stacking of 
good deeds to shore up the edifice of a worthwhile life. Just like there 
is beauty in the ephemeral, there is beauty in what is small and simple.
We have seen examples of the grand and enduring (Horace), the 
grand and ephemeral (the DJ), and the small and ephemeral (the 
fainting robin). What about the small and the enduring? There is a 
Chinese story of an old man who wanted to move a mountain that was 
blocking the sun. (Giddens and Giddens, Chinese Mythology, p. 39.) 
When he was mocked for hauling wheelbarrow loads of stones, the 
old man responded that his descendants would carry on his work and 
that the mountain would eventually be moved. Scientists may see their 
professional life in this light—their contributions may have been small, 
but they are worthwhile because they are part of a larger endeavor, and 
this larger endeavor is what is enduring.
So, we broadened the ideal in Horace’s Odes: Achievements need not 
be enduring, they may be ephemeral; and they need not be grand, they 
may be small. But some people may still find this wrong-headed. What 
is it, they object, with this focus on achievements and contributions, on 
making a mark, on making a difference? 
John Keats contracted tuberculosis in his mid-twenties and realized 
that an early death was awaiting him. In one of the letters to his beloved 
Fannie Brawne, he reports an internal dialogue: ‘”If I should die,” said 
I to myself, “I have left no immortal work behind me—nothing to make 
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my friends proud of my memory—but I have loved the principle of 
beauty in all things, and if I had had time I would have made myself 
remembered.”’ Keats thought that he had achieved too little to leave 
a mark in the literary landscape due to his young age. But he found 
consolation in having lived his life in a particular mode—in accordance 
with an aesthetic principle.
Indeed, some find contentment not in achievements or contributions, 
but in having lived their lives in a particular way. They have lived 
their lives guided by an ideal of integrity, honesty, love, or service. 
They consider their lives worthwhile precisely because they lived in 
accordance with ideals that they subscribe to or identify with. Life was 
lived as it ought to be lived.
So, what makes life worthwhile retrospectively? Here is the 
landscape: There are modes of living, and there are achievements, both 
enduring and ephemeral, both grand and simple. People have different 
conceptions of what would make their lives worthwhile. There may 
be a match between their conception and the way they view their own 
lives. If so, then this will be a source of contentment. Or there may be 
a mismatch. They may have a bookshelf of influential tomes and yet 
feel that life was not lived well because they sense a lack of integrity. 
They may have a life of caring and service behind them and yet feel that 
nothing meant much because there is nothing of them that projects into 
the future.
What place is there for hope when it comes to our concern with life 
being worthwhile?
If one aims for enduring achievements, it is good to remember that 
the future is fickle and will be even more fickle in one’s absence. Poets 
come and poets go as literary canons are rewritten. Family trees are 
unfolded with great interest only to end up in dusty attics (or archived 
websites), never to see the light of day again. There is always much room 
for doubt that our contribution will stand the test of time. And with 
doubt comes hope. We can at best hope that our lives were worthwhile; 
time shall be our judge.
When we are focused on the here and now, there is less room for 
doubt. The party our DJ threw was dope, and only a bore could deny 
it. Dickinson’s robin was saved from the claws of the cat. But with 
any achievement, questions remain about our contribution as well as 
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about consequences. I remember a psychiatrist telling me a story about 
a patient, in his care, who overcame schizophrenia. At the end of the 
story, he looked at me and said: ‘Did I do that? I don’t know.’ And, with 
each success, there are typically unforeseen consequences. For instance, 
the Gates Foundation reduced the incidence of malaria by dispensing 
malaria nets, but the nets are being used for fishing, polluting lakes, and 
depleting their fish. (The Guardian, 31 Jan. 2018)
Insofar as we strive to live life in a particular mode, we may have 
doubts because we are not fully transparent to ourselves. An artist may 
hope that they lived a life of aesthetic creation, but fear that they were a 
phony at heart. A philanthropist may hope that they were motivated by 
empathy, but fear that they were after fame and recognition. A politician 
may hope that they have lived a life of integrity, but fear that self-interest 
was often no less of a driving force.
No matter what we think a worthwhile life is all about, there is room 
for doubt. In the face of this doubt, modesty requires that we say, ‘I 
hope that my life was worthwhile,’ rather than, ‘I know that my life was 
worthwhile.’
Dying well
The hope that one’s life was worthwhile, that one has lived well, is 
mirrored in the hope that one will die well. What is it to die well? We all 
hope not to die a painful and agonizing death, but that’s a problem for 
palliative care and pain management experts rather than philosophers. 
Aristotle has some views on dying well in the Nicomachean Ethics. (Book 
3, Ch. 6) For him, dying on the battlefield is the noblest death—it is a 
proper ending to a happy life. But death caused by disease or death as a 
passenger on a sinking ship are unenviable deaths. Why does Aristotle 
think this?
On the battlefield one can courageously practice one’s skills. This is 
desirable because we like to die in a way that reflects the ideals that we 
hold dear and the skills that we have honed over our lifetime. One can 
do no such thing when one battles disease or is a passenger on a sinking 
ship. Aristotle even makes an exception for a sailor—for a sailor, death 
at sea is a worthy death since a sailor can practice their skills trying to 
save the boat. Furthermore, we do not die in vain on the battlefield—our 
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death serves some greater cause. Considering modern warfare, dying 
on the battlefield is not what it used to be. But the message still stands.
But the message still stands. We appreciate it if we can die in a way that 
reflects the way we lived, showing the ideals that have defined us. And 
we appreciate our deaths not to be in vain—we like them to serve some 
greater good.
When there is a fatal accident in sports, loved ones find consolation 
in assuring themselves that the athlete died doing what they liked 
doing best. A Muslim relative of mine faced protests from her family 
because she wanted to go on another Hajj—the Muslim pilgrimage 
to Mecca—at an advanced age and in poor health. She responded: 
‘Could there be any sweeter way to leave this earth?’ John Updike 
rested his head on the typewriter to gather the strength to type up his 
final poems on dying. (The Guardian, 11 March 2016) In all these cases, 
people died or faced death doing what they were good at, what they 
enjoyed, or what defined them throughout their lives. Loved ones find 
consolation in this.
People also hope to die in circumstances or at a time that reflects what 
they value in life or is symbolic of something they stand for or identify 
with. This can take many forms. They may hope to die surrounded by 
their families or in the comfort of their homes. They may hope to die, 
say, on Independence Day or a particular saint’s day.
Mark Twain was born in the year of Halley’s Comet and wrote that 
he hoped to die in the year of its return. He writes in 1909, the year 
before Halley’s return, that it would be: ‘the greatest disappointment 
of my life if I don’t go out with Halley’s Comet. The Almighty has said, 
no doubt: “Now here are these two unaccountable freaks; they came in 
together, they must go out together.” Oh! I am looking forward to that.’ 
(p. 1511) His hopes were met when he died in 1910 due to heart failure. 
Mark Twain was a great storyteller and dying in the year of the return of 
Halley’s Comet was a way to give the world another story.
The comedian Tony Hancock joked: ‘Does Magna Carta mean 
nothing to you? Did she die in vain?’ Humor aside, revolutionaries 
indeed hope that their untimely deaths will advance the cause. Relatives 
of deceased soldiers find it very hard to accept that the war shouldn’t 
have been fought. ‘A woman protested, saying: “Of course it was a 
righteous war. My son fell in it,”’ Kahlil Gibran writes in Sand and Foam. 
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Terminally ill patients participate in randomized controlled trials for 
experimental drugs and hope that their participation will contribute to 
the advancement of science. In all these cases, people would like their 
deaths to be good for something.
Aristotle’s interest in dying well is also relevant to the contemporary 
debate on euthanasia. Proponents of euthanasia argue that patients 
should have the opportunity to die in a way that reflects what they 
stand for in life. If what they stand for are independence, control, and 
autonomy, they may consider euthanasia the most fitting death when 
they are afflicted by a debilitating disease. They do not want to see their 
bodies helplessly deteriorate further. They do not want to be dependent 
on a regimen of painkillers for pain control. They do not want to see 
themselves as being dependent on caregivers. They want to have control 
over their deaths as they have had control over their lives. Others live 
a life believing that some things should be left in the hands of God or 
should be determined by natural processes. They should have proper 
access to palliative care and be able to live through the natural dying 
process without having to endure excruciating pain.
Euthanasia is legal in many jurisdictions. Some people have asked 
for euthanasia wanting to be organ donors. They hope that their deaths 
will lead to some good by giving other people a new lease on life. They 
make substantial sacrifices. Cancer patients can only be organ donors if 
they opt for euthanasia early on during the progression of the disease, 
lest their organs be affected. And even for other patients, being an organ 
donor precludes choosing to die at home since organs can only be 
harvested in hospital surgery rooms. 
And yet there is much resistance, and it is not easy to be an organ 
donor upon opting for euthanasia. There is the worry that unscrupulous 
medical providers will push patients to volunteer for euthanasia and 
organ donation. On the other hand, can we deny the terminally ill their 
last wish for their deaths to gain meaning through a life-affirming gift? 
Patients have one last hope—the hope that their sacrifices will make their 
deaths beneficial to others. Can one take this hope away from them?
Aristotle’s enchantment with death on the battlefield seems 
quaint—a curiosity harking back to times when heroic values reigned. 
But his reasons are still instructive today. No less than the ancient Greek 
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warrior, we also hope to die well and meet our end through a death that 
reflects our lives or that is not in vain.
A Good Future
‘Après moi le déluge’ [After me the downfall]. These were the prescient 
words of Louis XV, which he uttered a few decades before his grandson, 
who was heir to the throne, was executed in the French Revolution. The 
phrase signals disinterest in a better future after one is dead and gone. 
There is something disturbing about this. But what is meant by 
these four words? If we can figure this out, then we will gain a clearer 
sense of what is troubling about this phrase. And this will give us an 
insight into how it is that people really can have hopes for a future 
without them.
The phrase has a history. The earliest occurrence of a similar phrase 
is in an anonymous Greek fragment from a lost tragedy: ‘When I die, let 
earth and fire mix: It matters not to me, for my affairs will be unaffected.’ 
The line is echoed in Lucretius: ‘Certainly then, when we do not exist, 
nothing at all will be able to affect us nor excite our senses, not even if 
the earth mixes with the sea, and the sea with the heavens.’ Now it is 
true that events after our death won’t affect our senses. But some events 
don’t affect our senses, yet they do matter to us. If we judge our lives to 
be worthwhile based on enduring achievements, then the future does 
matter. And even if we don’t, there are still other reasons to have hopes 
for things that won’t affect our senses. 
Here is an analogy. Suppose you are heading some top-secret unit 
in the military and are about to retire. Due to the nature of the unit, all 
contact will be broken off. This does not stop you from saying: ‘I hope 
that the projects that I started come to fruition, I hope that the unit will 
succeed in its long-term mission, and I hope that my co-workers will do 
well, both professionally and in their personal lives.’ That you will never 
know any of this does not stop you from hoping.
The same holds for death. We are invested in our families, our 
communities, and our projects. Suppose that a loved one is shortlisted 
for a prize, and the prizes will be awarded next year. I very much hope 
that they will win. I then receive a diagnosis of a terminal illness, and 
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it is certain that I will not be there to witness it. That does not stop me 
from hoping.
Seneca despises an attitude of indifference towards what happens 
after one’s death and puts it in the same box as Nero’s saying: ‘Let them 
hate me, so long as they fear me.’ The attitude signals a lack of concern 
for things that are outside the narrow circle of one’s interests. What 
is objectionable is prioritizing one’s interests at the expense of distant 
people or future people. Even though distant and future people may not 
pertain to one’s interests, this is no reason not to care for them. And it is 
this hope for a world with less poverty or a future minimally affected by 
climate change that should guide our actions here and now.
The phrase can also be taken as a hope for posthumous calamities 
to occur rather than an expression of indifference about the future. 
Suppose that I am very much enjoying a party, but I must leave early. 
That hurts—and it is easier to take if I tell myself that the party is 
winding down. This may be mere wishful thinking. But it can also spill 
over in a kind of petty and shameful hope. I just can’t stand the idea that 
the DJ will pick up the pace and that I will be missing out. What I hope 
to hear tomorrow is that the party was all but over, and that the venue 
closed a few minutes after I had left.
Toward the end of life, some people selectively focus their attention 
on unwelcome developments in society and the world at large. They 
become enamored by religious or secular doomsday scenarios. It is 
easier to go if the future is not worth living for, or if we all must go 
together anyway. This may be just a way to find consolation, but there 
is a fine line between consolation through selective focus and petty and 
shameful hopes.
We used the phrase ‘Après moi le déluge’ and its history as a guide 
to uncover how it is that we have hopes for the future. First, some 
posthumous events do pertain to us, and hence we can hope for them. 
Second, minimally decent people do not restrict their cares to what 
pertains to them, but they also have hopes for distant and future people, 
and hence they can have hopes for them. And finally, reading the phrase 
as a wish for calamities to happen uncovers a shameful hope—the hope 
that the world will be a dismal place when it is our time to go.
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Attitudes of Others 
People hope that others will hold certain attitudes toward them when 
they are gone. They hope to be missed, remembered, and respected. There 
is some overlap between these categories. If one is missed, then one 
is remembered. The fallen in a war are not respected unless they are 
remembered. Nonetheless, these attitudes are different—for instance, 
one may be remembered without being either respected or missed. 
Each of these attitudes is in tension with some of the hopes that we have 
discussed earlier. We will take up each in turn.
Being missed. The hope to be missed by loved ones is a curious hope. 
Grief is a powerful emotion that can deeply mar one’s life. ‘Parting is 
all we know of heaven/ And all we need of hell,’ writes Dickinson. Why 
would we hope for anything like this from our loved ones, especially 
considering that our hopes for the future typically include that they will 
do well?
Why would we want to be missed at all? When you leave a job, you 
may hope that the company will fall apart without you. This may play 
into your sense of self-importance. It may be a kind of revenge: You feel 
that you were not respected, and now they get what they deserve. But 
these are sad hopes, if not shameful hopes. Some such hopes may enter 
in at the end of life as well. I remember an obituary stating that it was 
the wish of the deceased that there be no meal after the funeral, since 
‘people have had plenty of time to come and have a meal with me; I 
would have been more than happy to oblige, but nobody ever came.’ 
People feel slighted in life and hope that they will be missed in death—
and preferably missed with guilt-laden grief.
But is there not a healthy way of hoping to be missed when one is no 
longer?
Being missed, one might say, is a sign of being loved. And we hope 
that we were loved. This is a good explanation when we are uncertain of 
being loved. But what if we are confident that we are being loved? Why 
hope for the smoke when we know that there is fire anyway?
Being missed, one might say, is part and parcel of being loved. And so, 
in hoping to be missed, we are not hoping for a sign of being loved—we 
are simply hoping to be loved. But we don’t need to hope for everything 
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that is part and parcel of the things we hope for. World travelers hope for 
pristine beaches, breath-taking sights, and novel experiences, but not for 
the long plane rides to get to them.
But this, one might object, is an unfair comparison. Being missed is 
essential to being loved, but long plane rides are not essential to world 
travel: Elon Musk’s Big Falcon Rocket could get us anywhere on earth in 
less than an hour. Fair enough. But then think of parenting. Hardships 
are essential to parenting: There is no parenting without hardships. 
Prospective parents hope for the joys of parenting, but not for the 
hardships that are part of it. So why then, in hoping to be loved, would 
we need to hope to be missed?
Furthermore, being missed need not even be a sure-proof sign of 
being loved or part and parcel of being loved. People love in different 
ways, and they love different people in different ways. Grief after loss 
need not be a measure of the love that once was. There is love that can 
let go and that barely grieves. There is intense grief, not because of love 
for the deceased, but because it is intermingled with many other more 
and less healthy emotions.
So, then what should we hope for? There is much wisdom in 
Christina Rossetti’s poem ‘Song’: ‘When I am dead, my dearest,/ Sing no 
sad songs for me;/ Plant thou no roses at my head,/ Nor shady cypress 
tree:/ Be the green grass above me/ With showers and dewdrops wet;/ 
And if thou wilt, remember,/ And if thou wilt, forget.’ Rossetti asks that 
there be no expressions of grief from a loved one upon her death. But 
she hopes that a loved one will be like the grass on her grave—keeping a 
connection but standing strong and directed toward the world. Whether 
this is enhanced by missing her or not is of no import. The most we 
should hope for is that some connection remains, which can find 
expression in a feeling of absence, but this feeling should be a feeling 
that enriches life. 
Being remembered. The hope to be remembered is close to the hope to 
make an enduring contribution. But it’s not the same thing. Here are a 
few questions to ponder.
Both Alfred Russell Wallace and Charles Darwin came up with the 
core ideas of the theory of evolution at roughly the same time. Now 
suppose Wallace’s work did more for the theory of evolution than 
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Darwin’s work. However, Darwin is certainly remembered more than 
Wallace. Would you prefer to be Wallace or Darwin?
Suppose that you are William Shakespeare on his death bed. A genie 
in a bottle gives you a choice. Either all your work will remain preserved 
for posterity, but the identity of the author will be forgotten, and each 
of the plays will be signed with ‘Anonymous.’ Call this Shakespeare 
Anonymized. Or, half of your works will be preserved with your name 
properly attached to them, while the others will be lost forever. Or, to 
make it harder, suppose that 90 percent will be so preserved. Call this 
Shakespeare Redux. What would you choose?
If you only hope that your life is worthwhile on grounds of having 
made enduring contributions, then you should choose to be Wallace, 
and you should choose to be Shakespeare Anonymized. If you choose 
to be Darwin or Shakespeare Redux, you also hope that you will be 
remembered, over and above the hope of having made an enduring 
contribution. 
Why would one want to be remembered? We may think of ourselves 
as getting a kind of lease on life when our names live on in people’s 
minds and continue to be mentioned in conversations and written work. 
There is something very odd about this sentiment though. Woody Allen 
appropriately mocks it: ‘I do not want to achieve immortality through 
my work; I want to achieve immortality by not dying. I don’t want to live 
on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to live on in my apartment.’ 
(Woody Allen and Linda Sunshine, Illustrated Woody Allen Reader.) 
Presumably, we don’t just want to be remembered, we want to be 
remembered well, just as we want people to think well of us during our 
lives. What good does being thought well of do? It matters during one’s 
life because people will trust you and this provides for opportunities. But 
being remembered after one’s death does not offer any such benefits. It 
matters to be thought of well because it provides some limited evidence 
that one’s contributions are worthwhile. Sure, but why not just hope 
that one’s contributions are worthwhile? There is no point in hoping for 
smoke when you can hope for fire.
So, we need to give a different answer. Many people value being 
thought of well in itself. It is not of value because it provides opportunities 
or because it provides evidence. It is of value for what it is and that’s 
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that. It is reasonable to think that being remembered posthumously has 
the same appeal.
And so, a desire to be thought of well posthumously might make one 
hope to be Darwin rather than Wallace, and Shakespeare Redux rather 
than Shakespeare Anonymized. It wouldn’t be my choice, but it is not a 
crazy choice.
Being respected. Diogenes asked that his corpse be set out to be devoured 
by wild animals. Jeremy Bentham’s dressed-up skeleton with a wax 
head is put on display in the UCL (University College London) student 
center. King’s College students stole the actual head in 1975 (and 
returned it), and there is a legend that it was used for an impromptu 
game of football (or, for American readers, soccer.)
Most people are not like Diogenes. Neither would they like to see their 
heads used as footballs. They hope that their bodies, bones, or gravesites 
will be treated with respect after being gone. We are horrified when 
we hear reports of the corpses of US soldiers being dragged through 
Mogadishu, severed heads being displayed by ISIS, people urinating on 
graves, or Jewish graveyards being desecrated with swastikas.
There is an interesting tension at the heart of photojournalism that 
flares up regularly. It is an unwritten rule that there should be no frontal 
shots of corpses out of respect for the deceased and their loved ones. 
But the picture showing a frontal shot is often so powerful that it has the 
potential to bring about social change. Larry Burrows, a photojournalist 
who was killed in Vietnam, agonized about publishing shocking war 
images. He worried that he would be ‘simply capitalizing on other 
men’s grief.’ But he gave himself permission because his images ‘would 
penetrate the hearts at home of those who are simply too indifferent.’
Emmett Till, a Black fourteen-year-old boy from Chicago, was 
visiting relatives in Mississippi in the summer of 1955. He allegedly 
wolf-whistled a white woman in a store and was tortured and brutally 
killed by the woman’s husband and half-brother. His mother asked 
for an open casket and called Jet magazine to run pictures of the boy’s 
disfigured body to show the world what had been done to her son. These 
pictures shocked the world and galvanized the civil rights movement. 
More recently, the picture of Alan Kurdi, the Syrian toddler whose 
corpse was washed ashore on 2 September 2015 in Turkey, was a case 
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in point. There were two pictures—one in which he is washed up on 
the beach with his face toward the camera and one in which he is being 
carried away by an aid worker with his face hidden. (The Guardian, 2 
Sep. 2015) Newspapers were split on which picture they should publish. 
Some refused to publish the frontal shot out of respect for the little boy 
and his family. Still, it was precisely this picture that affected public 
opinion and made a difference to worldwide refugee policy. 
Alan Kurdi was just a toddler, which complicates the moral calculus. 
But if the image is an image of adults who lost their lives in tragic ways, 
there is a tension between the presumed hope of the deceased that one 
will be respected in death and the hope that one’s death will not be in 
vain, that is, that one’s death will raise awareness and effect positive 
change. How this tension is resolved will be different dependent on the 
wishes, presumed or actual, of the deceased and on the particulars of 
the case.
Summing up, we have hopes that others will bear certain attitudes toward 
us when we are no more. Hoping to be missed stands in tension with 
the hopes that our loved ones’ lives will not be marred by grief. Hoping 
to be remembered is subtly distinct from hoping for a worthwhile life 
on grounds of having made enduring achievements. And there is an 
interesting tension between meeting the deceased’s hope to be respected 




We want all kinds of things in life—an interesting job, a cruise to exotic 
lands, a night on the town, a sports car… And then there is our love life. 
Again, there are all kinds of things that we want in the way of love. We 
want a happy love life, we want to be with our beloved, or, one might 
say, we want our beloved. But love-related wants are curiously different 
from more mundane wants. 
Let’s start with something that so many of us want—chocolate. Like 
love, most ordinary mortals don’t just want chocolate; they crave it. 
Suppose that you grew up on Cadbury, but now you think that you have 
made the discovery of your life—you have tasted these nicely wrapped 
Ghirardelli squares from the Bay Area, and you swear that they are the 
best thing under the sun.
Being a choosy Belgian when it comes to chocolate, I ask what you 
like about it. You immediately start raving about the velvety texture, 
the robust bitterness, the aroma of hazelnuts, and so on. I understand 
your passion. But if that’s what you like about chocolates, then I have 
news for you. Try these pralines from Daskalidès, manufactured in 
Ghent, Belgium—they score higher than Ghirardelli on all the factors 
you mention.
You are somewhat incredulous, but you are willing to give it a 
go. And indeed, you fall head over heels for Daskalidès on first bite. 
It is to die for! Ghirardelli pales in comparison. And so, you trade up. 
Ghirardelli is a thing of the past—the future with Daskalidès is bright. 
And there are simpler ways to wean you off Ghirardelli. I might 
suggest you put on your reading glasses and read the ingredients of that 
Ghirardelli square. You notice the soy lecithin among the additives. For 
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some reason or other, you have some misgivings about soy additives, 
and you turn your back on Ghirardelli.
Or Ghirardelli may decide to source its cocoa from a different 
supplier. It just doesn’t taste the same anymore to your discerning 
palate, and, again, you say farewell to Ghirardelli. 
In all these cases, we wouldn’t bat an eyelid. You liked Ghirardelli 
yesterday. But you traded up for Daskalidès, you learned something 
new about Ghirardelli, or Ghirardelli changed. You don’t like Ghirardelli 
today. But there is no reason to say that you didn’t truly like Ghirardelli 
yesterday. 
Compare this to love. Suppose that you tell me that you have found 
a new beloved. You are besotted and beguiled—you hear the angels 
singing. I ask you what is so great about them? You are more than 
happy to tell me all about how beautiful, handsome, witty, charming, 
and intelligent your new beloved is. 
As with Ghirardelli, I am happy to dispense good advice. If that’s 
what you find so attractive in your newfound Mr. or Ms. Right, I invite 
you to come along and meet Mr. or Ms. So-Much-More-Right—someone 
who has all those nice character traits to an even greater extent. We set 
up a date, you agree with my excellent judgment as a matchmaker, 
swiftly trade up, and live happily ever after.
Trading up from Ghirardelli to Daskalidès did not stand in the way 
of saying that you truly liked Ghirardelli yesterday. But trading up from 
Right to So-Much-More-Right makes one less confident about your love 
for Right yesterday. If you were so beguiled and besotted, why did you 
even take me up on arranging a date? And how is it that you were so 
easily convinced? You have to admit that, maybe, you did not truly love 
Right after all. To quote a well-worn line from Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116: 
‘Love is not love/ Which alters when it alteration finds.’
Love should also be resilient to learning—at least more resilient than 
your fancy for Ghirardelli. As we become more acquainted with our 
beloved, we may learn things about them that would have stopped us 
from falling in love with them. But now that we are where we are, it 
shouldn’t matter. If this new knowledge can undo our love, one may 
question how true it was. 
This is a favorite ingredient in tragic love stories. In Thomas Hardy’s 
Tess of the d’Urbervilles: A Pure Woman, Angel learns on his wedding 
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night that Tess had a child out of wedlock and leaves her. One questions 
whether Angel truly loved Tess. As a contrast, take the young love that 
blossoms between Jimmy and Dil in Neil Jordan’s movie The Crying 
Game. Jimmy learns that Dil is transgender and anatomically male, and 
Dil learns that Jimmy was the cause of her former lover’s death. Though 
they would never have fallen in love with each other had they known 
these things at the outset, they cannot let go of their love. 
Wendy Cope has a two-line poem, entitled ‘Two Cures for Love,’ in 
her poetry book Serious Concerns: ‘1. Don’t see him. Don’t phone or write 
a letter. / 2. The easy way: get to know him better.’ The poem is tongue-
in-cheek. Indeed, it sounds fully reasonable that as we learn unwelcome 
information about our beloved—which is due to come—love will wither. 
But true love is less than fully reasonable and is meant to be resilient in 
the face of unwelcome information. 
Love should also be resilient to change. There is no problem with 
turning our back on Ghirardelli when they change their cocoa supplier. 
Nothing stays the same—Ghirardelli is just not what it used to be. But 
no person stays the same either—lovers tend to change on us as well. 
But here, again, is where love differs from our passion for chocolates. 
We expect love to be able to weather change—at least to some extent. 
Of course, it’s not all sunshine and rainbows—change brings new 
challenges and requires new coping strategies to keep the relationship 
afloat. 
I was intrigued by some autobiographical comments of Janine di 
Giovanni, a prize-winning war journalist. She talks about her divorce 
after her husband turned away from alcoholism: 
It was the saddest birthday, the day of his last drink. Not because I grieved 
for the passing of his alcoholism, but because I knew, instinctively, that 
he would change and never again be the man I married. Because, in fact, 
part of that love was based on the passion, the drink, the fury, the rage, 
the anger, the drive, that made him so intense. Without it, there was a 
smaller person who looked sad and hardened by life. (The Guardian, 25 
Jun 2011)
One wonders about a love that does not survive the process of recovery 
from alcoholism. Her husband had become a different man, and the 
spark was gone. Might this not say something about the love that came 
before? None of this is ours to judge, but di Giovanni’s story strikes a 
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familiar chord. One may remember occasions when love was lost in 
one’s own life over something that shouldn’t have mattered, leaving one 
to conclude that the love was never genuinely there to begin with. 
This is what is called the constancy of love. If alleged love is subject 
to trading up or is brittle in the face of learning unwelcome news or 
unexpected changes, then we conclude that the alleged love was not 
quite true love. It’s a mark that something was absent. It is this constancy 
that sets love apart from other desires, longings, and passions—even 
from cravings for chocolate. 
Granted, there are limits to the constancy of love. Relationships can 
become abusive over time, and it would be heartless to tell the party 
leaving that they never truly loved their partner. You may find out that, 
haplessly, the person you were dating was a perpetrator in the Rwandan 
genocide. Or as one of my students objected, tongue in cheek: ‘I truly 
love my boyfriend, but what is there to do if Ryan Gosling were to show 
up on my doorstep?’ 
But even though there are limits to constancy, love is different in this 
respect from other things we want in life, be it a nice job, a cruise, a sports 
car, or what have you. Such longings, intense as they may be, typically 
do not display constancy. Admittedly, they do occasionally, but there is 
something pathological about that. For instance, I may not be able to let 
go of an old beater car, even though there is plenty of room to trade up, 
I am aware that it’s a dreadful polluter, and repairs are endless. But that 
is a kind of misplaced constancy—one should not come to love a piece 
of metal with a love that ought to be reserved for persons.
Models
There are three grand and ancient models of romantic love. They go 
back to Socrates’ and Aristophanes’ speeches in the Symposium and to 
chapter thirteen of St. Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians. There is 
surprisingly little to be found in the original texts, but there is a kind of 
lore that has formed around a few lines of rather obscure musings.
Eros. Love is born in response to finding attractive features in a person. 
This can take many forms—beauty, riches, fame… In an interview, Diane 
Keaton says that there was chemistry between her and Woody Allen 
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‘because it was Woody Allen and because he was funny.’ Or one may 
find someone sensitive, charming, attentive, willing to listen to us, or 
what have you.
This is the model that we find in Socrates’ speech in the Symposium. 
Socrates says that all he knows about love he learned from Diotima, the 
woman from Mantinea, ‘a woman wise in this and in many other kinds 
of knowledge.’ In keeping with the tradition, we will call this the eros 
model of love. There is a bit of mission creep in Socrates’ speech. It starts 
with an appreciation of what is beautiful and good in one’s beloved, 
but a minute later, we move onto the beauty and the good in the laws 
and institutions of the city, in the practice of philosophy, and finally, 
to what it means for something to be beautiful and good. Let Socrates 
and Diotima go down this metaphysical alleyway on their own, all we 
need is the idea that romantic love is comprised of an appreciation of 
the wonderful features of the beloved. The motto for this model might 
be—to love is to find one’s beloved great. 
Agape. This is the love that wants to take care of the other, to bring out 
the best in them. This love is not a response to great things in the other. 
Rather, it aims to bring about great things. It does not seek value, but 
rather it confers value. 
Here is some Theology 101. When we say that God loves us, clearly 
the eros model would not be fitting: God is not gently looking down, 
impressed and beguiled by all the greatness to be seen in mortals 
roaming around on earth. Rather, God despairs at seeing all this 
sinfulness in motion. However, it is through loving us that God aims 
to lift us up and make us into better people, provided we are receptive 
to that love. 
St. Paul sings the praises of this kind of love in 1 Corinthians 13:1–7. 
He uses the Greek word agape, which is translated in Latin as caritas. It is 
a self-forgetful love that sacrifices its own interests for the well-being of 
the beloved. It is a love of commitment, no matter what comes. Let the 
motto be—to love is to make one’s beloved great.
One might object that St. Paul was interested here in the love that 
one should have for one’s fellow human beings—the love of Christian 
fellowship—not the love of romantic engagement. What St. Paul had 
in mind I do not know. But clearly, people do find some romantic ideal 
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in St. Paul’s words, considering how often they are the core reading in 
Christian wedding ceremonies. Conjugal love shares in this ideal of 
loving as bringing out the best in one’s beloved. 
Fusion. Before Socrates takes his turn in the Symposium, the playwright 
Aristophanes tells a myth about how humans in times long gone were 
like spheres and had two pairs of legs and arms, two heads and two 
genitals—some were double male, some were double female, and some 
were male-female. They revolted against Zeus, and as a punishment, 
Zeus split them in two. And that is the human form as we know it. But 
these humans have an irresistible longing to find their original other 
halves and to unite with them. Depending on our original form, this 
longing is for our gay, lesbian, or straight other halves. 
The myth underscores that we have a need to find someone in life 
who complements us. Falling in love is like linking up two segments 
that perfectly match and thereby become one. Lovers create a shared 
self or a joint identity. They go through the world not as two separate 
people, but as one in body and soul. They think of themselves as such, 
and they want to be seen by the world as such. Let us call this the fusion 
model of love with the motto—to love is to become one with one’s beloved. 
These three models are not mutually exclusive. In Sonnet 43, Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning ponders how to ‘count the ways’ in which she loves 
her beloved. Relationships tend to display a bit more or less of an eros 
focus, an agape focus, or a fusion focus. Single-model relationships tend 
to be pathological. With too much eros comes infatuation. With too much 
agape comes a loss of self. And with too much fusion comes clinginess. 
One needs a mix for a healthy relationship. 
All these models have, in their own way, a deep reverence for love. 
They portray love as the kind of thing that is worth pursuing in life. I 
call them ‘reflectively endorsable’ models because embracing the model 
in no way detracts from seeing love in its full glory. But, as we will see, 
each of these models also has a cynical counterpart. The Cartesian model 
maps onto eros, the love-for-love’s-sake model maps onto agape, and 
the neurobiological model maps onto the fusion model. These cynical 
models may not be a good fit for Valentine’s Day, yet they are edifying 
in their own way. 
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Let us look in more detail at each of these six models and see how 
they fare in the face of the constancy of love. And then there is the 
flipside—when constancy fails, there are heartaches. These models tell 
us different stories about the pangs of love lost and how one might cope 
with them. 
Eros 
Let us start with the eros model. Loving people for their features causes 
trouble for the constancy of love. Features may change. We may realize 
that we misjudged our beloved due to the infatuation of young love. Or 
someone may cross our path who displays the features that attracted us 
to a greater extent. If the eros model describes all there is to love, then 
what is there that could keep us from saying that we have reached the 
end of the line? 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Sonnet 14 in Sonnets from the Portuguese 
puts the worry very aptly: 
Do not say, 
”I love her for her smile—her look—her way
Of speaking gently,—for a trick of thought
That falls in well with mine, and certes brought
A sense of pleasant ease on such a day”— 
For these things in themselves, Belovèd, may
Be changed, or change for thee—and love, so wrought,
May be unwrought so. 
Browning exhorts her beloved not to love her on the eros model of love. 
All the features he may love her for may change in her. Or her beloved 
may come to see them differently. And that, she fears, would mean the 
end of love which she wishes to avoid at all costs. 
But the eros model may have its own defense mechanisms against 
short horizons built into it. Maybe true love is rooted in the appreciation 
of valuable features—as the eros model stipulates—but certain features 
just cannot play this role. If we fall for someone because of their beauty, 
riches, or fame, one would be hard-pressed to call it true love. 
This is fair enough, but then, what sort of features can play this 
role? What sort of features are such that their appreciation could be a 
ground for true love? There are many candidates, but none of them are 
unproblematic. 
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In ‘He that Loves a Rosy Cheek,’ the seventeenth-century English 
poet Thomas Carew warns that love should not be based on ‘a rosy 
cheek […] a coral lip […] star-like eyes,’ because these are bound to 
fade. Rather, it is ‘a smooth and steadfast mind, gentle thoughts, and 
calm desires’ that can ‘kindle never-dying fires.’ This matches Socrates’ 
argument in the Symposium: First, the novice in the art of love finds 
beauty in the body of the beloved, and at a later stage, ‘he will consider 
that the beauty of the mind is more honorable than the beauty of the 
outward form.’
The suggestion is that one should love a person for their character 
traits. Character traits may be somewhat less ephemeral than looks, 
but they provide far less constancy than one would expect from love. 
Browning does not want to be loved for ‘speaking gently’ either, because 
she may not speak gently tomorrow, or her beloved may not think of her 
as speaking gently tomorrow. 
People change, for better or for worse. Those who have nurtured a 
loved one through depression know all too well how little can be there 
of the person we fell in love with. If love is not to fade, character traits 
may be as fragile as beauty or money. But it may be wiser to focus on 
character traits because desirable character traits are typically a better 
predictor of long-term marital satisfaction. Similarly, it may be wiser to 
choose a place to live on grounds of its social scene or the opportunity 
for satisfying work, rather than on grounds of its natural beauty or the 
opportunity to make lots of money. But if natural beauty or riches really 
matter to you, then why not? And if the beauty of the outward form in 
a partner or the posh lifestyle that they promise really matters to you, 
then why not? You may come to realize that you were mistaken in your 
assessment of the relative importance of these features. But whether it’s 
‘a rosy cheek’ or ‘a smooth and steadfast mind’ that kindles your love 
does not make that love any more or less true. 
But maybe we love people not for having certain features—bodily, 
monetary, character, or what have you—but for the mode in which they 
display those features. I adore my beloved not for, say, being a great 
skier, but for the way in which they ski. Nobody takes those turns quite 
the way they do. It’s not how good a skier they are; it’s the mode in 
which they are a great skier that stirs those butterflies inside. 
This may guard against trading up. My beloved may not measure 
up to the Olympic skier I just met in the lounge, but the Olympic skier’s 
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mode of skiing does not catch my fancy the way my beloved’s mode of 
skiing does. But it is less clear that it will guard against change. After 
a few ligament ruptures, little may be left of their oh-so-special way of 
taking those turns. Maybe this mode of skiing may live on in the other 
things they do in life, and this is what guards against change. But if 
we go this route, it all becomes a bit mysterious—the ground for love 
becomes a kind of je ne sais quoi. 
There is another clue in William Butler Yeats’ ‘For Anne Gregory.’ 
The poem has Anne Gregory saying that she wants to be loved, not for 
her yellow hair, but for herself alone. But what is it to love a person for 
themselves alone? There is a mystical and not so mystical reading. 
Let’s start with the not so mystical. There are certain features of 
ourselves that we identify with, that we think of as defining us, and 
typically these are also the features that we are proud of. The real Anne 
Gregory, the granddaughter of the Irish playwright Lady Gregory, was 
a young child with flaxen hair when Yeats wrote his poem about her. But 
let’s think of an imaginary Anne Gregory. She may not have cared much 
for her yellow hair. So, to be loved for it is not very satisfying. Maybe our 
imaginary Anne Gregory may have thought of herself as an intellectual 
or an artist. She would not mind being loved for being just that. When 
she says that she wants to be loved for herself, she means for something 
that she stands for, something that she takes herself to be about. 
It is true that people like to be loved for what they take pride in. But 
it is one thing to be loved by the world and another thing to be loved 
romantically. It seems to me that there is, at least for most people, a 
separation of spheres. I want to be admired, appreciated, and loved for 
one set of features at work, for another set of features in my community, 
and yet another set of features by my beloved. Venus Williams may 
yearn to be loved by the world for her tennis prowess. Adele may be 
desperate to be adored by her fans for her vocal talent. But I doubt that 
they want to be so loved by romantic lovers. 
Here is a more mystical reading of being loved for oneself alone, 
which needs a bit of a metaphysical warmup. 
Think of the universe as a big bag. Grab something out of the bag. Put 
it back. Grab one more time. If both objects you grabbed have precisely 
the same features, then you grabbed the very same thing twice. This 
principle goes back to the seventeenth-century German philosopher 
Leibniz and is called the Identity of Indiscernibles. 
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The twentieth-century English American philosopher Max Black 
did not like the principle much. He asks us to suppose that there 
is a universe that is void except for two spheres of the same size and 
composition, circling around each other. Then both objects have precisely 
the same features, but they are not identical—they are clearly distinct 
objects. There seems to be something wrong with Leibniz’s Identity of 
Indiscernibles. 
To defend Leibniz, we step back a few centuries to the thirteenth-
century Scottish philosopher Duns Scotus. Aside from all its run-of-the-
mill features such as being blue, weighing twenty pounds, etc., each of 
Max Black’s spheres also has the property of being this very sphere. One 
sphere has the property of being this very sphere, and the other sphere 
has the property of being that very sphere. Each sphere has its own 
‘primitive this-ness’ or, following Duns Scotus, its own ‘haecceity.’ (Haec 
is a Latin form for ‘this.’) It is in virtue of their respective haecceities that 
the spheres in Max Black’s universe are discernible, and hence we can 
comfortably say, on Leibniz’s principle, that they are distinct. 
Let’s return to Anne Gregory now. In matters of love, Anne Gregory 
does not want to be loved for her yellow hair, her smarts, her gentle 
demeanor, or whatever run-of-the-mill property you might want to add. 
She wants to be loved for being her, for being the unique person that she 
is. She wants to be loved for her haecceity, in Duns Scotus style. 
This is a common theme in science fiction (such as in the episode 
‘Be Right Back’ in the TV series Black Mirror). We may be able to create 
a replica of your beloved, who is just as good-looking, sensitive, smart, 
witty, with the same memories and dreams, but it wouldn’t do: What 
they are lacking is being the very person whom you loved before. 
The more sober-minded will think it stark raving mad to bring in 
such bizarre features as haecceities to account for the fact that people 
do not wish to be loved for any other feature than being the unique 
person that they are. It’s also not clear what would be valuable about 
such a feature. But, when love is the prize, maybe a bit of metaphysical 
fairyland is just what we need. 
In short, the quest for a special set of features that can ground true 
love and provide a basis for constancy is quite elusive. We tried character 
features, modes, identity-constituting features, and haecceities. They all 
have some attraction, but none of them are entirely convincing. 
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Agape 
We now turn to St. Paul’s agape model—a love of unconditional 
commitment that is self-forgetful and self-sacrificing. After Anne 
Gregory kicks up a fuss in Yeats’ poem about wanting to be loved for 
herself alone, her interlocutor responds: ‘”I heard an old religious man/ 
But yesternight declare/ That he had found a text to prove/ That only 
God, my dear,/ Could love you for yourself alone/ And not your yellow 
hair.”’ 
There are two ways to understand this. One reading understands ‘for 
yourself’ as indicating the ground of God’s love: God loves us because we 
are the unique individuals that we are. But there is also another reading. 
Think of the expression: ‘Buy something nice for yourself.’ Here you are 
meant to be the beneficiary. So, if God loves us for ourselves, we are the 
beneficiaries—God loves us with the aim of lifting us up. 
Is it true that only God can love in this manner? Agape is an ideal of 
love, and maybe only God can live up to it. Nonetheless, it is held up as 
an ideal to strive for in interpersonal relationships as well as in romantic 
love. 
In Love and Responsibility, Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) holds 
agape up as a model of romantic love in marriage: 
We love the person complete with all his or her virtues and faults, and up 
to a point independently of those virtues and in spite of those faults. The 
strength of such a love emerges most clearly when the beloved stumbles, 
when his or her weaknesses or even his sins come into the open. One 
who truly loves does not then withdraw his love, but loves all the more, 
loves in full consciousness of the other’s shortcomings and faults. 
This agape model of love also finds expression in popular culture. Think 
of the lyrics of Tammy Wynette’s ‘Stand by your Man,’ in which she 
urges to forgive a lover who has gone astray. There is clearly constancy 
on this model, but what supports this constancy? 
Agape is a love that is not drawn out by attractive features of the 
beloved. Hence there is no problem with features changing, with 
learning about the darker sides of one’s beloved, or with any threat from 
someone crossing one’s path who exemplifies the features you fancy to a 
greater degree. Features simply don’t matter from the get-go. 
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Rather, it is a love that involves commitment. I once attended a 
wedding sermon in which the minister said: ‘You fell in love, you were 
in love, and now you are saying to each other, I will love.’ One takes on 
the commitment of taking care of one’s beloved and living up to this 
commitment is a matter of the will. It is a love that is not contingent on 
the good fortune that passions won’t fade. 
And love is unconditional on this model. Love won’t fade when one’s 
beloved errs, shows weakness, or in whatever way does not live up to 
expectations. It is a love that aims to build up the beloved. Hence the 
lower the beloved falls, the greater the call. It is like an ardent sports fan 
who is not let down when the team goes through a losing streak. Agape 
is not fair-weather love. 
But the constancy of agape comes at a cost. Here are some trouble 
spots for agape. A model of love that exhorts us to bear it all can become 
self-destructive. To protect our mental health, its proponents tend to 
throw in a qualifier that functions as an exit clause. Note how John Paul 
II throws in ‘up to a point’—love persists in spite of the beloved’s faults, 
up to a point. In Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116, love ‘bears it out even to the 
edge of doom’—but it doesn’t follow the beloved beyond this edge. 
Nonetheless, agape may have its boundaries, but it can come dangerously 
close to the pitfalls of co-dependency and abusive relationships. 
Here is another weakness. How can an agape-model lover respond 
to the simple question from their beloved: ‘Why do you love me?’ They 
might say: ‘Because I want to take care of you.’ ‘But why,’ the beloved 
may persist, ‘do you want to take care of me, rather than of somebody 
else?’ What might our agape-model lover respond? ‘Because our paths 
crossed?’ That just seems a bit too whatever. ‘Because I saw that you 
needed me?’ That seems a bit patronizing, or even worse, it sounds like 
a handyman who is keen to buy a fixer upper. What would bring a spark 
to the beloved’s eye is if the lover would tell them what makes them so 
special. But if they are genuine about this, if it’s more than some sweet 
nothing, then we are back with the eros model. 
Fusion
Finally, there is the fusion model. Aristophanes’ myth tells of how humans 
try to find their other halves to reunite with them and go through life 
 573. Love
in the form they were before Zeus punished them. Unlike on the agape 
model, features do matter: People find their other halves by identifying 
complementary features, like the white and the black shape in a yin-yang 
symbol. But unlike on the eros model, what elicits our love is not how 
wonderful these features are. Rather, we recognize a complementarity 
between ourselves and the beloved, and it is this complementarity that 
grounds our love. 
Philosophers talk about the phenomenology of love. What they mean 
by this is that there is something that it is like to be in love, that loves 
strikes us in particular ways, that love appears to us to be one way or 
another. The myth of Aristophanes ticks many boxes in this respect. 
Love is about forming an extended self or a shared identity with the 
beloved. ‘One is both and both are one in love’ is a line in Christina 
Rossetti’s poem ‘I Loved You First.’ Or think of Catherine’s speech 
in Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights in which she proclaims: ‘I AM 
Heathcliff! He’s always, always in my mind: not as a pleasure, any more 
than I am always a pleasure to myself, but as my own being.’ 
The extended self can take various forms. It can be a kind of 
merging—the individual selves are permeable, and they fuse as 
two cells become one. The old selves are no more. There is one new 
self that has absorbed the selves that once were. The singletons are 
gone; only the dyad remains. Aristophanes in the Symposium seems 
to favor this idea of merging. He imagines Hephaestus, the god of 
blacksmiths, proposing to weld the two lovers together. And the 
lovers wholeheartedly agree to this—they wish to ‘be melted into one 
and remain one here and hereafter.’ And this is what grounds love’s 
constancy: Dissolving the union would be like a death—a death of the 
extended self. 
If we wish to preserve the individual self, then we can envision love 
in one of two ways. Draw an outer circle representing the individual 
self and place a smaller circle of the shared self within it. Or draw an 
outer circle representing the shared self and place a smaller circle of the 
individual self within it. These pictures are suggestive. In ‘Love’s Bond,’ 
(The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations, 1989), the philosopher 
Robert Nozick writes that there is a gender difference, with men 
typically identifying with the former model and women with the latter 
model. That is, men typically make some space for the we within the I, 
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whereas women let the I be absorbed within the we. I leave it as an open 
question whether this is still a feature of love today. 
Love strikes us as fated. Think of the 20s jazz tune ‘It Had to Be You‘ 
by Isham Jones. It’s not that we got to know one another, and we found 
out that we were a good match. Rather, as soon as we met, we knew 
right away that this was the match that was waiting for us all along. 
There is no room for maybe. There are 7.9 billion people on the globe, 
and the only right match is between you and your beloved—nothing 
else will do, it just had to be you. Lovers may even tell stories about how 
it seemed as if someone was pulling the strings, providing a little tug left 
and right to bring back the two halves that were once united.
This also squares with Aristophanes’ explanation of sexual 
preference. We do not choose our sexual preference. They are simply 
given to us because they are contingent on whether we came from a 
unisex or mixed-sex original unit.
We feel that we have always known our beloved. ‘I knew I loved you 
before I met you’ is a line in the chorus of the late 90s hit ‘I Knew I Loved 
You’ by Savage Garden. Lovers sense that they were already present in 
each other’s dreams before their paths crossed. They did not just find 
someone who matched their dreams—rather, they already knew this 
very person from their dreams. 
Gabriel García Márquez plays on this theme in the short story ‘Eyes 
of a Blue Dog.’ It is a conversation between two lovers who repeatedly 
meet in their dreams. Since they hit it off so well, they agree to find 
each other in the real world, with the phrase ‘Eyes of a Blue Dog’ as a 
kind of code. But tragically, nothing comes of it because the man cannot 
remember his dreams, and the woman goes mad in her pursuit to find 
the lover of her dreams in real life. 
This feeling of prescience or déjà vu is also present in Aristophanes’ 
myth. We feel that we already knew each other before we met because 
our beloved is our long-lost love from the time before time began when 
we were still one. 
This model also has some trouble spots. It combines two aspects. 
First, there is love as merging, and second, there is uniqueness, the 
notion that we are destined to love the one and only person that is the 
one for us. 
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As to merging, Kahlil Gibran warns against this loss of the individual 
self in ‘On Marriage.’ One should drink together, but not from the same 
cup. One should eat together, but not from the same loaf. And then he 
suggests various images in which greatness is reached by joint action 
that involves individuality—such as the pillars that make a temple or 
the strings of a lute that stand by themselves yet jointly create music. A 
respectful distance helps the cause of love—the cypress and the oak do 
not grow in each other’s shadow. 
We find a similar warning in Shel Silverstein’s children’s books The 
Missing Piece and The Missing Piece meets the Big O. A rock is trying to 
find its missing piece, and a missing piece is trying to find its rock so 
that the two of them can merge and roll, but the mission ultimately fails, 
and they find happiness without merging. 
As to uniqueness, granted, there is something magical about love 
being fated and about prescience. At the same time, in a more sober 
hour, who could believe this to be the case? It is a fitting thing to say at 
moments of a distinctly romantic nature. But really, 7.9 billion people, 
and we each should find our very own Waldo in that multitude? We 
might as well give up from the start. This feature of the model also 
makes it into the cruelest model for the pangs of love lost—to which we 
will turn below. 
Finally, there is a tension between merging and uniqueness. Merging 
suggests a slow process. The shared self is formed over time, and it 
draws on a shared history between the lovers. We have gone through so 
much together, they say. Uniqueness is based on your beloved being the 
one and only person whom you were once connected with. When you 
meet your other half, you will recognize it as such, as if meeting with 
an old friend, and you will wish to reconnect pronto. Hence uniqueness 
suggests that love should be love at first sight and that it should be head 
over heels. Now maybe love is a little bit of both and then the co-presence 
of merging and uniqueness is to the credit of the model. 
Love Lost
So, what about when love is lost? What about when constancy fails? 
Each of these models has its own story to tell on why the pangs of love 
lost hurt so much. 
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On the eros model, loving one’s beloved is like loving an awesome 
Lamborghini for a car lover. And losing one’s beloved is like losing 
that Lamborghini—maybe different in magnitude, but not in kind. 
Something great—that is, something with the greatest features—just 
slipped through my fingers. Maybe the car was even tailor-made, a kind 
of pièce unique. And that is what is lost, never to return. I may find a new 
sports car, just as I may find a new love. But it may take a while. And 
there is the fear that I may never find one as wonderful as the one I had 
before.
On the agape model, the pangs of love lost are less about loss but rather 
about failure. It is not that someone drove off with my Lamborghini. 
Rather, it is as if I was trying single-mindedly to save the family firm, 
working night and day, but I finally had to admit defeat and declare 
bankruptcy. There is this nagging doubt that if I had just tried a bit harder, 
I could have succeeded, and maybe I just did not quite love enough. And 
now the whole endeavor was for naught, a kind of Sisyphus labor. 
The fusion model is the cruelest of them all when it comes to the loss of 
love. The loss of love is like a death—it is the death of the shared self. 
It is Dickinson’s ‘all we need of hell.’ And this death of the shared self 
affects the individual self in the deepest way, though how it affects us 
depends on whether we see the shared self as a merged self, as having a 
place within the individual self, or as encompassing the individual self. 
On the model of merged selves, the individual selves are ripped 
apart and are left wounded. On the model of the shared self within the 
individual self, what is left is a hole, a gap, an emptiness. On the model 
of the individual self within the shared self, the individual self is left 
without a compass or a mooring place—it is adrift in a world that makes 
no sense because the shared self that gave it meaning is gone. 
What adds to the trauma is the image that love is fated. If it had to be 
you, then it is not just a death—it is the death of the one and only shared 
self that there can ever be. It is the sense that there is only one missing 
piece that provided the right fit that makes the loss irreparable. 
It is not a loss of something of great value, as in the eros model. The 
relationship may even have been arduous from the get-go. It is not a loss 
of a project as in the agape model—a doomed love may never even have 
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reached the stage of being a project to bring to fruition. Rather, it is the 
sense that there is something deeply amiss with the world, because, for 
whatever reason, what had to be so cannot be so—the world below does 
not live up to what is written in the stars. 
‘Love like you’ll never be hurt’ is a line in a quote that has many 
attributions on the web. The pangs of love lost have their distinct bitter 
tastes on the eros, the agape, and the fusion models. The prospect of being 
hurt may make us wary of entering amorous relationships. That is one 
way of coping. It may not be to everyone’s taste. And even if we choose 
this route, Cupid may just relentlessly knock again—’comes love, 
nothing can be done,’ as the jazz standard ‘Comes Love’ goes. 
Another way of coping is to give into love but to conceive of it in 
some more cynical fashion or other, to shield oneself from the pangs of 
love lost. There are three variants of this, and they curiously map onto 
the eros, agape, and fusion models. This is what we will turn to next. 
Cynical Models
After directing The Piano, Jane Campion volunteered some interesting 
reflections on love in an interview: 
I think the romantic impulse is in all of us and that sometimes we live it 
for a short time, but it’s not part of a sensible way of living. It’s a heroic 
path and it generally ends dangerously. I treasure it in the sense that I 
believe it’s a path of great courage. It can also be the path of the foolhardy 
and the compulsive. 
Note how Campion is both respectful and dismissive of romantic love. 
The eros, agape, and fusion models are reflectively endorsable models 
of love: They are respectful of love, make love worth having, and its 
loss worth mourning. Coping with the loss of love requires different 
dynamics within each of these models. An altogether different way of 
coping with the loss of love is to be dismissive of love, to construe love 
as something rather foolish, something that is not worth shedding a tear 
over. Let us call these cynical models. If that is what love is all about, then 
it is not much worth having. And if it’s not much worth having, then 
its loss is not much worth mourning. And so, a cynical model is itself a 
coping device. We tell ourselves that love is something strangely banal, 
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and we should not let something so banal get to us. The Cartesian model, 
the love for love’s sake model, and the neurobiological model are three such 
cynical models.
The Cartesian model. In René Descartes’ Letter to Chanut on the sixth of 
June 1647 (p. 201), he addresses the question of why we are attracted to 
people without having any ideas about their merits. He tells how he was 
fond of a young girl who had a slight strabismus (that is, a particular eye 
affliction) when he was a child. He finds himself at a later age attracted 
to women who have a strabismus. Once he becomes aware that his 
attraction is caused by what he calls a ‘defect,’ he manages to correct for 
it and withdraws his love.
Descartes backs up this observation with the science of the time. 
Impressions form creases in the brain. Once the creases are in, the brain 
is disposed to fold in the same way when an impression occurs that is 
similar in certain respects. I take it that the girl with the strabismus was 
lots of fun as a playmate and so elicited a love crease in Descartes’ brain. 
And once the outline of the crease had formed, eyes with a strabismus 
by themselves sufficed to reproduce that very same love crease.
Descartes’ insight is surprisingly modern. His observation anticipates 
the experiments on Pavlovian conditioning in the early twentieth 
century. Ivan Pavlov rang a bell each time his dog was about to be fed. 
After a while, the dog started salivating whenever the bell rang, no 
matter whether there was food or not. The unconditioned stimulus is 
the food, and the unconditioned response is salivation. The conditioned 
stimulus is the bell. After a while, the conditioned stimulus suffices to 
set off the conditioned response of salivation, as psychologists say. 
Similarly, the enfant René is confronted with a playmate who is both 
fun and has a strabismus. For Monsieur Descartes, his love is triggered 
upon meeting a woman who has a strabismus, even if he knows nothing 
else about her. The unconditioned stimulus is the fun his playmate 
offers, and the unconditioned response is the affection. The conditioned 
stimulus, in Descartes’ case, is the strabismus and the conditioned 
response is that very same affection. 
Mixed with this Pavlovian conditioning is also a Freudian theme—
that this conditioning happens at an early age. Reading Descartes’ 
story today, one would think that many of the stimuli that condition 
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our affection are imprinted at an age that goes even further back than 
where our memory can reach. The neural creases of love are set in early 
infancy. Even though Descartes can identify the origin of this strange 
predilection, for most of us the secrets of the human heart are deeply 
hidden. 
Why do we love the people we do? We fall head over heels in love 
knowing full well that trouble is around the corner—with ‘eyes wide 
shut,’ to quote the title of Stanley Kubrick’s last film. And this explains 
why such dismal relationships are formed. Imagine shopping for a 
car in a used-car lot and what subconsciously compels your choices is 
attending to something that does not matter in the least—say, whether 
the door handles are nice and shiny or not. You would come home with 
one lemon after another—and no wonder. 
If there is so little rhyme or reason to our heart’s desires, then that 
does at least give us some reason to treat them with a bit less reverence, 
if not be outright distrustful of them. But love is resilient—we can’t just 
turn off the dial of our affections. As Pascal writes in Pensées, ‘the heart 
has its reasons, which reason does not know.’ (§277) But if reason comes 
to realize that some of the heart’s reasons have a dubious history, then 
it may at least be worth reminding oneself of this to soften the pangs of 
love lost. 
The love for love’s sake model. In the area of romantic love, some people 
see themselves in a line of great romantics—to surrender to love’s 
vicissitudes is all that makes life worth living for them. They are the 
Tristans and Isoldes, the Abelards and Eloises, the Romeos and Juliets 
among us—either desperately looking for love, too much in love, or 
tragically falling out of love. For them life is worth living only on a 
rollercoaster of love gone mad. They render themselves vulnerable to 
these emotions or even encourage them since they are, after all, the most 
uncompromising romantics who ever roamed this earth. 
This model has its champions. After Elizabeth Barrett Browning asks 
her beloved in Sonnet 14 not to love for any feature of hers that may 
perish, she asks him to love ‘for love’s sake’ instead. What is it to love 
for love’s sake? Think of making art for art’s sake. People who make art 
for art’s sake are uncompromising—all that matters is aesthetics. People 
who love for love’s sake are equally uncompromising—all that matters 
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is romantic sentiment. Following Browning, let us call this the love-for-
love’s-sake model—or to give it some erudition, the amor-amoris-gratia 
model. We come to love because we want our lives to be guided by 
romantic sentiment. 
If willing to live the life of a great romantic brings a bit of spice to 
life, there is little harm in it. But if we cherish romantic sentiments too 
much, they may come to drag us down, and they are known to take their 
champions well beyond the edge of doom. There is a feedback loop. In 
one direction, the sentiments that surge within us inform our sense of 
self—our sense of who we are and what we are like. In the other direction, 
our sense of self discourages some sentiments and encourages others. 
Cultivating a sense of self as a great romantic operates as a catalyst in 
this cycle—it encourages us to indulge in the sentiments of romantic 
love, for better or worse—and I am afraid, mostly for worse. In so far as 
it is for worse, coping with the pangs of love lost requires removing the 
catalyst or correcting a sense of self that is too much defined by tragic 
love. And this is especially so if it is a willed sense of self influenced by 
social fads.
There can be solace in admitting that one’s love is merely the love 
of the great romantic. When we are in the throes of a heartache, we ask 
ourselves to what extent our agony might not be fed more by being in 
love with love and all its accouterments, rather than by having lost the 
love of the actual person. We acknowledge that being in love with love 
is a love that is not worth cherishing, we try to self-correct, and this 
self-correction will soften the heartache that is de rigueur on this model. 
The neurobiological model. Biologists studying pair-bonding have found 
that among mammals, monogamy is relatively rare—we find it in only 
five percent of species. It is particularly interesting to compare closely 
related species that differ in this respect, with one being monogamous 
and the other not. What causes this kind of behavior in the animal world? 
Prairie voles mate for life. They form attachments after short periods 
of exposure to each other. It helps if they can mate during this period, 
but even without mating, they can form a bond for life. Their bond even 
transcends death—if the female dies, the male does not search for a 
new partner. (I have not been able to ascertain whether the female is 
equally committed.) Their close cousin, the montane vole, is more of 
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a libertine—always in search of new sexual partners—or in biological 
parlance, it does not display any pair-bonding behavior. 
Why does one species pair-bond while the other does not? The species 
have evolved under different environmental pressures. First, in low-
density environments much time is lost finding another suitable mate, 
so it pays off to stick with the same partner. Second, with low dispersal 
opportunities across the terrain for the offspring, a species is better off 
creating low numbers of high-quality offspring, and this is helped by 
the presence of both parents. The prairie vole lives in lower-density 
and lower-dispersal-opportunity environments than the montane vole, 
which explains the difference. 
Is there something in the neurobiology of the prairie vole that explains 
how they manage to pair-bond? During cohabitation and mating, 
hormones (oxytocin and vasopressin) are released. In prairie voles, the 
placement of the receptors for these hormones is in brain centers rich 
in dopamine, and dopamine is known to play a role in addiction. This 
physiology does not hold for montane voles. 
When prairie voles are separated from their mates, they react with 
listlessness. They don’t paddle when thrown in water, and they don’t flail 
when they are suspended from their tails. And again, the neurobiology 
that underlies this listlessness is well-documented. 
Does it transfer to the human animal? There are similarities in 
behavior and the underlying neurobiology. Yet less is known since 
we may be just a tad more complex than the prairie voles and getting 
permission to run experiments on human love lives is not so easy. But it is 
safe to assume that, with time, scientists will fill out the neurobiological 
stories of humans falling in love, being in love, and falling out of love. 
How would knowledge of this neurobiological model of love affect 
our experience of the pangs of love lost? Knowledge of the physiology 
of what happens when you slam your knee into a coffee table does 
not help much when coping with physical pain. But when it comes 
to psychological pain, the case is slightly different. Knowledge of the 
physiology that underlies our emotions can help us cope, at least to 
some extent. Some people are sensitive to time-zone changes due to 
intercontinental travel or darkness during the winter and react with 
mood swings and depression. Knowing one’s sensitivities allows one to 
brace oneself and exercise at least some control. 
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Think of yourself as a member of a species that has evolved with 
a qualified preference for life-long mating due to pressures from its 
environment. This preference rests on a neurophysiological mechanism 
that discourages break-ups. Separation deregulates the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis in the human brain, causing stress and 
mood swings. The mechanism resembles the mechanism underlying 
addiction. There may even be a genetic basis for the effectiveness of this 
mechanism, in the same way that there may be a genetic basis for being 
an addictive personality. 
This may not be the most romantic story to tell on your first Valentine’s 
Day with a newfound love. It’s better to stick to Aristophanes on such 
an occasion. But when love has gone sour, this objectifying stance 
may bring more consolation than what we can say on any reflectively 
endorsable model. 
What the Cartesian model, the love-for-love’s-sake model, and the 
neurobiological model have in common is that they bring some 
irreverence to our understanding of love. If love is just latching on to some 
features that we became fixated on in early childhood, if it is contingent 
on a faddish sense of self, if it is brought on by a neurophysiological 
mechanism that played a role in the evolution of our species, then is it 
worth losing much sleep over? 
For Descartes, knowledge translated into control. He gave up on his 
attraction to women with strabismus. But of course, with knowledge 
does not come foolproof emotional control. We may continue having 
a thing for eyes affected by strabismus, cherish the drama in ill-fated 
loves as great romantics do, or shed tears while studying how much 
the regulation of the HPA-axis is sensitive to separation. Nonetheless, 
irreverence may have some healing power, when administered in the 
right dosages. 
The reflectively endorsable models and the cynical models are 
curious mirror images. Within each pair, the reflectively endorsable 
model offers the brighter image, while the cynical model offers the 
darker image. The eros model and the Cartesian model are both focused 
on the beloved’s features. The agape model and the love-for-love’s-sake 
model are both placed in negative space—they define themselves as a 
love that is not based on features. And the bond of love is what draws 
together the fusion model and the neurobiological model. 
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Is there a right model? I don’t think so. The revelers in Plato’s 
Symposium all have something to add to the mixture. At different times 
in life, depending on where we come from, whom we are with, and 
where we want to go, it’s good to hold up some models and downplay 
others. Neither is there a right model to deal with unrequited love or 
love lost. There is no telling what may work when, for whom, and with 
whom. Loving, after all, is an art, not a science. And so is coping with 




‘Man is a wolf to other men,’ a Latin proverb goes. Social life can be 
a source of conflict. There is a curious tool for coping with tensions, 
namely the social practice of apologizing and accepting apologies. It 
is a restorative practice that is meant to heal what went astray, a kind 
of lubricant that keeps social life rolling. But at the same time, it is a 
curious tool that renders endless philosophical conundrums. 
In the private sphere, we expect our friends or loved ones to apologize 
for the harm or hurt they have done to us. In the public sphere, we 
welcome apologies from institutions for morally questionable policies. 
But there are also voices saying that there is too much apologizing, 
both in private and public life. In the short story ‘The Man Upstairs’ 
P.G. Wodehouse writes, ‘It is a good rule in life never to apologize. The 
right sort of people do not want apologies, and the wrong sort take a 
mean advantage of them.’ Wodehouse’s quote is tongue-in-cheek, but it 
does point to the fact that there are constraints on dispensing the social 
lubricant of apologizing—that more is not necessarily better. 
One might retort that there are not too many apologies, but rather 
too few genuine apologies. Gilbert K. Chesterton writes in The Common 
Man: ‘a stiff apology is a second insult.’ But what makes an apology 
a genuine apology? There is a cognitive, emotional, motivational, and 
attitudinal component to a genuine apology. 
As to the cognitive component, the offending party may fail to properly 
recognize their wrongdoing. Japan offered formal apologies in 2005 for 
their actions in World War II, but China and South Korea continue to see 
these apologies as disingenuous. The issue is that history textbooks used 
in Japanese high schools present a slanted perspective on the war, and 
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Japanese public officials continue to visit the Yasukuni shrine honoring 
Japan’s war-time dead, including war criminals. (‘Koizumi Apologizes 
for War; Embraces China and South Korea.’ The New York Times, 16 Aug. 
2005)
As to the emotional component, an apology may signal a lack of 
remorse or sympathy for the suffering caused and may be motivated 
by opportunism. The compensation offered by Volkswagen and other 
German companies for slave labor during World War II in the late 90s 
was criticized for being ridiculously low and motivated by political 
expediency. (‘Volkswagen to Create $12 Million Fund for Nazi-Era 
Laborers.’ The New York Times, 11 Sep. 1998)
As to the motivational component, the offending party may not 
display a willingness to change its ways. Apologies for the treatment 
of Native Americans in the US carry little weight if land rights are not 
being restored and sacred places are still not being recognized as such. 
As to the attitudinal component, we expect an apology to be 
accompanied by an attitude of humility. After the first Gulf War, a 
Kuwaiti public official rejected Saddam Hussein’s apology for the Iraqi 
invasion of his country as an apology disguised in arrogance because of 
the provocative nature of his speech and his military uniform. 
Each of these components seem both obvious and innocent enough, 
but they raise many issues. I will discuss each of them in turn, raising 
more questions than answers, I am afraid. What is even more mysterious 
than offering and accepting apologies is bidding for and offering 
forgiveness. I will say a few words about the difference between these 
practices. Finally, I will address P.G. Wodehouse’s dictum that there is 
too much apologizing—even genuine apologizing—in this world. 
Mea Culpa
A genuine apology typically expresses the recognition that what one did 
or failed to do was wrong. It is not due for actions that are merely wrong 
in hindsight. Suppose that all the medical evidence points in favor of one 
treatment, the treatment is pursued, and yet the patient dies because of 
the treatment, say, due to an unforeseeable allergic reaction. In this case, 
no apologies are due. The doctor might say that they are sorry for what 
happened, for how things turned out, but they do not need to apologize 
for what they did. 
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Expressions of regret over the consequences of one’s actions are 
often substituted for apologies. They are often coined as apologies, but 
they fall short of genuine apologies. For a genuine apology, it does not 
suffice that the offender admits that their action turned out badly—they 
must also recognize their culpability. This issue is at the forefront of two 
controversies that were in the news in the 2000s. 
The newspaper Jylland Aftenposten published satirical cartoons 
targeting Islam and the person of Muhammed. Many Muslims 
considered these cartoons to be highly offensive. Carsten Juste, the editor 
of Jylland Aftenposten, offered apologies for the feelings of Muslims that 
were hurt but did not apologize for publishing the cartoons since the 
actual publication, he said, is protected by freedom of the press. Many 
Muslims did not accept these apologies, presumably because Juste 
merely apologized for the fact that his actions turned out badly, while 
denying culpability for the action itself.
There was a similar reaction to a public lecture by Pope Benedict 
XVI at the University of Regensburg in September 2006. Pope Benedict 
discussed the incompatibility of faith and violence. He quoted the 
fourteenth-century Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Paleologus: ‘Show me 
just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find 
things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the 
sword the faith he preached.’ In response to the outrage in the Muslim 
world about the use of this quotation, the Vatican made the following 
statement: ‘The Holy Father […] sincerely regrets that certain passages 
of his address could have sounded offensive to the sensitivities of the 
Muslim faithful, and should have been interpreted in a manner that in 
no way corresponds to his intentions.’ But once again, to say that one 
regrets having caused offense and having been misunderstood is not the 
same as admitting culpability for one’s actions. 
These kinds of apologies are an inch away from a Hans Schwadron 
cartoon featuring a news anchorman saying: ‘As station manager, I’d like 
to apologize to any morons our TV editorial may have offended.’ 
There is a range of moral choices in which the connection between 
apologies and culpability is complex. These are choices that fall under 
the broad umbrella of moral dilemmas. I will distinguish between hard, 
tragic, and authentic choices. 
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Let a hard choice be a choice in which there are good reasons on both 
sides of the fence, but there is a right answer. For instance, my professional 
integrity may leave me with no choice but to fire a befriended colleague. 
Do I owe my friend an apology? 
Let a tragic choice be a choice in a situation in which there simply is no 
right moral answer. Reasons on both sides of the fence are individually 
compelling, and one does not outweigh the other. No choice constitutes 
the right choice—whatever one does is wrong. Think of Alan J. Pakula’s 
movie Sophie’s Choice after William Styron’s novel by the same name. 
A concentration camp guard forces a mother to choose between her 
two children or to lose both. Arguably, there is no right course of action 
here—not choosing and choosing are both wrong. Does Sophie owe an 
apology to her daughter because she chose her son? 
Let an authentic choice be a choice in which moral considerations 
unequivocally point to one course of action, but these moral 
considerations conflict with what the agent stands for in life. One can 
construe Gauguin’s choice to leave his family and to pursue his painting 
career in Tahiti as an authentic choice. Or think of the injunction to 
refrain from performing radiocarbon and DNA tests on the Kennewick 
Man—a 9,000-year-old skeleton dug up in the shallows of the Columbia 
River—to respect Native American sensitivities. Considering what one 
stands for in life, say, living as a committed and uncompromising artist 
or scientist, it may be the case that what one ought to do conflicts with 
the demands of morality. Arguably, morality may not always provide 
overriding reasons. Let us assume that there are indeed such authentic 
choices. Should Gauguin apologize to his family? Should a dedicated 
scientist who surreptitiously conducts testing on the Kennewick man 
apologize to Native Americans? 
One might say that apologies are due in moral dilemmas only in cases 
where there is culpability. In hard choices there is a right answer, and, 
arguably, pursuing this course of action releases one from culpability. In 
tragic choices, there is no right answer, and, arguably, no matter what 
one does, there is culpability. In authentic choices, one turns one’s back 
on moral demands, and again, arguably, there is culpability. So, one 
might say, apologies are due for tragic and authentic choices, but not 
for hard choices provided I made the right choice. But maybe this is too 
simplistic. 
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Maybe, in hard choices, apologies are due even in the absence of 
culpability. There may be no culpability, but moral conflicts are not 
‘soluble without remainder,’ as Bernard Williams wrote. If I miss an 
appointment with you because my child suddenly became ill, I certainly 
chose to do the right thing by attending to them, but I owe it to you to 
inform you, to offer you apologies, and to make reparations if my failure 
to honor our appointment was costly to you in some way or other. 
But do we really need to apologize? Is the demand for apologies 
not misplaced here? What I owe you might not be an apology, but 
rather an expression of regret for having been placed in this choice 
situation and for the consequences of my actions. This would take care 
of the remainder, and a genuine apology for what I did is misplaced 
considering that there is no culpability. 
As to tragic and authentic choices, maybe an apology would not 
be genuine even in the presence of culpability. The reason is that there 
is a motivational component to a genuine apology—a willingness to 
act differently. Tragic and authentic choosers may admit that they are 
culpable for transgressing a moral boundary. Still, they typically do 
not say that they would have acted differently or will act differently in 
relevantly similar situations. Sophie may stand by what she did while 
admitting that she is culpable. And the same holds for Gauguin and 
our dedicated scientist. But if this is the case, could they be said to be 
offering a genuine apology? How could one accept an apology if one 
were to know full well that the person offering the apology stands by 
their actions and would do the same in relevantly similar situations? 
What might be more fitting is not an apology for what one did, but 
an expression of regret for having been placed in a tragic or authentic 
choice situation, or an expression of sympathy for the suffering caused 
by one’s choice.
Recall Zidane’s infamous head-butt on Materazzi after a provocation 
in the World Cup final of 2006. In a TV interview, Zidane states: ‘I 
reacted, and it, of course, is not an action that one should do. I must say 
that strongly.’ He apologizes, not to Materazzi but to fans and educators, 
saying that ‘it was an inexcusable action.’ But at the same time, he claims 
that he has no regrets for what he did since to have regrets ‘would be 
like admitting that [Materazzi] was right to say all that.’ 
74 Coping
Zidane’s action can be seen as an authentic choice in which the 
moral demand not to engage in un-sportsmanlike actions is outweighed 
by what his honor demands of him. ‘Above all, I am a man,’ he says. 
He recognizes that what he did was morally wrong, and that provides 
sufficient reason for an apology to the world, although not to the 
offending party. Nonetheless, his saying that he does not have regrets 
can be interpreted as affirming that he would not act differently if he 
could do it over again. But it remains questionable whether an apology 
that is not accompanied by regret for what one did is indeed a genuine 
apology. 
Sympathy and Remorse
A genuine apology typically expresses remorse for one’s actions, and 
there is sympathy for the harm or hurt one’s wrongdoing may have 
caused. An apology’s sincerity can be measured by one’s willingness 
to make amends or, more concretely in some cases, reparations. This 
willingness is a proxy for the presence of sympathy. If one really cares 
about the harm or hurt that one has caused, one ought to be willing to 
take steps to alleviate this suffering. It is also a proxy for remorse. A 
remorseful person wishes that they could do things over again. But the 
past cannot be undone, and the next best thing is to make amends. In 
making amends, we pay respect to the victim, and we distance ourselves 
from our offense. Of course, the converse does not hold. The willingness 
to make amends is not conclusive evidence for the presence of remorse 
or sympathy. One could make amends begrudgingly because one is 
under pressure or make amends because restoring social interaction 
opens up new business opportunities. 
Sometimes there is just no room for making amends. The victim may 
be unreachable or dead. Or they may simply not accept apologies or 
any overtures from the offender to make amends. It may matter very 
much to the offender that they have the opportunity to make amends. 
In a religious context, the wrongdoer can appeal to the practice of 
penance. The wrongdoing is construed as an offense against God, and 
the wrongdoer can make amends to God through acts of penance. 
In a secular context, a proxy for the victim is often sought—think of 
Germany’s support for Israel, which extends well beyond reparations to 
Holocaust survivors.
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The willingness to make amends hinges on remorse and sympathy. 
How much is required in the way of making amends? Two factors are 
relevant. There is the turpitude of the wrongdoing—that is, how vile or 
wicked was the thing you did. And then there is the size of the harm and 
hurt that was caused by what you did. Typically, the turpitude and the 
extent of harm and hurt go hand in hand. Genocide is deeply vile, and 
the scale of suffering is massive. A single micro-aggression is merely 
insensitive, and the hurt is often fleeting. But sometimes, the turpitude 
of the wrongdoing does not match the size of the harm or hurt. The 
former may be either greater or smaller than the latter, and this makes 
for interesting cases. 
Here is a case where the turpitude of the crime is greater than the 
harm or hurt caused. Suppose that a doctor maliciously administers 
what they take to be an overdose of a medicine to make space on 
their ward, but that the dosage unexpectedly cures the patient. Is it 
meaningful to ask that amends be made in such cases? One solution is 
that the offender is asked to make amends by supporting causes that 
support victims of medical malpractice in general. 
What if the size of the hurt or harm is greater than the turpitude of 
the crime? These are cases of moral bad luck and are extensively discussed 
in jurisprudence. For instance, there is the eggshell skull rule. An offender 
inflicts a minor injury on a victim, but due to the victim’s frailty—their 
proverbial eggshell skull—the injury causes major harm. The rule states 
that the offender is liable for all the harm caused. Similar issues arise for 
strict liability and felony murder. 
The legal question is what the proper measure of punishment should 
be in such cases. In the context of apologies, the question is whether 
a genuine apology requires that the willingness to make amends be 
proportional to the limited turpitude of the crime or the extensive harm 
or hurt that was thereby caused. This is a complicated issue. One would 
certainly expect some sympathy from the offender for the damage 
caused, and it is hard to believe that this sympathy is genuine if it does 
not translate into a willingness to make amends that provide relief. But 
then again, it does seem excessive to impose substantial reparations for 
offenses of limited turpitude as a requirement on a genuine apology. 
A solution to this problem might be that there are two kinds of 
amends—amends that address the wrongdoing and amends that 
address the harm or hurt caused. Through the former, I make it clear 
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to you that, unlike how I treated you in the past, I consider you to be 
a person who is worthy of respect. For example, doing something for 
you that is costly to me may convey this message. Through the latter, I 
compensate you for the harm or the hurt that I inflicted on you. What is 
due are different kinds of amends, viz. respect-conveying amends, such 
as a public admission of wrongdoing, and harm-repairing amends, such 
as reparation payments. The turpitude of the crime and the size of the 
harm caused determine what kind of amends are fitting.
 Striving to Do Better
A genuine apology typically expresses counterfactual and conditional 
commitments. Counterfactual commitments are about whether I would 
be motivated to act differently if the clock were turned back. Conditional 
commitments are about whether I am motivated to act differently if I 
encounter a future situation similar in morally relevant respects. 
However, there are cases in which counterfactual or conditional 
commitments are absent, and yet apologies may be fitting. We already 
discussed the controversial cases of tragic and authentic choices. 
Furthermore, consider cases of incorrigible weakness of the will. I 
genuinely recognize my culpability for a past weak-willed action. But I 
also know my weakness of will in the matter at hand to be incorrigible. 
I know that being the weak-willed person that I am, I would act in 
precisely the same way if I were placed in the same situation, and I 
will act in precisely the same way if I am placed in a similar position. 
Would an apology then be disingenuous? I do not think so—people in 
loving relationships continually apologize to one another for recurrent 
wrongdoings, knowing full well that they are likely to reoffend in 
similar ways. 
These considerations prompt the following response. One might say 
that I need not be confident that I will act differently—it suffices that I 
intend to act differently. However, can I intend something when I know 
full well that I will fall victim to weakness of the will and that I will not 
be able to do so? 
This brings us to the Toxin Puzzle, which was coined by the 
philosopher Gregory Kavka in 1983. I can instantaneously get one 
million dollars merely by intending today to drink a toxin tomorrow 
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that will make me painfully ill for one day. I do not need to actually 
drink the toxin; it suffices that I intend to do so. This seems like easy 
money, but the problem is, as Kavka points out, that by tomorrow, I will 
have no reason whatsoever to drink the toxin—after all, the money will 
be in the bank by the time I am supposed to drink the toxin. And since 
I know this to be the case, how can I intend today to drink it tomorrow? 
Similarly, an incorrigibly weak-willed person who has self-
knowledge would be unable to form an intention to change their ways. 
If they know that they will be weak-willed tomorrow, they cannot form 
an intention today to be strong-willed tomorrow. Does this block them 
from apologizing? Is it the case that an incorrigibly weak-willed person 
who has the epistemic virtue of self-knowledge is not capable of offering 
a genuine apology, but their counterpart who lacks this virtue would 
be capable thereof? Is ignorance bliss in the practice of apologizing? 
This seems to follow once we endorse conditional commitments as a 
requirement on genuine apologies. I do not quite know what to respond, 
but I find it difficult to swallow: It seems to me that even incorrigibly 
weak-willed people who have self-knowledge can offer genuine 
apologies. 
There is the curious biblical passage (Luke 17:4) in which Jesus 
enjoins the disciples to forgive their brother even ‘if he sins against 
you seven times in a day, and comes back to you seven times, saying, 
“I repent.”’ But what does this injunction amount to? Does Jesus enjoin 
us to forgive the incorrigibly weak-willed after a genuine apology, or 
does he enjoin us to forgive unconditionally, even if there is no genuine 
apology on the table?
There is a further issue about the scope of conditional commitments. 
Suppose that I swindle an elderly woman out of her savings. I offer my 
apologies. What kind of commitments does a genuine apology impose 
on my future actions? Clearly, I cannot be plotting to swindle another 
elderly person out of their savings while making a genuine apology. 
Nor can I be plotting another crooked money-making scheme. So, a 
necessary condition is that I commit myself to improving my actions 
in the types of choices similar in morally relevant respects. At the same 
time, it would not commit me, say, to stop boozing. So, in general, 
it does not commit me to refrain from unrelated vices. A genuine 
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apology requires a moral renewal in relevantly similar areas but not a 
full-fledged moral renewal. 
Humility
A genuine apology should be delivered in a humble manner. ‘The 
manner of the Baalei Teshuvah [the penitent] is to be very humble 
and modest,’ writes Maimonides. Why is such an attitude required in 
offering apologies? 
Being humble is about metaphorically or literally bowing one’s head. 
When I bow my head to you, acknowledging my offense, I attribute 
special respect to you. I do so for two reasons. First, I try to make up for 
the deficit of respect with which I treated you. Second, I offer you the 
authority to accept or not to accept my apology. If you do, you restore 
my moral stature, and we can treat each other again as moral equals. Let 
us look more carefully at this process. 
‘Bowing one’s head in shame’ is a common expression. But bowing 
one’s head does not always require feeling shame. Outside of the moral 
sphere, we feel shame for egregious failings, but not for common failings. 
There is shame in failing a simple exam, but not an exam with very low 
success rates. Similarly, if the moral failing is an egregious failing, then 
shame is in order. When apologizing for rape or murder, we expect the 
offender to bow their head in shame. But we also apologize for losing 
our temper or forgetting to do our chores, and there is no shame in such 
common moral failings. Our apologies for such common offenses are 
not any less genuine. So, shame does not tell the complete story of why 
we bow our heads when apologizing.
So, what is bowing one’s head all about then? Apologies are 
admissions that I did not treat you with the respect that is due to you. I 
bow my head to make up for the deficit of respect in my earlier treatment 
of you. Kant describes a case (p. 197) in which a wealthy offender must 
not only apologize but also kiss the hand of the victim who is of lower 
social status. This display of humility expresses an excess of respect, and 
this excess is meant to put the scales of respect back into balance.
In offering an apology, we run a risk. The victim has the authority 
to either accept or not to accept the wrongdoer’s apologies. What is it 
to accept an apology? Let us think about why a person may not want to 
accept an apology. They may think that there is no reason to apologize 
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or that the apology is not genuine. That is fair enough. But could a 
person refuse to accept an apology that they consider both in order and 
genuine? 
One suggestion might be that they do not accept the apology because 
they do not want to return to the way things were. But the acceptance 
of an apology does not commit one to do that. A date-rape victim might 
accept an apology from the offender who once was a trusted friend, but 
the last thing the victim might want to do is go back to the way things 
once were. So then why would I not accept an apology that I consider to 
be in order and genuine?
Within a religious context, there is humility in letting God be my 
judge. Similarly, there is humility in giving the victim of my wrongdoing 
the authority to restore my moral stature. In accepting an apology, the 
victim awards the offender the status of a moral equal again, that is, as 
a subject to whom respect is due on grounds of their personhood. To 
put this colorfully, if I accept an apology from you, then I can no longer 
proclaim that you are a scumbag, treat you as a scumbag, or even think 
of you as a scumbag. Certainly, I can continue to believe that what you 
did was a scumbag-like thing to do, but I no longer believe that what 
you did defines you as a scumbag. And if I am not willing or not able 
to do that, then I have no business accepting your apology. If I were 
to accept your apology and continue to think of you in this negative 
manner, I would not be genuinely accepting your apology. 
Forgiveness
How does accepting an apology relate to offering forgiveness? 
Forgiveness has a place in religion. We do not offer apologies to God, 
but rather, we ask for forgiveness. Nonetheless, humans do ask each 
other for forgiveness, especially for graver offenses in which offering 
apologies would feel too light. And forgiving also seems to require some 
emotional commitment that is less subject to the will and goes over and 
above accepting an apology. 
Can one forgive without accepting an apology? In the forgiveness 
literature, there is a sharp distinction between the position that 
forgiveness can be granted unconditionally, and the position that 
forgiveness should always be conditional on repentance. If forgiveness 
80 Coping
can be granted unconditionally, then it is possible to forgive an 
unrepentant offender who has no intention to apologize. If forgiveness 
is conditional on repentance, one may forgive a repentant offender who 
is unwilling or unable to apologize, maybe because they believe that 
what they did is so monstrous that it is beyond apologies. 
But suppose that the offender has offered genuine apologies. It 
seems to be a conceptual confusion to respond that one is willing to 
forgive, but not to accept apologies. What could possibly justify such 
a stand? Maybe a (confused) Christian might say: ‘I am following the 
commandments of my faith to forgive, but this does not mean that I 
accept your apologies.’ But in this case, I think that they would merely 
be paying lip service to the commandment. They would not genuinely 
be forgiving. 
The converse does strike me as meaningful though: One can accept 
apologies but not forgive. At least, one could say that one is not able 
to forgive yet. Forgiving requires something more than accepting an 
offender as a moral equal again, than committing oneself to no longer 
thinking of them as a scumbag. What is needed is an emotional change 
in the victim. Following Bishop Butler, forgiving requires that the victim 
let go of excessive resentment towards the offender. 
The Reverend Julie Nicholson lost her daughter in the 7/7 bombings 
in London. She left her position because she was unable to forgive the 
perpetrators and takes this attitude to conflict with the teachings of 
Christianity. (The Guardian, 7 Mar 2006) Now if the offenders were still 
alive and truly repentant, then she might accept their apologies but not 
yet be able to find it in her heart to forgive. In accepting their apologies, 
she would restore the offenders’ moral stature—she would commit 
herself to no longer thinking of them as moral monsters. But she may 
find it much harder to let go of intense feelings of resentment towards 
the offenders. Granting forgiveness is less under the control of the will 
than accepting apologies. 
Too Many Apologies
Now that we have tried hard to make sense of offering and accepting 
apologies, it is time to revisit P.G. Wodehouse’s quote: ‘The right sort of 
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people do not want apologies, and the wrong sort take a mean advantage 
of them.’ Who are the ‘right sort of people’ who do not need apologies? 
Zidane does not offer apologies to Materazzi in a TV interview after 
the infamous head-butt. What Zidane might say is that Materazzi has 
foregone a claim to respect in virtue of his own offenses—his verbal 
insults, his ‘words which were harder to take than actions.’ And indeed, 
there would be something ludicrous about Materazzi insisting on an 
apology from Zidane. There may be stringent moral reasons for Zidane 
not to reciprocate Materazzi’s insults. But be this as it may, these moral 
reasons are not grounded in claims to respect owed to Materazzi. 
There is a more general point here. When one is deeply aware of 
one’s own wrongdoings and shortcomings, one is much less inclined 
to insist on apologies. Rather, with this awareness comes a capacity to 
respect each other inclusive of shortcomings. We come to see offenses as 
expressions of a shared moral frailty rather than instances of disrespect. 
This level of self-knowledge of one’s own imperfections makes one 
much less insistent on apologies. 
Also, people with a strong sense of self-worth are less in need of 
apologies. They may recognize the offense, but they do not see themselves 
as being cast in the role of victim. The whole process of being offered 
apologies, and being expected to accept apologies, is just a distraction 
for them. Granted, at the extreme, this attitude could be seen as a fault. 
One may consider oneself too far above the fray, like a soaring hawk 
who can’t be bothered by the little birds mobbing them. In this case, one 
fails to see others as moral equals in the first place. But I do think that 
there is a healthy version of this attitude that is worth aspiring to. 
And what about the ‘wrong sort’ of people? The wrong sort of 
people are smug—they are unaware of their own shortcomings. They 
are all too prone to see moral deficits in others but not in themselves and 
hence overly eager to demand apologies. And insecurity makes people 
perceive minor offenses (or even alleged offenses) as major threats to 
their sense of self-worth. There is a Dutch saying that some people have 
‘long toes’—it’s all too easy to step on their feet. 
What about the wrong sort of people taking ‘a mean advantage’ of 
apologies? Power-crazed people will impose unreasonable conditions 
on accepting an apology, stipulating excessive demands for amends. 
82 Coping
They cherish the authority they have over the acceptance of the apology 
offered and will extend this sense of power far beyond the actual 
exchange of apologies offered and accepted. 
I do not wish to embrace P.G. Wodehouse’s dictum wholeheartedly, 
but there is a kernel of truth to it. People who are smug, insecure, and 
eager to gain personal advantage are all too eager to insist on apologies. 
People who are aware of their own shortcomings and have a strong 





The Fox in Aesop’s fable stumbles on some grapes in the woods that 
look appetizing to him. He jumps for the vine but can’t reach the grapes. 
He walks off and says something unappreciative about the grapes to 
cope with his frustration. Precisely what he says differs from one version 
of the fable to the next in subtle ways. Sometimes he changes tastes, 
sometimes he changes beliefs, and sometimes he changes frames. These 
are all different strategies for adapting to failure and hardship. Each of 
these strategies, as we will see, yields interesting conundrums. 
There is no genuine original version of the fable—Aesop is thought 
to have lived in the seventh and sixth century BCE, but no actual 
writings by his hand survive. There is a Latin version by Phaedrus (p. 
114–15) dating back to the first century CE. There is a seventeenth-
century French version by de La Fontaine (p. 92). There is also an 
eighteenth-century English version by Samuel Croxall (p. 41) and there 
are nineteenth-century English versions by Joseph Benjamin Rundell 
(p. 100) and by Walter Crane and W.J. Lipton. These versions make for 
interesting comparisons.
In Crane and Lipton’s version, the Fox ‘to this hour,/ Declares that 
he has no taste for grapes.’ Granted, the Fox may be kidding himself—
he still likes grapes but just says that he doesn’t. That is possible, but 
let’s take the Fox’s word for it—he no longer likes grapes. This is not 
an implausible reading: The Fox represents humankind, and it is a 
common human strategy to cope with frustration by tuning down or 
extinguishing one’s desires. 
Phaedrus has the Fox talking to the grapes: ‘You are not ripe yet—I 
don’t want to eat you while you are (still) sour.’ Similarly, Croxall’s Fox 
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proclaims: ‘Let who will take them! They are but green and sour; so I’ll 
even let them alone.’ This is a different coping strategy. The Fox doesn’t 
change his tastes. He still likes grapes—nice, sweet, and juicy grapes—
as much as he did before. But the grapes on the vine in the woods—no, 
they are green, unripe, and hence nasty and sour, he says. This is a case 
of shifting beliefs. Before the Fox found out that he couldn’t reach them, 
he had no doubt that these grapes were ripe and ready for eating. It’s 
only after he finds out that he can’t reach them that he comes to believe 
that the grapes are not ripe yet. The Fox is kidding himself about these 
grapes—he is a self-deceiving fox.
Then there are foxes for whom eating grapes suddenly becomes 
too vulgar. De La Fontaine’s Fox says that these grapes are ‘good for 
low-lives,’ and Rundell’s Fox declares that grapes are ‘not at all fit for 
a gentleman’s eating.’ This is yet another way to cope. The Fox places 
eating grapes in a different frame. Grapes are grub for the plebs of the 
woods. A fox shouldn’t be caught scarfing down grapes. He should dine 
like the nobler animals do—on field mice or what have you. 
Compare this to finding the local convenience store closed when 
you have a sudden urge for a cigarette. You turn around and say: ‘Oh 
well, smoking is bad for my health anyway.’ This is not self-deception. 
What you say is true enough, and you knew it all along. It’s just that the 
urge for that cigarette was so strong. There are some nice things about 
cigarettes and some not so nice things. Now that you can’t have your 
smoke, you might as well focus on the not so nice things. You switch 
frames so that you can cope. 
There are pure cases of taste, belief, and frame shifts, but often, they 
occur in combination. I run into a friend who regularly travels from New 
York to Boston for work. She says that she takes the plane—it’s fast and 
typically takes about four hours door-to-door. When I tell her that I tend 
to take the train for that stretch, she makes a wry face and says that she 
is sure glad her company does not make her do that. A year later, we run 
into each other on the train from New York to Boston. She tells me that 
her company changed policies, and she now has to take the train. I ask 
how she likes it. She says that she finds it quite nice. Why might that be?
She may have changed beliefs: She may tell me that the plane typically 
takes a good six hours door-to-door and that it’s actually faster by train. 
Or she may have changed tastes: She may tell me that she had no choice 
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but took to it easily and grew to like it fast enough—’Frankly, now that I 
am used to it,’ she might say, ‘I don’t understand how I ever put up with 
air travel.’ Or she may have changed frames: She may tell me about the 
carbon footprints of air travel versus train travel and that she is glad that 
she is not traveling by air anymore, considering climate change. Or, as is 
typically the case, she may have done a bit of each. 
And there is often ambiguity—not all responses fit neatly in the 
boxes of taste, belief, and frame shifts. If my friend comes to believe that 
the average travel time by air is longer, that would be a belief shift. But it 
is more likely that previously she focused on trips when the travel times 
by air were markedly faster, but now focuses on trips when the travel 
times by train are markedly faster. This would be more of a frame shift. 
Maybe she was a skeptic about climate change before. In that case her 
frame shift comparing carbon footprints also involves a belief shift. Or 
perhaps her taste shift from plane to train travel involves a frame shift—
she genuinely came to enjoy train travel by focusing on the fact that one 
can get work done on the train. 
 Mind Control 
An appeal to sour grapes deals with the frustration that comes with 
not being able to get what we want. That is one reason to self-manage 
by shifting beliefs, tastes, and frames. But it is not the only reason. We 
make willful belief shifts, taste shifts, and frame shifts not just to deal with 
frustration but to make our lives less painful, more bearable, or more 
pleasurable overall. 
Such acts of self-management may not happen consciously. It may 
require a third party to see what we are up to. The will controls a good 
many things in life without our being conscious of it doing so. And even 
if a third party tells us that some sudden shift in beliefs, tastes, or frames 
looks like sour grapes, we may vehemently deny it. 
Let’s start with willful belief shifts. In Arthur Miller’s play All My Sons, 
Joe and Kate Keller’s son is a fighter pilot reported as missing in action. 
Joe Keller is running a company that knowingly sells defective airplane 
parts to the military, causing many pilots’ deaths. All the evidence 
points to the fact that their son is dead, but Kate refuses to believe 
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it—she continues polishing his shoes for the day of his return. This is a 
case of wishful thinking. 
People try to forget painful episodes in their past. War traumas, 
unhappy childhoods, abandonment, or sexual abuse are erased from 
memory, are selectively remembered, or are substituted by more 
palatable but inaccurate accounts. These are cases of willful forgetting 
and willful misremembering. 
Wishful thinking, willful forgetting, and willful misremembering are 
all cases of willful belief shifts. Some of the things we believe don’t make 
us very happy. We try to cope with these beliefs by either deleting them, 
editing them, or overwriting them with more palatable versions. 
As to willful taste shifts, the Fox could work up his tastes for other culinary 
delights that the woods have to offer. If the field mice are abundant and 
the blackberries are in season, he can try to appreciate this new menu. If 
he finds better food than grapes, then it’s easy enough to extinguish his 
desire for the grapes on the vines that he can’t reach. 
Think of adapting to changing circumstances. You move to the city—
you try to work up an appreciation for theater and live music. You move 
to the country—you do the same for hiking and the great outdoors. 
With the right social context to prod, you can make art critics out of 
philistines and nature lovers out of city slickers. 
Young love tends to work very much like this. Your new soulmate 
may like all kinds of things—dog shows, country music, paragliding, 
or what have you—that were not high up on your list before they 
showed up. But you are having the time of your life, and you are willing 
to give anything a shot. As you are accompanying them on these new 
adventures, you come to enjoy all kinds of things. Young love could 
even make curling look a blast. 
In willful frame shifts, we place what we can’t have in a negative frame 
and what we do have in a positive frame. Or we contrast the present 
situation—dismal as it may be—with an even worse situation as in the 
proverbial, ‘It could have been worse!’ 
The pre-Raphaelite painter Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema numbered 
all his paintings in the order that he painted them to fend off forgeries. 
When he died, there was one painting missing—painting 338. An 
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unknown forger, probably a London art dealer, took advantage of this 
by forging Alma-Tadema’s name on unknown paintings and adding the 
number 338. Claiming to have uncovered the elusive painting, he sold 
the forgeries for high prices—mostly to art collectors from continental 
Europe who would be less likely to come back and challenge him. Many 
of these forgeries are still around. (The real 338 recently resurfaced at an 
antique roadshow in England.) 
Now suppose that you have unwittingly paid decent money for one 
of these forgeries. You certainly wouldn’t do it again, but you might come 
to reconcile yourself with the fact that you own one of the most famous 
forgeries of the Victorian age. You own a painting sold by ‘The Master 
of 338’ as he has come to be known. It is a good story. You creatively 
reframe your misfortune and make lemonade out of lemons. 
As in the case of sour grapes, there are many hybrid cases. I restricted 
taste shifts to instances where the shift is purely in taste—as in, losing 
one’s taste for coffee for no discernible reason. In my examples of taste 
change following a move or new love, such a pure taste change may 
be at work. But I may also come to see the activity in a different frame. 
Whereas I thought that curling was plain boring before, I now come to 
appreciate, say, the cooperative aspect of it. 
There is a danger of compliance that comes with such coping 
mechanisms. One can be overly skillful in coping with one’s present 
situation and this can take away the courage to fight for much-needed 
change. For example, you may adapt to being grossly underpaid by 
developing simple tastes, but maybe what you should do is gather the 
courage to knock on your boss’s door and demand a raise. Or you may 
adapt to living with an abusive spouse by telling yourself that things 
will get better, whereas what you really should do is call a lawyer and 
file for divorce. 
The situation may be genuinely unalterable, though. It may be 
such that no amount of courage can bring about change. In cases 
like this, tinkering with beliefs, tastes, and frames seems like the best 
way to cope with adversity and adapt to an irrevocable situation. We 
willfully steer our mental states to shore up strength, to safeguard 
our happiness, or at least to protect ourselves against a downward 
spiral of depression. There is a motivational quote that pops up on 
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many websites and is attributed to Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations: 
‘You have power over your mind, not over outside events. Realize 
this, and you will find strength.’ The quote is fitting and in the spirit 
of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, but the connection to any passage in 
the Meditations is tenuous at best. 
Do we have power over our minds? Some people hold beliefs strictly 
informed by the evidence, stick to what they want, and don’t fall for 
reframing. Others willfully manage their beliefs, tastes, or frames 
without flinching. They make up stories to make themselves feel better, 
have maximally elastic tastes, or always come up with an optimistic 
take on the situation. They have internal control over what they believe, 
what they want, and how they frame matters. And they are masters at 
working these controls to keep life maximally sweet. 
There are fanciful techniques for self-management. Hypnotherapists 
claim to erase memories and extinguish the urge to smoke. Drugs can 
reduce or increase sexual desire, control addictions, or make you see 
things in a rosier way. Amnesiac drugs make you forget about your 
colonoscopy. Beer lowers inhibitions. And philosophers like to imagine 
a pill that will make you believe that two plus two is five. 
A particular mode of self-management that is less fanciful but both 
common and curious is pretense—acting as if one already has brought 
about the projected mental shift with the aim of bringing it about. It’s 
the old saying: Fake it till you make it. This is what we will turn to next. 
Pretense
Here is a classic case of a willful belief shift through pretense. Blaise 
Pascal gives us a recipe for acquiring religious belief in his Pensées (§233) 
where he first lays out his wager: Either God exists, or he doesn’t. If he 
does, then you gain much by believing. If he does not, you don’t have 
anything to lose by believing. So, you should believe. 
The logic that governs this choice is the same as a mundane choice 
like this one: Should I throw an umbrella in the car? Why not? If it rains, 
you will be happy you have it along—and if not, then nothing is lost. So, 
take an umbrella. 
Pascal then envisions someone who says that they just can’t make 
themselves believe—they are just not the type to hold religious beliefs. 
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Pascal’s advice: Just act as if you already believe. Bless yourself with 
holy water and attend Mass. Start with a bit of pretense, and your beliefs 
will follow suit soon enough. 
The same strategy works for willfully shifting tastes. Your friends 
decide to have wine-tasting parties with dry white wines. You would 
like to join in, but you don’t like dry white wines. But you just decide to 
sign up. You also decide not to be a killjoy—you won’t be making wry 
faces and negative remarks. You will act as if you like them. In the right 
environment and with the right attitude, you figure, you will probably 
come to appreciate dry white wines. 
It also helps when it comes to willfully shifting frames. As you agree 
to join your new love in their favorite pastime, you will come to discover 
frames in which activities that were in the same category as a visit to 
the dentist suddenly become exciting and rewarding. You wouldn’t 
have been caught dead at a dog show, but things have changed since 
your dog-loving darling came on stage. So, you figure that something 
about it will strike your fancy—there will be some frame that will break 
the tedium of dog shows. Maybe you always liked biology, and you see 
the potential to strike up a conversation about canine genetics with the 
breeders. 
In Kurt Vonnegut’s novel Mother Night, he writes: ‘We are what we 
pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be.’ 
This isn’t entirely true—there is some distance between pretense and 
reality: A conman is not a neurosurgeon. But what is true is that we 
tend to become what we pretend to be. By pretending to have a particular 
outlook, appreciation, and belief, we become a person with such an 
outlook, appreciation, and belief. So indeed, we need to be very careful 
about what we pretend to be. 
Why does pretending set us on the path toward the real thing? What 
is the magic of these charades? There is no straight answer to this. The 
fact of the matter is that there are multiple paths and paths crisscross 
one another. 
Frame switches happen on the most innocuous routes. Through 
pretending, you have a chance to discover and try out frames that permit 
you to appreciate what you loathed before. Pretense offers learning 
opportunities. It’s not as simple as ‘try it, you’ll like it,’ but rather ‘try it, 
you’ll find ways to come to like it.’ 
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Taste switches can also be quite simple and innocent, as our tastes 
tend to shift with increased exposure. For instance, you figure that your 
tastes will just shift as you drink dry wines in pleasant surroundings. 
Perhaps you will even grow to like them. After all, familiarity breeds 
fondness. But it’s not that you find reasons for liking them—rather, you 
will just come to appreciate the taste. It doesn’t always work, but it’s a 
strategy that is worth trying.
Belief switches are trickier. We like to think of ourselves as acting in 
line with what we believe. Suppose one acts as if one believes something 
that one does not actually believe. Then it’s easy enough just to shift 
beliefs so that actions and beliefs are properly aligned again. 
The psychologist Leon Festinger calls this cognitive dissonance. In the 
late 1950s, he and his colleague James Merrill Carlsmith conducted an 
experiment in which subjects were instructed to do a thoroughly boring 
task. They were then asked to brief a person who was a stooge but was 
introduced to them as the next subject who was about to start the task. 
They were instructed to tell this person that the task was enjoyable. 
Many of them complied. Some were paid little, while others were paid 
well for the briefing. Subsequently, the subjects were asked whether 
they thought that the task really was enjoyable. The curious thing is that 
those who were paid less were more likely to say that it was, more so 
than those who were paid well. 
Why did they do so? The subjects asked themselves: Why did I brief 
the next subject in the way I did? Those who were paid well had an easy 
answer: The money made it worth it. But those who were paid poorly 
did not, and they had some explaining to do. So, they resorted to telling 
themselves: Well, I guess I must believe what I told them. 
There is one difference between Pascal’s advice and the cognitive 
dissonance experiments. Following Pascal, we ourselves decide to act 
as if we believe something to bring about changes in our beliefs. In 
the cognitive dissonance experiments, we are manipulated into acting 
as if we believe something within the context of the experiment. But 
from here on, the mechanism is the same. We witness ourselves acting 
counter to our beliefs, need to explain why we are doing this, and the 
strategy we come up with is to shift our beliefs. 
The same strategy is present in wishful thinking. A person diagnosed 
with terminal cancer tells me that they are making grand plans to build 
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a new house, go on long trips, etc. Why are they doing this? They very 
much want to beat the cancer, so they start to act as if they can do so 
and have many more years to live and carry out their plans. They then 
ask: ‘It wouldn’t be reasonable for a person with terminal cancer to act 
like that, would it?’ In a similar vein, Nina Riggs writes that buying an 
expensive couch while facing a terminal diagnosis is ‘a lovely expression 
of hopefulness.’ (‘When a Couch is More than a Couch.’ The New York 
Times, 23 Sep. 2016) 
Willful frame and taste shifts seem much more innocent than willful 
belief shifts. In willful frame shifts, we are just creatively exploring 
how we might cast a positive light on something that didn’t seem 
too appealing to begin with. In willful taste shifts, we rely on the 
psychological mechanism of prolonged exposure breeding fondness and 
bank on that doing the work for us. But in willful belief shifts, we seem 
to be kidding ourselves. It doesn’t make much sense to infer from one’s 
long-term planning that one can’t possibly be dying if the only reason 
one engaged in this long-term planning is to convince oneself that one’s 
prognosis is rosier than it really is. Similarly, it doesn’t make much sense 
for Pascal to infer from his religious practices that there must be a God if 
the only reason he engaged in these practices is to convince himself that 
there is a God. It seems like an elaborate act of self-deception. 
So, is it simply thumbs up for willful frame and taste shifts and 
thumbs down for willful belief shifts? So far, it certainly seems like that. 
But my goal in the remainder of this chapter is to be a bit subversive 
and turn things upside down. Some willful taste and frame shifts are 
problematic because they are self-defeating: They do not get off the 
ground because the projected taste or frame resists manipulation. And 
some willful belief shifts are quite innocent and may even be imperative 
because they are self-verifying. If you face a challenge, you should believe 
that you can do it, rather than setting yourself up for failure. 
Self-Defeat
Aristotle lays out the path to becoming a courageous person in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (Book 2, Ch. 1). Say that I find much cowardice 
within me—in my actions, choices, fears, and aspirations. But I set out to 
become more courageous by acting as if I am already courageous. I force 
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myself to go for walks in the woods at night, join a survival camp, or, 
in a different sphere of life, shift some of my assets to high-risk stocks. 
And it may work—I may learn to give up my fears and to face danger 
and uncertainty with a smile. I may learn to enjoy doing the courageous 
thing. 
It may work nicely for courage, but there are obstacles for other types 
of values. In the wake of Peter Singer’s work, the Effective Altruism 
movement has gained much momentum recently. The website, Giving 
What We Can, invites you to make a pledge to donate at least ten percent 
of your income and helps you pick the most effective charities. Effective 
charities are such that the next donation you make to them has the 
potential to save the most lives from premature death and reduce the 
most suffering. 
I know that there is much suffering in the world and that there 
are various charitable organizations that provide effective relief. But 
suppose that I find myself completely unmotivated to donate to charity. 
Frankly, I’d rather spend the money on a night on the town. Writing that 
check to the Against Malaria Foundation simply hurts. 
In The Doctrine of Virtue (p. 575–6), Kant tells us that if we find 
ourselves lacking in compassion and find it hard to be charitable, we 
should seek out ‘sickrooms and debtors’ prisons’ and expose ourselves 
to the world’s sufferings. If I am trying to become the kind of person 
who wants to give a bit more and wine-and-dine a bit less, I could try 
Kant’s advice. Maybe giving will come a bit easier next time around. 
Charity is driven by compassion, and a compassionate person is a 
person who is self-forgetful and other-directed. But there is something 
troubling about trying to become more compassionate by performing 
more self-forgetful and other-directed actions. Why are we setting out 
on this path? Well, we would like to become better people. But why do 
we want to become better people?
We may want to become better people because it will make it easier 
to do the right thing, and then it is reasonable to expect that we will 
come to do more of it. This is Kant’s motivation, and there is nothing 
problematic about this. However, we may also want to become better 
people because of the sheer beauty of having a self-forgetful and other-
directed character. But this is a terribly self-focused way to live: It is 
navel-gazing to build a less navel-gazing character. Good luck with that! 
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One may end up even more self-absorbed than when one started. On 
this path, you will create a Narcissus, not a Gandhi. 
This is how the economist Paul Seabright (Ethics, 98(2), 1988) reads 
Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady. The self-defeating project of trying 
to be other-oriented and self-forgetful is played out in Isabel Archer, 
the protagonist of the novel. Isabel is obsessed with the state of her 
character. Lord Warburton, who admires Isabel, warns her that this is no 
way to live: ‘Don’t try so much to form your character—it’s like trying 
to pull open a tight, tender young rose. Live as you like best, and your 
character will form itself.’ (Ch. XXI) One should not try to make a work 
of art of oneself. One should aim to do noble things, but not aim to 
become a person with a noble character—the latter is just a recipe for 
self-centeredness and unhappiness.
The problem of self-defeat is not restricted to trying to attain a more 
self-forgetful and other-directed character. Self-defeat is also an issue in 
other projects of sculpting the self.
Think of hipster apathy—a resistance to take anything seriously, to 
embrace any conception of a good life. This commitment to apathy is 
even self-reflective: Hipsters fiercely deny the label of being a hipster. 
To do otherwise is to admit that they are serious about their hipster 
lifestyle with all the trappings of hipsterdom: the ukulele and the five-
string banjo, piercings and pacers, vintage clothing, Pabst beer, fixie 
bikes, knitting circles, pickle bars, Indie Rock, and handlebar mustaches. 
This attitude of apathy suffers the same fate as self-forgetfulness: Its 
pursuit is self-defeating. The more you want to cultivate an attitude of 
apathy, the more you believe that there is something worth striving for 
in this world. And the more you believe that there is something worth 
striving for, the less you are flirting with apathy. To stand for standing-
for-nothing is like a Liar Paradox. If you truly stand for nothing, then you 
can’t stand for standing-for-nothing. If you truly are a liar, then you can’t 
truthfully say that you are a liar. Hipsters wear T-shirts, saying ‘I am 
not a hipster,’ just as paradox aficionados like to write ‘This statement is 
false’ on the blackboard. 
Another feature in the cultural landscape is the New Sincerity 
vogue with iconic figures such as the author David Foster Wallace, the 
filmmaker Wes Anderson, or the musician Joanna Newsom. What is 
cherished is naiveté, directness, spontaneity—a beeline from feeling to 
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expression. But there is a tension between planning and spontaneity: 
You cannot carefully lay out the tracks for a beeline. 
So, are we doomed? Is it hopeless? Is the self-forgetfulness of Isabel 
Archer, the apathy of the hipsters, and the naiveté of New Sincerity 
forever out of reach of wannabes? There is a special hurdle here that was 
absent in Aristotle’s project of acquiring courage. Wanting to become self-
forgetful as a motivation for doing self-forgetful actions is problematic 
in a way that wanting to become courageous as a motivation for doing 
courageous actions is not. But not all is lost. There is a way forward that 
takes its inspiration from Homer’s Ulysses. 
When Ulysses set out to sail past the Sirens, who lured sailors to 
shipwreck with their enchanting singing, he ordered his men to stuff 
their ears with wax so they would not hear them. He himself was eager 
to hear their song but understood that, like so many before him, he 
would not be able to resist. So, he had himself bound to the mast and 
gave orders to his crew that he was not to be unbound, however much 
he might implore them. 
Similarly, we can bind ourselves to a routine with the motivation 
to become more caring, apathetic, or sincere. Once the routine is 
established, we don’t need to motivate every single act anymore—
we just do what needs doing within the constraints of the routine. 
Without the self-defeating motivations, our routine actions will mold 
our attitudes, and our characters will shift toward charity, spontaneity, 
and apathy. 
What should we do to bind ourselves? We can join Mother Teresa’s 
Missionaries of Charity. If we decide today to do just that, then we will 
be called upon daily to do self-forgetful and other-directed actions 
without having to think all the time that what we are aiming for is to 
improve our precious selves. We can join social groups who live the 
hipster lifestyle or breathe New Sincerity. We can immerse ourselves in a 
wide range of cultural expressions that define a cultural movement—be 
it literature, film, or music—and just let it all happen. We absorb what is 
on offer while forgetting that we had a plan.
Does it work for some people? No doubt. But strategies of self-
sculpting are fragile. One needs a divided mind with one part doing the 
planning and the other part doing the forgetting of why precisely we 
set out on this route. And failures abound. Think of the smug bankers 
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working in soup kitchens, even more full of self-importance than on 
Wall Street. New Sincerity art can become so contrived that it becomes 
unbearable—a sad product spawned by willful spontaneity. And the 
don’t-give-a-damn hipsters who do care a great deal about exhibiting 
the right hipster paraphernalia have long become a household joke.
 Self-Verification
The American philosopher William James collected essays which he had 
delivered as public talks to student societies, and published them in 1897 
under the title The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. 
Four of the essays aim to defend the legitimacy of religious belief against 
skeptical voices from the scientific community at the time. There are 
some interesting insights to be gleaned about the circumstances under 
which it is permissible to adopt beliefs, not on grounds of the evidence, 
but simply because there is something to be gained from believing. 
James writes that we can’t just believe that the existence of Abraham 
Lincoln is a myth and that his portraits are all of someone else. We can’t 
believe ourselves to be well when we are ‘roaring with rheumatism in 
bed’ or that the 2 one-dollar bills in our pocket add up to one hundred 
dollars, however much we may wish for this to be true or however 
strong our will is. There is no blanket endorsement for believing what 
we would like to believe, but James considers two special cases. 
The first special case is, in James’s words, when ‘faith in a fact can 
help create the fact’ or ‘faith […] creates its own verification.’ James 
finds this logic at work in ‘promotions, boons, appointments’—they go 
to the people who believe that these gains are somehow in the cards 
for them. There are limits to self-verifying beliefs, though. James is no 
Rhonda Byrne in her 2006 bestseller The Secret proclaiming that we can 
get anything we want so long as we wish hard enough for it and pretend 
that we already have it. This would lead to complacency: Sometimes, 
actions and not positive thinking are needed to realize our goals. 
Nonetheless, there is a proper place for a can-do mentality. If you 
believe that you will make a good impression, can jump the creek, 
can pass the exam, then you are so much more likely to succeed. The 
opposite is to set yourself up for failure. Once you lose confidence that 
you can pull off the task ahead, then your determination falters, and you 
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are indeed likely to fail. That’s why it’s essential to keep up the morale 
on the battle-field—if the morale falters, the war is as good as lost. 
There is nothing untoward if we make ourselves believe that we will 
pull off the task at hand. If believing indeed warrants that we will pull it 
off, then why shouldn’t we be able to believe this? Part of the evidence is 
that I am setting myself up for success. The belief is self-verifying, but it 
does not go beyond the evidence. 
But it is a different story when people overshoot. I am always struck 
by how confident people in an election campaign feel about victory. 
They seem to think that the world will somehow unfold in mysterious 
ways, and their candidate who is way behind in the polls will move 
forward with leaps and bounds. Part of it is just pretense to pull in the 
vote. But they often seem to believe it. Now, this confidence may raise 
the chance of their candidate winning from, say, a very small chance to 
a slightly greater but still small chance. And without the confidence that 
victory was at the doorstep, this slight raise might not have happened. 
Similarly, it may well be the case that I need to banish from my mind 
any doubt that I may not make a good impression, won’t be able to jump 
the creek, or won’t pass the exam to have any chance to pull off these 
feats. But if I take a step away from the action and ask myself honestly 
what my chances are, I need to admit that I barely have a fighting chance. 
Is there something untoward about banishing such doubts? Now we 
are believing against the evidence. It seems to me that nothing is lost, so 
long as we don’t stake the farm on making a good impression, jumping 
the creek, or passing the exam. Part of us believes that we can pull it off, 
and that’s the part that gives us confidence, keeps anxieties in check, 
and motivates us to be prepared. But another part of us keeps an eye 
on the evidence, refrains from staking too much on our success, and 
refrains from making rash decisions. This requires a bit of a divided 
mind. But what’s so bad about a divided mind, a mind that is playing a 
bit of hide-and-seek with itself? 
There is career advice in this. Suppose you are working a less than 
fully desirable job and you have a job interview for a highly desirable 
job lined up. It is good to harbor contradictory beliefs. One part of you 
should be confident that you will shine. That is the part that walks into 
the interview with a smile and a confident stride. The other part should 
heed the evidence and be much more cautious. That is the part that 
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does not burn bridges and stops you from handing in your resignation 
prematurely. Some people can’t do it—their minds are single-track, 
leave no room for hide-and-seek. That’s alright. But why be down on 
those who can? When managed carefully, a divided mind is a fine thing 
to cherish. Walt Whitman’s line from the poem ‘Song of Myself‘ (§51) 
comes to mind: ‘Do I contradict myself?/ Very well then I contradict 
myself,/ (I am large, I contain multitudes.)’
James concludes his essay ‘Is Life Worth Living?’ with a piece of 
advice: ‘Be not afraid of life. Believe that life is worth living, and your 
belief will help create the fact.’ The advice requires willful belief change. 
One may find one’s life marred by existential worries. We follow James’s 
advice hoping that the worries will dissipate. And if they do, then life 
will indeed be worth living. James does not seem fully confident that it 
will work: The phrase ‘your belief will help create the fact’ displays less 
confidence than if he had written, ‘your belief creates the fact.’ But no 
matter. Even if adopting the full-blooded belief that life is worth living 
raises the chance of shedding existential worries or just softens them to 
some extent, it is good advice, nonetheless. 
The second special case is designed to legitimate religious belief 
based on limited evidence. James’s conditions are perfectly general and 
not restricted to religious belief. You may adopt a belief at will if doing 
so is a ‘live’ option, and the choice is ‘forced’ and ‘momentous.’ What does 
James mean by that? 
In Cambridge, Massachusetts of James’s time, it was not a live option 
to become a ‘Theosophist’ or a ‘Mohammedan,’ but being an atheist, an 
agnostic, subscribing to various Christian faiths were live options for 
him and many of his contemporaries. James uses the metaphor of live 
electrical wires. Live options are options that are offered by one’s life 
world and are not closed off by overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 
The choice is forced in that James thinks we can’t proclaim indifference 
to the matter, as one could concerning whether it will rain on Sunday, 
whether Arsenal will win the next game, or whether string theory is 
true. 
And the choice is momentous in that we only have this life to make the 
decision, and it radically affects how we live our lives.
James gives us a perfectly general scheme to determine whether 
one may reasonably embrace religious beliefs. But do these conditions 
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transfer to secular beliefs? I think so. Suppose that your child is accused 
of a crime. The evidence is far from conclusive. It is a live option for 
you to believe that they are innocent; it is a forced choice because you 
are called upon to take a stand; and it is a momentous choice because 
it makes a difference to one of the most valued relationship in your life. 
So, following James’s advice, we can just embrace the belief that they are 
innocent. We may be in error, but fear of error should not hold us back in 
this case. We don’t have to sit back and say, ‘Well, I don’t know what to 
believe.’ Rather, we may stand by a belief in their innocence in the same 
way that we may stand by a religious belief. 
There is something curious about the connection between James’s 
discussion of self-verifying beliefs and religious belief. In ‘The Will to 
Believe,’ the argument seems to be an argument from analogy. Just as 
it is permissible to will to believe self-verifying beliefs, it is permissible 
to will to believe when it concerns a forced and momentous choice of 
a live option. But in ‘Is Life Worth Living?’ he draws a much tighter 
connection: 
[W]ill our faith in the unseen world similarly verify itself? […] I confess 
that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in 
part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to 
the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and 
increase of very being from our fidelity.
For James, the belief in the supernatural is a belief that contributes its 
own truth. Just like believing that we can jump the creek makes it happen, 
believing in the supernatural brings it into existence. This position is not 
in line with the independence or self-existence of God in the Abrahamic 
faiths. In the Abrahamic faiths, God would continue to exist, even if the 
last person on earth embraced atheism. But enough said—the waters of 




Count your Blessings 
Be grateful. Count your blessings. It’s not so bad—there is much to 
be thankful for. This is what we tell people who feel down about their 
situation in life. How are we to understand this counsel? 
Let’s think about a standard case of being grateful. Your car breaks 
down, and you find yourself stranded in the middle of nowhere. 
Someone stops their car and gives you a ride to the next town. Naturally, 
you are grateful. You were in dire straits, and they didn’t have to do 
that. Gratitude makes perfect sense in this case: We are grateful to other 
people for doing us a favor. 
But if this is the model for being grateful, then why would it be 
good counsel to tell people who are down that they should be grateful? 
Gratitude is supposed to be a virtue that lifts us up. How does it do this? 
Cicero in For Plancius tells us that it is not only the greatest of all virtues 
but also the parent of all others. So, what virtues does gratitude spawn? 
Thanksgiving originated as a harvest festival. Think of a farming 
family who are grateful for the harvest at Thanksgiving time. For a 
theist, this gratitude can be modeled on being grateful for getting a ride 
when one’s car breaks down. Without God’s loving care, we would be 
nothing. God looked down kindly on us and, even though nothing was 
owed to us, granted us an abundant harvest. So, our gratitude is due. 
And, for a religious person, to be reminded that one’s life is in God’s 
hand may indeed be a source of strength. 
But the charm of Thanksgiving is that it is a holiday for the religious 
and secular alike. How is it that being grateful for the harvest makes 
sense in a secular context? Why would it be uplifting? What virtues does 
gratitude for the harvest carry in its wake? 
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First, when we are grateful, we are grateful for everyone’s contribution 
to the success of the harvest. It corrects for the illusion of self-sufficiency. 
It is a reminder of the old line by John Donne: ‘No man is an island,/ 
Entire of itself.’ Even if you did all the sowing and reaping yourself, there 
would have been no sowing without the seed house and no reaping 
without the dealership that sold you the combine. There would be no 
sowing and reaping without those who came before you and taught you 
how to sow and reap. One is not alone. This feeling of connectedness is 
uplifting and a source of empathy and caring. 
Second, a good harvest requires not only a village of people playing 
their parts; the weather also has to cooperate. And this is also what my 
Thanksgiving table is thankful for. A theist is thankful to God for rain 
and shine happening—exactly when they needed them. But if there is 
no God to thank, is there room for this kind of gratitude? Is it fitting to 
be thankful for rain and shine when we do not believe that there exists a 
rain- and shine-maker to thank? 
This kind of gratitude has a secular analog in the awareness that 
success in life is fragile. It is contingent not only on the cooperation of 
others but also on so many other factors falling into place. Things are 
very much outside of our control. It teaches us humility. It is an antidote 
to smugness—the self-righteous attitude that good things come to us 
because they are owed to us, and they are owed to us because of the 
excellent work that we have put in. The realization that there is little that 
we have in hand, that chance plays a large role in our lives, is liberating. 
We can do our part but need to take things as they come. 
And finally, one may be grateful for witnessing the sheer beauty of 
the harvest and for being part of the cycle of life. As the combines come 
in, one whispers a quiet thanks, as one does upon seeing a sunrise or a 
breath-taking landscape. Again, if one believes that there is a God to 
offer us these joyful experiences, it makes sense to be grateful to this 
God. But what form is gratitude to take in the absence of anyone doing 
the offering? Is this a type of gratitude that is lost once we shift into 
secular gear? 
I used to live in a mountain town. Some people get used to the 
scenery—it just gets old and hardly registers anymore. Others continue 
being appreciative of the majestic beauty. This appreciation hinges on 
an attitude of not taking things for granted, retaining a sense of wonder, 
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and taking the time to stop and smell the roses. And, of course, what 
holds for mountain towns also holds for downtown Manhattan. Just as 
one can count oneself lucky for living in nature, one can count oneself 
lucky for living in downtown Manhattan. This aspect of gratitude urges 
us to be mindful of what is around us here and now. In E.E. Cummings’ 
‘i thank you God for most this amazing,’ it is through gratitude that ‘the 
ears of my ears awake […] the eyes of my eyes are opened.’ 
Hence gratitude is a fine thing. It saves us from egotism. It saves us 
from smugness. And it saves us from letting life pass us by while we 
forget to listen and watch. It may be the finest of all virtues, and it carries 
empathy, humility, and mindfulness in its wake. 
Can gratitude become too much of a good thing? Friedrich Nietzsche 
thought so in Human, All Too Human (§550): ‘There are slavish souls who 
carry their appreciation for benefits received so far that they strangle 
themselves with the tie of gratitude.’ Though we sing the praises of 
gratitude, can one be grateful to a fault? And, if so, how?
Our standard case of gratitude pictured a stranded motorist who 
was vulnerable, nothing was owed to them, and a kind passer-by went 
over and above the call of duty to offer help. The motorist wouldn’t be 
strangling themselves with any rope of gratitude in this case. 
What is problematic is when gratitude is expected from us, yet what 
we are supposed to be grateful for is much less than what is owed. When 
cars are stolen in Beirut, the thieves bring them to a central place. You 
can retrieve your car from there for a handsome sum. When you do so, 
you are expected to thank the person who is running the lot. Now, this 
is madness. The man who sells your car back to you is part of the racket. 
He is a crook who is in cahoots with the gang of car thieves. Nietzsche 
is right in this case: Gratitude has no place here and the expectation of 
gratitude indeed strangles one’s pride.
There is a similar argument coming from voices from minority 
groups who suffer from structural injustice. There is no place for 
gratitude for government aid programs, reparation payment or policies 
that aim to rectify the injustice. What is offered is most often much less 
and certainly no more than what is owed. They may appreciate that 
some progress is being made toward greater equality, but they strongly 
resist any political request for gratitude.
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Help Your Neighbor 
Wounded animals lash out. The human animal is no different. Homer’s 
Iliad reports that Achilles went on a killing spree on the Trojan plains 
after Hector slew his friend Patrocles. Causing suffering seems to be a 
natural reaction to hardship and loss, but does it relieve one’s suffering? 
Wisdom has it that we should try to do something meaningful with our 
lives in the face of adversity, rather than cause more hardship: Help your 
neighbor, visit a lonely elderly family member, volunteer in a local soup 
kitchen. Why would this be good counsel? Why is there consolation to 
be found in doing acts of kindness?
Many people search for solace by caring for those who are less 
fortunate. Soup kitchens in metropolitan areas tend to have a steady 
supply of volunteers, at least before COVID times. Why is this the 
case? I will present some explanations why there might be solace in 
volunteering, whether in a local soup kitchen or in any other capacity 
where one is directly helping the needy in a hands-on way.
Warm Glow. The simplest answer is that helping others generates a warm 
glow, at least in some people, and it’s this warm glow that people are 
after. People say that it’s intrinsically rewarding and the best thing they 
have ever done in their life. 
Channeling. Loss embitters. It breeds negativity. It comes with the 
destructive energy of Achilles. We can let our anger get the upper hand. 
Or we can try to channel that very energy into something constructive. 
This is where the proverbial soup kitchen provides a positive outlet. It 
offers a mission that transforms what is eating the soul into something 
that lifts the soul. 
Focus. Hardship may also be paralyzing. We can’t get anything done. 
Our work piles up. When line managers know that an employee is 
battling depression, they often suggest a more structured task load—a 
set of hands-on jobs with clear results and boxes to tick off—rather 
than projects that require blue-sky thinking. Hands-on tasks provide 
focus and immediate reward. Soup kitchens provide the same kind of 
promise.
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Meaning. Being down in the dumps feels like wasted time. Life passes us 
by, and we have nothing to show for it. One does not want to stand there 
empty-handed—better to put a ladle in those empty hands. If we have 
fed a few hungry people, then at least there was something that made 
those darker days worthwhile. And it may also chase the clouds away: 
Helping one’s neighbor distracts and engages us and provides a sense 
of purpose in life. 
Empathy. Hardship, it is said, will make one into a kinder and more 
caring person. And like often breeds like: Empathy tends to be directed 
toward people facing the same predicament that we found ourselves 
in. Recovering alcoholics will volunteer as mentors in Alcoholics 
Anonymous. Students who have struggled with anorexia will become 
active in the campus self-help group for eating disorders. And servers 
in soup kitchens have often known poverty firsthand. 
Shelter. Soup kitchens are places where good will reigns. People come 
together to help their neighbor in need and form community. And this 
may be precisely what we need when we are seeking shelter from a dark 
and hostile world. There is consolation in surrounding oneself with a 
spirit of caring—a reminder that there is still some goodness in this 
world. 
Opportunity Cost. The opportunity cost of volunteering is what makes 
it worthwhile. Instead of volunteering, we could join the country-club 
and enjoy a good game of tennis. Or we could work an evening shift and 
treat ourselves to that trip to Barbados we always wanted to take. There 
is a kind of magical thinking that enters in. Costlier medication has a 
greater placebo effect. The greater the opportunity cost, the better we 
feel about volunteering. 
These are seven explanations of what could make sense of the counsel 
to go work in the proverbial soup kitchen and why so many people 
take this path. This is not an exhaustive set. And not every soup-
kitchen volunteer will recognize themselves in every single one of these 
explanations. Different strokes for different folks, as they say. Also, one 
hardship is not like another, and one proverbial soup kitchen is not like 
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another either. But I hope that I have captured some aspects of what 
drives people to take up hands-on work with immediate and tangible 
benefits when life is not treating them kindly. 
Don’t Cry over Spilled Milk 
Don’t cry over spilled milk! What’s done is done! It’s all water under 
the bridge! This is all perfectly reasonable counsel, but it is easier said 
than done. The pull towards reassessing the past—how things might 
have been much better than they are—can be persistent and crippling. 
‘Footfalls echo in the memory/ Down the passage which we did not 
take/ Towards the door we never opened/ Into the rose-garden,’ T.S. 
Eliot writes in ‘Burnt Norton’ in Four Quartets. Indeed, there is always 
the lure of looking back, saying, ‘Darn it! Why didn’t things work out? 
Should have, would have, could have …!’ 
A crucial distinction in this backward-looking attitude is the 
distinction between disappointment and regret. Disappointment is about 
how things turned out. Regret is about the choices that you made. Let me 
explain. Suppose you are torn between going on a vacation to Xanadu 
or to Shangri-La. You decide for Xanadu. The service in your hotel turns 
out to be dismal. You are disappointed. The weather in Xanadu turned 
out to be much worse than in Shangri-La. You regret that you did not 
choose to go to Shangri-La. 
How can we help people quit crying over spilled milk when their 
ailment is disappointment? We can try to show that there never was a 
genuine possibility. It’s not that things turned out poorly. It just wasn’t 
in the cards. The service in Xanadu hotels is notoriously terrible.
How can we help people quit crying over spilled milk when their 
ailment is regret? We can try to show that the chance of success on the 
unchosen alternative was not any better. We point out that the weather 
in Shangri-La tends to be worse than in Xanadu during that time of 
year. There is nothing to regret. The weather did not turn out right for 
you in Xanadu. But it would not have been any smarter to have chosen 
Shangri-La. 
Counseling against disappointment and against regret are orthogonal. 
When counseling against disappointment, we talk down the chance of 
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success on the chosen path. Success was never a genuine possibility on the 
chosen path. When counseling against regret, we talk up the comparative 
chance of success on the chosen path relative to the unchosen path. You chose 
the better path. 
If you cure my disappointment by showing me that the chosen path 
had low chances of success, you feed my regret: I should have chosen 
some other option that had better chances of success. If you cure my 
regret by telling me that the chosen path had greater chances of success 
than the unchosen path, you feed my disappointment: So why didn’t 
success materialize then on the chosen path? It’s not that easy to mop up 
spilled milk. Spilled milk covers disappointment and regret. The cure for 
disappointment feeds regret. The cure for regret feeds disappointment. 
Here is an example. I was torn between marrying Frankie or Johnny. 
I married Frankie. Things did not work out. I am disappointed. You 
console me by telling me that Frankie was just not a good match for me, 
and it just couldn’t have worked out. But now you are feeding my regret: 
I should have married Johnny! You then point to the comparative virtues 
of Frankie: Frankie really was the better bet of the two, and I made the 
right choice. But wait, if Frankie was the better bet, then success was 
genuinely possible, and so now I am disappointed again that things did 
not work out! 
The late Cambridge philosopher D. Hugh Mellor once visited in 
Boulder, Colorado. It had been raining cats and dogs all day long, and 
I remarked that this was truly unusual. He responded by saying that 
when one is hosting a guest from out of town and there is inclement 
weather, then one is prone to say one of two things: Either one says 
that the weather is always like this at this time of year; or one says that 
this kind of weather is very unusual—it is never like this at this time of 
year. Why do hosts choose to say this? Most of the time, the stats would 
probably support a more nuanced answer. 
Here is an attempt at a response. The host notices that the guest 
is unhappy and tries to offer consolation. They may try to dispel 
disappointment: It’s always like this here—there is nothing to be 
disappointed about. Or they may try to counteract regret: Don’t regret 
having come here rather than somewhere else. You made the right 
choice. The chance of rain here this time of year is very low relative to 
other places you might have considered visiting. 
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The host can’t say just anything—meteorology poses constraints. In 
England’s Lake District, you can only cure disappointment. It always 
rains, so you can hardly be disappointed when you meet with rainy 
weather. In Utah’s Canyon Lands, you can only cure regret. Rain is truly 
unusual, and you really can’t regret going there even if you are unlucky 
with the weather. Just about any other place on earth has higher average 
rainfall. 
Here is a case in which disappointment and regret are improperly 
mixed. Sally undertook a two-day bike ride from Portland to Seattle. 
She had a bike accident three-quarters of the way through. Luckily, she 
was wearing a helmet and survived without serious injury. Here is an 
absurd thing for Sally to say: ‘I regret having put on my helmet: If I 
had not taken the time to put on my helmet, I would have been at the 
intersection a few seconds earlier, and I would not have had an accident 
at all.’ That’s true, but it’s no ground for regret. It’s ground for being 
disappointed that things turned out the way they did. Sally could have 
made it to Seattle, and it was a bummer that a car just had to make an 
unexpected turn right in front of her. But she can’t take this bad luck to 
be a reason for regretting her choice of putting on a helmet. The fact of 
the matter is that the chances of survival without serious injury on a 
bike per mile traveled are greater with than without a helmet. And so, 
there is no reason for regret. When she got onto that bike, she chose the 
safer option. 
Express Yourself
It’s a good thing in life to dabble a bit in some art form or other. When the 
road is bumpy, you can sing your blues away, throw a pot on a pottery 
wheel, put some paint on canvas, or dance to ‘Singing in the Rain.’ I 
want to give some thought to the art of writing. ‘I was raised by the cold 
that, to warm my palm,/ gathered my fingers around a pen,’ writes the 
Nobel laureate Joseph Brodsky in the poem ‘A Part of Speech.’ (Collected 
Poems in English, p. 102) People find solace in expressing themselves 
through writing, ranging from entries in a diary, posts on social media, 
emails to friends, columns in newspapers, or penning their very own 
War and Peace. 
Writing is an art form that has an intriguing relationship with mental 
health. I was once chairing a session with migrant writers. They spoke 
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about the hardships of being uprooted from their native communities. 
An audience member asked them why they write. What was striking 
was how every single one of them wholeheartedly agreed that, in their 
own words, they write out of pain. 
Agathon, in Plato’s Symposium, tells us that romance is what 
inspires—at the touch of love, everyone becomes a poet. But seemingly, 
it is not only feelings of love but also plain suffering that makes writers 
clasp their pens. Why is it that pain compels us to write? What promises 
of solace does writing hold out? It is somewhat bizarre because writing 
itself can be agony. If you don’t have to write, why would you? So how 
can agony shield from agony? Not everyone reaches for a pen when 
hardship strikes. But it is a curious response—sufficiently curious, well, 
to put a few words on paper about it. 
Writing is a solitary activity. One can create a space of tranquillity 
far away from the troubled world outside. Everything is beautiful at the 
ballet. And so it is in our coffee-stained work corners—they are places 
to create, places to forget. 
Writing can also be like talking to a friend. One comes to see things 
clearer. A jumble of feelings, memories, and conversations is clouding 
up one’s head. Writing helps place things in pigeonholes so that one can 
remember without obsessing. And even if one’s inner goings-on don’t 
gain clarity, there is at least displacement. What ails cannot be both in 
our heads and on the paper—or so it seems. 
‘We read to know we are not alone,’ says the character of C.S. Lewis 
in William Nicholson’s play Shadowlands and Richard Attenborough’s 
movie by the same name. This is also why people reach for a pen. 
Writing is rebellion against being singled out by misfortune. Why me? 
In reaching out to others, one learns that nobody is spared. 
Writing helps break through a vicious cycle. Being focused on the 
futility of life feeds self-centeredness. Self-centeredness stands in the 
way of contributing. And being unable to contribute reinforces the 
belief that life is indeed futile. And so the wheel turns. But writing is 
contributing—it is letting other people know that they are not alone. 
In the song ‘The Competition‘ the singer-songwriter Kimya Dawson 
sings of people being grateful to her for saying what they don’t have 
the words to say and how there is an art to feeling down which is what 
keeps her on the stage. 
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‘Life being what it is, one dreams of revenge,’ writes Gauguin in 
Avant et Après, a collection of autobiographical notes, translated under 
the title Gauguin’s Intimate Journals (p. 2) Was painting a form of revenge 
for him? Clearly, writing, being a narrative art, can be a form of revenge. 
Memoirs often take this form, and this is what gets their authors in 
trouble—as when Thomas Wolfe wrote about people in his native 
Asheville, North Carolina in Look Homeward, Angel. Or, more recently, 
Karl Ove Knausgård had to contend with the fallout from My Struggle, 
which depicted family members in unflattering ways. 
And finally, there is writing as social activism. Journalists and non-
fiction writers bear witness to how political conditions are ruining lives. 
Each story may just be a drop of cold water on a hot plate—but enough 
drops may lead to much desired social change. And once we start 
writing, the anger is enlisted in a cause and is transformed. It is good for 
something, and, as such, no longer drags us down. 
There are many forms of pain, many kinds of writings, and many 
therapeutic routes. Some of these benefits also come with other art 
forms—there is a sense of seclusion in the pottery studio as well. Some of 
them are specific to the narrative arts—one finds solace in sharing one’s 
story, but of course, music and painting also have narrative elements. 
For some people it is sufficient to write—their diary is a private matter, 
not to be shared. For others, being read, being heard, being seen is 
crucial—it is the sharing itself that is healing.
Eat Well 
Approaching food in some way or other is often recommended 
as an answer to life’s problems or a route to happiness—but the 
recommendations could not be any less varied. There is one group that 
recommends eating whatever you darn well please. Let’s call them 
gourmands. The other group swears by regimenting food consumption 
in one way or another. Let’s call them abstinents. Both the gourmands 
and the abstinents see their relationship with food as a route toward 
happiness.
Virginia Woolf is with the gourmands. ‘One cannot think well, love 
well, sleep well unless one has dined well,’ she writes in A Room of One’s 
Own, and she is a master at describing tables decked with luscious food. 
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There are lots of tongue-in-cheek cards in praise of eating to your heart’s 
delight. You can eat your way to happiness: ‘You can’t buy happiness, 
but you can buy ice cream, and that’s kind of the same thing.’ Sweets 
relieve stress: ‘Stressed spelled backward is desserts.’ And there is 
the Italian delicacy Tiramisu—meaning ‘Pick me up’—with its power 
inscribed in its very name. 
There is little surprise in this recommendation. It is no secret that 
getting what you want can contribute to happiness. So why shouldn’t 
eating to your heart’s delight not help in the pursuit of happiness, 
provided that the heart delights in the right measure? Certainly, the 
desire for luscious food can become obsessive and turn into gluttony. But 
any desire can turn into a desire for excess. Remember William Blake’s 
poem ‘Eternity’: ‘He who binds to himself a joy/ Does the winged life 
destroy/ But he who kisses the joy as it flies/ Lives in eternity’s sunrise.’ 
So long as we keep a healthy appreciation for chateaubriand, cheese 
soufflé, and crème brûlée, we can indulge and be merry. 
The abstinents pose more of a challenge. What is curious is that, 
rather than consuming less fattening or unhealthy food, there is a 
tendency to ax complete food categories. Meat is off the menu for 
vegetarians, animal products for vegans, and all but nuts and fruits for 
the fruitarians. Atkins dieters cut out just about all carbohydrates. Paleo 
dieters stick to all and only those food items that our cave-dwelling 
ancestors gnawed on. Allergies to cow’s milk, eggs, peanuts, soy, and 
so on are a reason to carefully check ingredient lists. And supermarkets 
stack just about anything in gluten-free format for the gluten sensitive. 
Now people have various reasons for adjusting their diets. There 
are moral reasons, cultural reasons, and health reasons. As for health 
reasons, there is physical and mental health. If you have celiac disease, 
strict gluten avoidance is essential for physical survival. But axing 
food categories is also a means of addressing mental health issues. 
Psychiatrists, therapists, and life coaches recommend that we cut out 
food categories that might affect moods. And there is no shortage of 
dietary fads trending on social networks. 
Axing food categories is a coping strategy. But how could it possibly 
make us feel better not to eat this or that? It’s easy to understand that 
chocolate can be a mood enhancer, but how can abstention from food 
categories be a mood enhancer? 
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There can be a strictly physiological explanation. Coffee may make 
you jittery. Milk may make you feel blue. If you are drinking coffee 
and consuming milk products from morning until night, you may not 
know that the coffee and the milk are the culprits. Cut the coffee, and 
you will relax. Cut the milk, and you will cross over to the sunny side 
of the street. Abstention can lead to mood enhancement via a strictly 
physiological route. 
But how the physiology works is for others to figure out. We are 
interested here in psychological explanations. There are multiple paths 
from food to mood. Without trying to be exhaustive, I will distinguish 
between six such paths: focus, displacement, control, pretense, belonging, 
and purity. 
Focus. Working around dietary constraints requires research and 
dedication. As the mind is engaged in checking ingredient lists for traces 
of allergens or working out how to increase calcium intake after cutting 
out dairy products, it is not obsessing or in the grip of its sorrows. A 
busy mind is a happy mind. 
Displacement. If you cannot solve the issues that underlie your sorrows, 
why not designate a dietary problem as its cause and then solve the 
dietary problem instead? Diagnose what ails you as something that you 
have control over and then undertake to correct it. If you can convince 
yourself that there is a causal link between some food item and mood, 
then your mood will clear as you ax the food item. It may sound a bit 
like the drunk who is looking for their wallet under the streetlight, not 
because they lost it there, but because that’s where the light is. But the 
drunk is sure not to find their wallet, whereas displacement may just 
work. 
Control. You may find yourself powerless in life. In response, you import 
a set of dietary rules into your life that you can autonomously accept 
and live by. You answer the lack of control by constructing a world that 
you do control. Control differs from displacement in that you do not 
presume that following some diet will solve your problems. Instead, 
what you crave is control—and you welcome a set of dietary rules 
because they are something you can control. 
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Pretense. Mental health messes with dietary habits. There is compulsive 
eating, addictions, loss of appetite, and more. Remember Pascal: If you 
find yourself unable to have religious belief, then bless yourself with 
holy water and attend Mass—that is, act as if you already have faith, and 
faith will follow. Similarly, if you force yourself to mimic healthy eating 
habits, then this may improve your mental health issue. 
Belonging. It is good not to be alone. There are a host of support groups 
for various allergies, gluten sensitivity, and lactose intolerance. There are 
coffee shops and restaurants that cater to fruitarians, vegans, and Atkins 
dieters. Community has multiple purposes. It fosters a social context 
that combats loneliness. There are people to talk to about something 
of common interest, be it in support groups or online communities. It 
provides an identity. You don’t just have this annoying sensitivity to 
gluten—you have joined the ranks of the gluten insensitive. This, in turn, 
reinforces the belief that the axed food category is what caused lethargy, 
lack of focus, depression, or what have you. It’s not just you who are 
affected—others report the very same symptoms. And it provides 
a sense of common purpose. As a vegan, you want to put an end to 
animal suffering and mitigate climate change. The gluten insensitive are 
battling a food industry that has been increasing the gluten content of 
food for commercial purposes, leaving many to pay the price. You are 
fighting for proper labeling of allergens, and so on. 
Purity. There is a good deal of analogical reasoning in health food 
recommendations. Walnuts look like brains, so they must be good 
for brain function. Smiley bananas improve mood. Grapes aid lung 
function. Celery increases potency. This kind of analogical reasoning 
has a bad rap, and we are supposed to have outgrown it in this age of 
science and enlightenment. 
But there is something to all this when it comes to mental health. 
Think of decluttering. If you declutter your attic, it may do some good 
for decluttering your head. ‘Declutter, Organize, Live Joyfully’ is the 
epigraph of a minimalist-living website. 
Something similar is going on with food. We are what we eat. Look 
at the ingredient list on a candy bar and count the number of food 
additives and preservatives it contains. There is a messiness to it—food 
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should be food, not some processed amalgamation of substances that 
do not belong. The quality of our food reflects the quality of our lives. 
Modulate what you eat, and you will modulate how you live. Eat messy 
food, live a messy life. Choose to eat food that is simple and pure, and 
thereby force your life to become simple and pure. 
There are critics. The Intuitive Eating movement sees axing food 
categories as a route to failed diets, leading to overeating and eating 
disorders. Instead, we should make peace with food and not let the 
food police dictate what foods to eat and not to eat. Without rules, there 
is nothing to fret about, and there are no rules to be broken. Eating 
should be a source of joy. Worrying about what you eat is stressful, and 
all the frustration and guilt induced by self-imposed dietary rules are 
counterproductive. 
There are cynics. A New Yorker cartoon makes fun of the craze for 
gluten-free diets with a woman in a restaurant saying to a friend: ‘She 
thinks she’s so great ‘cause she has real celiac disease.’ There are indeed 
many unsympathetic voices dissing health foods, dieting, and food 
allergies. They say that it’s all just a fad, that most followers do not have 
a problem with gluten, lactose, or any other allergens and that what is 
driving all this is the desire for attention. Food restrictions can place 
us on the social map. Do people remember my allergy? Do they make 
accommodations? Self-imposed food restrictions are an easy tool to test 
for respect. 
So, what is the bottom line: To ax or not to ax? It’s complicated. I trust 
the experts telling us that eating disorders often start with self-imposed 
dietary restrictions. But I have also known people who have successfully 
built dietary restrictions into their lives to provide focus, a sense of 
community, and the illusion of control. It is like rhyme and meter in 
poetry. For some people such constraints kindle creativity. For others, 
they kill the joy of self-expression. The path of abstinence is interesting, 
but it may lead to peril, and one should be careful where one treads.
Final Words
In an earlier draft, I wanted to title this book ‘On What Abides.’ Friends 
and colleagues did not think much of this title. And, of course, they 
were right. Would you have bothered reaching for it or clicking on a link 
with a title like that? Books with archaic titles attract dust rather than 
elicit curiosity. And yet, there are many ways in which this book is on 
what abides. 
The very word ‘abides’ has not been doing much abiding over the 
last century and a half. When you enter it into Google n-grams, you will 
notice a steady decline in its occurrence in the written word from around 
1865. However, in the late 1990s there is a curious upswing with a return 
to 1907 levels by 2019 (the last year for which n-grams has data). 
Why this upswing in late 90s? I do not know whether it is just a 
coincidence, but 1998 is the year that the Coen Brothers brought out the 
movie The Big Lebowski, with the famous line ‘The Dude abides.’ The 
internet has lots of discussion of what could be meant by the phrase 
‘The Dude abides.’ Indeed, what does ‘abide’ even mean? 
There is the meaning that follows Ecclesiastes 1:4: ‘One generation 
passes away, and another generation comes; but the earth abides forever.’ 
Here abiding is simply not vanishing, simply retaining a presence. 
But there is more to abiding than merely being present. The Dude 
abides not just in the sense that he will always be a fixture in the bowling 
alley—instead, he will remain a presence in the way that, say, a memory 
abides—authentic and unaffected by what besieges it. The most-cited 
phrase containing ‘abides’ is St. Paul’s line in 1 Corinthians 13:13: ‘And 
now abide faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love.’ 
Faith, hope, and love endure because they are the stronger forces in 
human life. 
This book is about questioning those things that abide, and those 
questions are taken up across the ages in philosophical traditions, in 
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literature, as well as in today’s popular culture. Hope, love, and faith are 
among the things that abide.
And there is even more to ‘abide’—meanings abound. Abiding can 
mean trusting in a nurturing source as in ‘the branch cannot bear fruit by 
itself, unless it abides in the vine’ (John 15:4) It can mean tolerating as in 
‘I cannot abide rudeness,’ or, more positively, respecting or holding dear, 
as in ‘law-abiding citizens.’ 
This book is also about trusting in various ways of coping, tolerating 
adversity, and holding life dear. It would be nice to conclude: May you 
abide as you abide in its counsel. But my aspirations have been much 
less grand. If some snippets here and there made you wonder, offered 
a moment of recognition, or simply brought a smile to your face, then I 
will not have written for naught.
Additional Teaching Materials
Chapter 1. Hope. Frank Darabont’s movie The Shawshank Redemption 
(1994), after Stephen King’s novella ‘Rita Hayworth and the Shawshank 
Redemption: Hope Springs Eternal’ in Different Seasons (1982), focuses 
on the value of hope. As to poetry, Emily Dickinson’s poems ‘Hope is 
a subtle glutton’ (Part 1. Life. 86) and ‘Hope is the thing with feathers’ 
(Part 1. Life. 32) are good conversation starters. Martin Luther King’s 
‘Shattered Dreams’ adds a political dimension to the discussion.
Chapter 2. Death. Leo Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich (1886) will come 
as no surprise. Akira Kurosawa’s movie Ikiru (1952) addresses the search 
for meaning in the face of death. David Velleman’s ‘Dying: Some People 
Hope to Die in their Sleep. Not me.’ (OpenBooks, 2012; Think, 2012) is a 
short read discussing what the subtitle says. Nina Riggs The Bright Hour: 
A Memoir of Living and Dying (2017), with an excerpt entitled ‘When a 
Couch is More than a Couch’ in the New York Times, 23 Sep. 2016, is a 
touching memoir about living with the prospect of imminent death. 
Chapter 3. Love. Neil Jordan’s The Crying Game (1992) hints at many 
aspects of our models of love. Ann Beattie’s ‘Snow’ (1986) is a hauntingly 
beautiful short story about the loss of love. You may also find inspiration 
for short stories and related newspaper and magazine articles on my 
website ‘TESS: Teaching Ethics with Short Stories,’ following the links 
‘Stories by Theme’ and ‘Gender and Relationships.’
Chapter 4. Reconciliation. Act 3 (‘Two Words You Never Want to Hear 
from Your Doctor‘) of This American Life, 277: ‘Apology’ (2004) discusses 
apologies offered by medical doctors for making incorrect decisions. 
Joe Wright’s movie Atonement (2007) after Ian McEwan’s novel (2001) 
by the same name will provoke discussion about responsibility for 
childhood transgressions and the impossibility of forgiveness. Off 
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the beaten path, I have had some of my best student discussions with 
Milcho Manchevski’s movie Before the Rain (1994). It mixes topics on the 
ethics of war, moral luck, and the search for redemption in a non-linear 
temporal structure. 
Chapter 5. Self-Management. This might be an opportunity to read 
William James’s lectures ‘The Will to Believe’ and ‘Is Life Worth 
Living?’ I recommend Arthur Miller’s play All my Sons (1946) (Act 1 
and Acts 2 and 3) or Akira Kurosawa’s movie Rashomon (1950) for the 
construction of self-serving and exonerating frames. Act 5 (‘The All-Too-
Real Housewives of Argentina’) of This American Life, 724 : ‘Personal 
Recount’ tells the story of a right-wing TV show host in Argentina who 
comes to embrace feminism. 
Chapter 6. Counsel. E.E. Cummings’ ‘i thank you God for most this 
amazing’ brings in a religious dimension for ‘Count your Blessings.’ 
For ‘Help your Neighbor,’ I recommend Isabel Allende’s ‘And of Clay 
Are We Created’ in The Stories of Eva Luna (1991). As to ‘Don’t Cry over 
Spilled Milk,’ the NPR interview with Toni Morrison, entitled ‘“I Regret 
Everything”: Toni Morrison Looks Back On Her Personal Life’ (2015), 
touches on regret and loss, race relations in the US, the joy of writing, 
and Morrison’s journey to becoming an author. ‘Express yourself’ can 
be matched with some observations on writing by T. Kira Madden in 
‘Against Catharsis: Writing is not’ (Literary Hub, 2019) and by Julie 
Bunting in ‘On Making Things up: Some True Stories about Writing 
my Novel‘ (Catapult Magazine 2017). To complement ‘Eat well,’ I am 
proposing a piece on the physiological pathways between diet and 
mental health: Joseph Forth and colleagues ‘Food and Mood: How Do 
Diet and Nutrition Affect Mental Wellbeing’ (British Medical Journal, 
2020), either as a short and accessible scientific article or as a podcast. 
Tamar Adler’s ‘All You Can Eat? Inside the Intuitive Eating Craze’ 
(Vogue, 2020) is an interesting read as well.
Discussion Questions
Chapter 1. Hope 
1. I draw a distinction between ‘being hopeful’ and ‘hoping’ 
when it comes to the health situation of a loved one. Explain 
this distinction. Do you think it is a plausible distinction? Can 
you think of other examples in which this distinction holds? 
2. George Frederic Watts was a nineteenth-century British 
symbolist painter. ‘I paint ideas, not things,’ he said. Here is a 
version of his painting, ‘Hope.’ What ideas does this painting 
convey about hope? 
3. How is the ‘audacity of hope’ explained in the text? Do you 
think that this is a reasonable interpretation of this phrase? 
4. I laid out various pros and cons of hoping. What pros do you 
find most and least convincing? What cons do you find most 
and least convincing? 
5. Comment on Emily Dickinson’s poems ‘Hope is the thing 
with feathers’ and ‘Hope is a subtle glutton.’ 
6. One might object, as a counter to my analysis of hope, that 
we only genuinely hope for things that, all in all, we want. 
Dark and shameful desires may preoccupy us and engage our 
imagination, but unless we affirm and embrace them, they do 
not really underlie our hopes. We can only hope for things that 
we want upon due consideration and in a cool hour. Do you 
agree with this objection? 
7. One might object, as a counter to my analysis of hope, that a 
person who despairs engages just as much in mental imaging 
of what they would like to have, but under the guise of there 
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being this wonderful thing that they cannot have. Hence, my 
analysis does not distinguish between hope and despair. Do 
you think that this is a reasonable objection? 
8. The hope for salvation is central to the Christian faith. Some 
(though by no means all) Christians consider faith to be a 
matter of certainty. But given that we can only hope for things 
that are less than certain, how can it be meaningful to say that 
one hopes for salvation and is certain of salvation? How can 
we make both attitudes consistent? 
Chapter 2. Death
1. Would you prefer to die suddenly without forewarning or to 
see your death coming from far ahead (assuming the absence 
of pain in both cases)? What do you think makes for the 
difference between people who prefer the former and people 
who prefer the latter?
2. Imagine that you are Shakespeare on his death bed, and you 
could have (i) all your manuscripts preserved anonymously 
or (ii) half (or ninety percent or ten percent) preserved with 
your name attached to it. What would you choose?
3. Can you think of anyone (whether famous or not) who lived 
in such a way that you would say: If I were to have lived like 
that, then I would die easy (as in the gospel blues song ‘In 
my Time of Dying‘). What kind of life would you look back 
upon in a contented manner? And what makes such a life a 
meaningful or a good life? 
4. Some countries have legalized euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Should people who opt for euthanasia or assisted suicide be 
able to choose to be organ donors? 
5. Suppose that humans were no longer fertile and you were the 
last generation on earth, as in P.D. James’s novel Children of 
Men (1992). How would this affect how you live your life? 
Would you still be able to find meaning in the things you do? 
Or suppose that scientists predicted with certainty that an 
asteroid were to hit the earth one year from now, wiping out 
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all of humanity. Compare this predicament to learning that 
you have a terminal illness and have one more year to live. 
Does it make a difference to how you would live the remaining 
year of your life? (Samuel Scheffler takes up this issue in Death 
and the Afterlife (2013).)
6. Look at the pictures of Alan Kurdi’s lifeless body in the 
Guardian (2 Sep. 2015). If you were on the editorial team of 
a newspaper, which of the two pictures would you defend 
for publication? If you were Alan Kurdi’s surviving parent, 
would you consent to have either picture published? Why or 
why not? 
7. In the poems ‘Remember’ and ‘Song’ Christina Rossetti tells a 
beloved how she wishes to be remembered after death. What 
is her wish? Can you identify with this sentiment? Would you 
wish for more? Or would you wish for less? 
Chapter 3. Love 
1. Which of the models of love discussed in this chapter are you 
most drawn to? Which one are you least drawn to? Explain. 
What model of love would you like a beloved of yours to see 
you through? What model would you want them to not see 
you through? Explain. 
2. As Yeats’ poem ‘For Anne Gregory’ suggests, people want to 
be loved for themselves. What does this mean? What is it not 
to be loved for oneself? 
3. Comment on the three components of the agape view of love: 
(i) It is through love that one elevates one’s beloved, (ii) 
love is unconditional, and (iii) love is subject to the will and 
hence a matter of commitment. How intertwined are these 
components?
4. In ‘Love’s Bond,’ (Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical 
Meditations, 1989; reprinted in Solomon and Higgins, The 
Philosophy of (Erotic) Love, 1991), Nozick writes: ‘Although 
both see the we as extremely important for the self, most men 
might draw the circle of themselves containing the circle of 
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the we as an aspect within it, while most women might draw 
the circle of themselves within the circle of the we.’ (pp. 74–5 
in Nozick; p. 421 in Solomon and Higgins) Do you think that 
this claim still holds today? 
5. Kahlil Gibran’s ‘On Marriage’ (1923) is a commonly read text 
at wedding ceremonies. In a blog post, ‘Please Don’t Read 
This Poem at Your Wedding’ on the National Catholic Register 
website, Jennifer Fulwiler argues that this is a recipe for 
disaster. Do you agree? Is it possible to form a joint identity 
through love and still retain one’s own identity? What models 
of love underlie Gibran and Fulwiler’s views? 
6. Do you have any sympathy for any of the cynical models of 
love? Do they provide a more truthful and accurate analysis 
of love than the rosier eros, agape, and fusion models? What is 
their place in life? Can they coexist with these models?
7. How have dating apps changed the nature of courtship? Have 
they changed our conception of romantic love? 
Chapter 4. Reconciliation
1. One cannot accept apologies unless apologies are offered. But 
can one forgive, even if no forgiveness is asked for? Can one 
forgive an unrepentant offender? Can one forgive an offender 
who asks for forgiveness but is clearly not intent on changing 
their ways? 
2. Are accepting apologies and forgiving always discretionary? 
Or do we sometimes have an obligation to accept apologies 
and to forgive? 
3. Why might it matter to a repentant offender that a victim 
accepts their apologies or forgives them when they have 
sincerely offered their apologies and have sincerely asked for 
forgiveness? Should it matter? What difference does it make? 
4. Is there any truth to P.G. Wodehouse’s lines: ‘It is a good rule 
in life never to apologize. The right sort of people do not want 
apologies, and the wrong sort take a mean advantage of them’?
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5. There is much discussion recently about reparation payments 
to African Americans for slavery. Are reparation payments 
an appropriate tool to atone for historical wrongdoings? 
For some arguments for and against, read Andre M. Perry 
and Rashawn Ray ‘Why we Need Reparations for Black 
Americans’(Brookings, 2020) and Jeff Jacoby ‘Reparations for 
Slavery are Unworkable—and Unjust’ (Boston Globe, 2019). 
6. Does Zidane’s apology to his fans in his TV interview, after 
the 2008 head-butt against Materazzi constitute a meaningful 
apology? 
Chapter 5. Self-Management 
1. Can you think of any cases in which you adapted your tastes, 
beliefs, or attitudes in response to your circumstances? Do you 
look back on this as a positive move in your life? 
2. What is the difference between hopefulness, wishful thinking 
and self-deception? 
3. If a bit of self-deception makes you happy, then what, if 
anything, might be wrong with it? Why should we believe 
based on the evidence? You might say that we want to have 
true beliefs, but what is so good about true beliefs if they make 
us unhappy? 
4. You may have misgivings about deceiving yourself and trying 
to believe something that you know deep down to be false. 
But would you also object to not wanting to know certain 
things by refusing to consider the evidence? Why would this 
be less objectionable? Can you think of plausible cases? Do 
you think that consciously not wanting to know something 
can sometimes be a good way to proceed in life? 
5. Pascal lays out two routes to religious faith. There is Pascal’s 
wager, and there is the advice to acquire religious beliefs by 
acting as if you already believe, that is, by blessing yourself 
with holy water and going to Mass. Do you find the wager 
a reasonable argument for adopting religious beliefs? Might 
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Pascal’s advice for acquiring religious beliefs work? Would it 
be an acceptable route to religious belief? 
6. What is hipster irony? Is it just a fad? Or might it be a 
worthwhile ideal to strive for? 
7. ‘Being Sexually Submissive Doesn’t Make You A “Bad 
Feminist”’ (HuffPost, 2018) argues that feminism should not 
stop women from embracing submissive sexual desires. Do 
you agree? Are there certain desires that one should try to 
extinguish or cultivate for moral or political reasons? 
Chapter 6. Counsel 
1. The Cicero quote ‘[Gratitude] is not only the greatest virtue, 
but it is also the parent of all the other virtues’ can be found 
in For Plancius, chapter 33. Cicero offers five virtues that are 
spawned by gratitude: (i) filial affection; (ii) good citizenry; 
(iii) piety; (iv) friendship; and (v) kindness. Explain how he 
supports these connections. Do you think that friendship and 
loving relationships require mutual gratitude? 
2. Gratitude is thought to procure joy. We find this idea in E.E. 
Cummings’ poem ‘i thank you God for most this amazing.’ 
We find it in Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley: ‘Gratitude is a divine 
emotion: it fills the heart, but not to bursting; it warms it, but 
not to fever.’ Willie Nelson thought of it as transformative: 
‘Once I started counting my blessings, my whole life turned 
around.’ How is it that gratitude can have a positive effect on 
our emotional well-being? 
3. Gratitude is about not taking favors for granted after the fact. 
Saying ‘please’ is about not taking favors for granted before the 
fact. The Bright Hour: A Memoir of Living and Dying (pp. 75—6) 
is a memoir by Nina Riggs about her last year of life struggling 
with breast cancer. She writes a list to her children’s future 
selves—‘a list they won’t possibly understand for twenty to 
thirty years’—trying to make them see why it’s good to say 
‘please’ in this world. The presentation is quite lyrical, but can 
you state in plain language what reasons she offers? 
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4. Here is an argument that we might hear from an Effective 
Altruist. If we have a well-paying job, we should not be 
volunteering in a soup kitchen. We could work overtime 
instead of working in the soup kitchen and send the money to 
charities that are recommended by Effective Altruist websites, 
such as GiveWell and Giving What We Can. If we have a 
choice between saving one person and saving five people, 
we should clearly do the latter. Similarly, more lives could be 
saved by working overtime and donating to the Anti-Malaria 
Foundation than by working in a local soup kitchen. So, we 
ought to do the former. Is this argument convincing? (A 
similar argument for career choice can be found in William 
MacAskill’s ‘Replaceability, Career Choice, and Making a 
Difference.’) 
5. There is some wisdom in the advice that one regrets not 
trying, more so than one regrets trying and failing. In Gabriel 
García Márquez’s Love in the Time of Cholera, Fermina Daza is 
considering a marriage proposal, and her aunt counsels her: 
‘Tell him yes. […] Even if you are dying of fear, even if you are 
sorry later, because whatever you do, you will be sorry all the 
rest of your life if you say no.’ Can you think of real-life cases in 
which the same reasoning might apply? How does this advice 
square with our discussion of disappointment versus regret?
6. Throughout history, artists have used their art to express their 
pain, ranging from Edvard Munch’s ‘The Scream’ to Demi 
Lovato’s four-part YouTube documentary ‘Dancing with the 
Devil’ about their struggle with addiction. Pick your favorite 
work of art in this vein as an example. What is driving this 
self-expression? How does the public react? What does the 
artist hope to gain? 
7. In ‘Against Catharsis: Writing is not’ (Literary Hub, 2019), T. 
Kira Madden argues that writing is not catharsis. How does 
she conceive of her art? 
8. The African American author and social activist Toni Cade 
Bambara conceives of religion as ‘a technology of living.’ 
Religion incorporates various coping mechanisms that aim to 
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make life manageable and joyful. Now many religions impose 
dietary constraints on their followers. What is the purpose of 
these constraints? Do they serve similar purposes as dietary 
constraints in secular movements? Or are there different 
motivations at work? 
9. What does Tamar Adler find out about Intuitive Eating in ‘All 
You Can Eat? Inside the Intuitive Eating Craze.’ (Vogue, 2020) 
What is driving these ideas? Do you agree?
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